

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

RYAN KARNOSKI, ET AL.

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT*

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
BEFORE JUDGMENT**

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QUESTION PRESENTED

In 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis announced a new policy concerning military service by transgender individuals. Under the Mattis policy, transgender individuals would be permitted to serve in the military, while individuals with a history of a medical condition called gender dysphoria would be disqualified from military service unless they meet certain conditions. The question presented is:

Whether the district court erred in preliminarily enjoining the military from implementing the Mattis policy nationwide.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners (defendants-appellants below) are Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; the United States of America; James Mattis, in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense; and the United States Department of Defense.

Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) are Ryan Karnoski; Cathrine Schmid, Staff Sergeant; D. L., by his next friend and mother, FKA: K. G.; Laura Garza; Human Rights Campaign Fund; Gender Justice League; Lindsey Muller, Chief Warrant Officer; Terece Lewis, Petty Officer First Class; Phillip Stephens, Petty Officer Second Class; Megan Winters, Petty Officer Second Class; Jane Doe; Conner Callahan; and American Military Partner Association. Respondents also include the State of Washington, Attorney General's Office Civil Rights Unit (intervenor-plaintiff-appellee below).

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The Solicitor General, on behalf of President Donald J. Trump, et al., respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the district court granting respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction (App., *infra*, 1a-28a) is not published in the Federal Supplement but is available at 2017 WL 6311305. The order of the district court striking the government's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction (App., *infra*, 36a-72a) is not published in the Federal Supplement but is available at 2018 WL 1784464.

JURISDICTION

On April 13, 2018, the district court struck the government's motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction.

The government filed a notice of appeal on April 30, 2018 (App., *infra*, 73a-74a). The court of appeals’ jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1) and 28 U.S.C. 2101(e).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment to the Constitution provides in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const. Amend. I.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides in pertinent part: “No person shall be * * * deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. V.

STATEMENT

A. The Military’s Policies

1. To assemble a military of “qualified, effective, and able-bodied persons,” 10 U.S.C. 505(a), the Department of Defense (Department) has traditionally set demanding standards for military service, App., *infra*, 116a. “The vast majority of Americans from ages 17 to 24—that is, 71%—are ineligible to join the military without a waiver for mental, medical, or behavioral reasons.” *Id.* at 125a.

Given the “unique mental and emotional stresses of military service,” App., *infra*, 132a, a history of “[m]ost mental health conditions and disorders” is “automatically disqualifying,” *id.* at 151a. In general, the military has aligned the disorders it has deemed disqualifying with those listed in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)*, published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). *Id.* at 132a-133a.

The 1980 edition of the *DSM* listed, among other disorders, “transsexualism.” *Id.* at 133a. When the *DSM* was updated in 1994, “transsexualism” was subsumed within, and replaced by, the term “gender identity disorder.” *Ibid.* (citation omitted); see C.A. E.R. 416.¹

Consistent with the inclusion of “transsexualism” in the *DSM*, the military’s accession standards—the “standards that govern induction into the Armed Forces”—had for decades disqualified individuals with a history of “transsexualism” from joining the military. App., *infra*, 126a-127a; see *id.* at 133a; C.A. E.R. 482. And although the military’s retention standards—the “standards that govern the retention and separation of persons already serving in the Armed Forces”—did not “require” separating “transsexual[]” servicemembers from service, “transsexualism” was a “permissible basis” for doing so. App., *infra*, 127a.

2. In 2013, the APA published a new edition of the *DSM*, which replaced the term “gender identity disorder” with “gender dysphoria.” App., *infra*, 136a. That change reflected the APA’s view that, when there are no “accompanying symptoms of distress, transgender individuals”—individuals who identify with a gender different from their biological sex—do not have “a diagnosable mental disorder.” C.A. E.R. 416; see App., *infra*, 204a.

According to the APA, a diagnosis of gender dysphoria should be reserved for individuals who experience a “marked incongruence between [their] experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender, of at least 6 months’ duration,” associated with “clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or

¹ References to the “C.A. E.R.” are to the excerpts of record filed in the court of appeals in No. 18-35347.

other important areas of functioning.” C.A. E.R. 417; see App., *infra*, 136a-138a. Treatment for gender dysphoria often involves psychotherapy and, in some cases, may include gender transition through cross-sex hormone therapy, sex-reassignment surgery, or living and working in the preferred gender. App., *infra*, 155a-156a; C.A. E.R. 345-346. The APA emphasizes that “[n]ot all transgender people suffer from gender dysphoria.” App., *infra*, 152a (citation omitted; brackets in original). “Conversely, not all persons with gender dysphoria are transgender.” *Id.* at 152a n.57; see *ibid.* (giving the example of men who suffer genital wounds in combat and who “feel that they are no longer men because their bodies do not conform to their concept of manliness”) (citation omitted).

3. In 2015, then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered the creation of a working group to “formulate policy options * * * regarding the military service of transgender Service members,” and instructed the group to “start with the presumption that transgender persons can serve openly without adverse impact on military effectiveness and readiness.” App., *infra*, 84a. As part of that review, the Department commissioned the RAND National Defense Research Institute to conduct a study. *Id.* at 139a. The resulting RAND report concluded that allowing transgender personnel to undergo gender transition and serve in their preferred gender would increase health-care costs and undermine military readiness and unit cohesion, C.A. E.R. 330-331, but that those harms would be “minimal” because only a small percentage of the “total force would seek transition-related care,” *id.* at 331; see *id.* at 408.

In June 2016, following the issuance of the RAND report, Secretary Carter ordered the armed forces to

adopt a new policy on “Military Service of Transgender Service Members.” App., *infra*, 87a. In a shift from the military’s longstanding policy, Secretary Carter declared that “transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve in the military.” *Id.* at 88a. But Secretary Carter recognized the need for “[m]edical standards” to “help to ensure that those entering service are free of medical conditions or physical defects that may require excessive time lost from duty.” *Id.* at 91a. Secretary Carter thus ordered the military to adopt, by July 1, 2017, new accession standards that would “disqualify[]” any applicant with a history of gender dysphoria or a history of medical treatment associated with gender transition (including a history of sex reassignment or genital reconstruction surgery), unless the applicant met certain medical criteria. *Id.* at 92a. An applicant with a history of medical treatment associated with gender transition, for example, would be disqualified unless the applicant provided certification from a licensed medical provider that the applicant had completed all transition-related medical treatment and had been stable in the preferred gender for 18 months. *Ibid.* If the applicant provided the requisite certification, the applicant would be permitted to enter the military and serve in the preferred gender.

Secretary Carter also imposed new retention standards, effective immediately, prohibiting the discharge of any servicemember on the basis of gender identity. App., *infra*, 91a. Under the Carter policy, current servicemembers who received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria from a military medical provider would be permitted to undergo gender transition at government expense and serve in their preferred gender upon completing the transition. C.A. E.R. 219-236; see App., *infra*, 93a.

Transgender servicemembers without a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, by contrast, would be required to continue serving in their biological sex. See App., *infra*, 128a; C.A. E.R. 221-222.

4. On June 30, 2017—the day before the Carter accession standards were set to take effect—Secretary of Defense James Mattis determined, “after consulting with the Service Chiefs and Secretaries,” that it was “necessary to defer” those standards until January 1, 2018, so that the military could “evaluate more carefully” their potential effect “on readiness and lethality.” App., *infra*, 96a. Without “presuppos[ing] the outcome” of that study, Secretary Mattis explained that it was his intent to obtain “the views of the military leadership and of the senior civilian officials who are now arriving in the Department” and to “continue to treat all Service members with dignity and respect.” *Id.* at 97a.

While that study was ongoing, the President stated on Twitter on July 26, 2017, that “the United States Government will not accept or allow” “Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” App., *infra*, 98a. The President issued a memorandum in August 2017 noting the ongoing study and directing the military to “return to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016 until such time as a sufficient basis exists upon which to conclude that terminating that policy and practice would not have * * * negative effects” on the military. *Id.* at 100a. The President ordered Secretary Mattis to submit “a plan for implementing” a return to the longstanding pre-Carter policy by February 2018, while emphasizing that the Secretary could “advise [him] at any time, in writing, that a change to th[at] policy is warranted.” *Id.* at 100a-101a.

5. Secretary Mattis established a panel of experts to “conduct an independent multi-disciplinary review and study of relevant data and information pertaining to transgender Service members.” App., *infra*, 106a. The panel consisted of “senior uniformed and civilian Defense Department and U.S. Coast Guard leaders.” *Id.* at 205a. After “extensive review and deliberation” over several months—including input from transgender servicemembers—the panel “exercised its professional military judgment” and presented its independent recommendations to the Secretary. *Id.* at 148a.

In February 2018, Secretary Mattis sent the President a memorandum proposing a new policy consistent with the panel’s conclusions, along with a lengthy report explaining the policy. App., *infra*, 113a-209a. Like the Carter policy, the Mattis policy holds that “transgender persons should not be disqualified from service solely on account of their transgender status.” *Id.* at 149a. And like the Carter policy, the Mattis policy draws distinctions on the basis of a medical condition (gender dysphoria) and related treatment (gender transition). *Id.* at 207a-208a. Under the Mattis policy—as under the Carter policy—transgender individuals without a history of gender dysphoria would be required to serve in their biological sex, whereas individuals with a history of gender dysphoria would be presumptively disqualified from service. *Ibid.* The two policies differ in their exceptions to that disqualification.

Under the Mattis accession standards, individuals with a history of gender dysphoria would be permitted to join the military if they have not undergone gender transition, are willing and able to serve in their biological sex, and can show 36 months of stability (*i.e.*, the absence of gender dysphoria) before joining. App., *infra*,

123a. Under the Mattis retention standards, service-members who are diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering service would be permitted to continue serving if they do not seek to undergo gender transition, are willing and able to serve in their biological sex, and are able to meet applicable deployability requirements. *Id.* at 123a-124a.

Under both the accession and the retention standards of the Mattis policy, individuals with gender dysphoria who have undergone gender transition or seek to do so would be ineligible to serve, unless they obtain a waiver. App., *infra*, 123a. The Mattis policy, however, contains a categorical reliance exemption for “transgender Service members who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria and either entered or remained in service following the announcement of the Carter policy.” *Id.* at 200a. Under that exemption, those servicemembers “who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a military medical provider after the effective date of the Carter policy, but before the effective date of any new policy, may continue to receive all medically necessary treatment * * * and to serve in their preferred gender, even after the new policy commences.” *Ibid.* The Department has since confirmed that the exemption would also extend to any servicemember “who was diagnosed with gender dysphoria prior to the effective date of the Carter policy and has continued to serve and receive treatment pursuant to the Carter policy after it took effect.” C.A. E.R. 489.

6. In March 2018, the President issued a new memorandum “revok[ing]” his 2017 memorandum “and any other directive [he] may have made with respect to military service by transgender individuals.” App., *infra*, 211a. The 2018 memorandum recognized that the

Mattis policy reflected “the exercise of [Secretary Mattis’s] independent judgment,” and it permitted the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security “to implement” that new policy. *Id.* at 210a-211a.

B. Procedural History

1. Shortly after the President issued his 2017 memorandum, respondents—current and aspiring service-members as well as various advocacy organizations—brought suit in the Western District of Washington, challenging as a violation of equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment what they described as “the Ban” on military service by transgender individuals reflected in the President’s 2017 tweets and memorandum. C.A. E.R. 118; see *id.* at 117-156. The State of Washington subsequently intervened in the suit as a plaintiff. *Id.* at 55-62, 108-116.

Similar suits were filed in the Central District of California and in the District of Columbia. See *Stockman v. Trump*, No. 17-cv-1799 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2017); *Doe v. Trump*, No. 17-cv-1597 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 9, 2017). A summary of the proceedings in the suit filed in the Western District of Washington (*Karnoski*) follows. A summary of the proceedings in the other suits can be found in the government’s petitions for writs of certiorari before judgment in those cases, filed simultaneously with this petition.²

² A similar suit was also filed in the District of Maryland. See *Stone v. Trump*, No. 17-cv-2459 (D. Md. filed Aug. 28, 2017). Like the district courts in the other suits, the district court in *Stone* issued a nationwide preliminary injunction requiring the military to maintain and implement the Carter retention and accession standards. See *Stone v. Trump*, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D. Md. 2017). Unlike the other district courts, however, the district court in *Stone*

2. In December 2017, the district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction, enjoining the military “from taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump’s July 26, 2017 announcement” on Twitter. App., *infra*, 27a.

The district court construed the President’s 2017 tweets and memorandum as “unilaterally proclaim[ing] a prohibition on transgender service members.” App., *infra*, 16a. The court determined that respondents were likely to succeed in challenging that prohibition on equal-protection, substantive-due-process, and First Amendment grounds. *Id.* at 18a. With respect to respondents’ equal-protection claim, the court reasoned that the policy set forth in the President’s 2017 memorandum “distinguish[ed] on the basis of transgender status, a quasi-suspect classification, and [wa]s therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny.” *Id.* at 19a. The court determined that the policy did not survive such scrutiny because its justifications were “contradicted by the studies, conclusions, and judgment of the military” in adopting the Carter policy. *Id.* at 20a (citation and emphasis omitted). With respect to respondent’s substantive-due-process claim, the court determined that the President’s policy “directly interfere[d]” with respondents’ “fundamental right” to “define and express their gender identity” by “depriving them of employment and career opportunities.” *Id.* at 23a. And with respect to re-

has yet to rule on the government’s motion to dissolve that injunction, which the government filed in March 2018, after the President revoked his 2017 memorandum and permitted the military to implement the Mattis policy. See Gov’t Mot. to Dissolve the Prelim. Inj., *Stone, supra* (No. 17-cv-2459) (Mar. 23, 2018).

spondents' First Amendment claim, the court determined that the President's policy was an impermissible "content-based restriction" that "penalize[d] transgender service members * * * for disclosing their gender identity." *Id.* at 24a.

The district court subsequently clarified that maintaining the "status quo" under its injunction required implementing the Carter accession standards by January 1, 2018. App., *infra*, 31a. The government filed an appeal but dismissed it after the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit denied the government's requests for partial stays of similar nationwide injunctions in *Doe* and *Stone*. See *Doe 1 v. Trump*, No. 17-5267, 2017 WL 6553389 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017) (per curiam); *Stone v. Trump*, No. 17-2398, 2017 WL 9732004 (4th Cir. Dec. 21, 2017); 17-36009 C.A. Doc. 21, at 1 (Dec. 29, 2017). Absent a stay of those injunctions, the military would be forced to implement the Carter accession standards in any event. The government also expected that Secretary Mattis would soon be proposing a final policy that would render moot any appeal of the December 2017 injunction.

3. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the district court. See D. Ct. Doc. 129 (Jan. 25, 2018); D. Ct. Doc. 150 (Jan. 25, 2018); D. Ct. Doc. 194 (Feb. 28, 2018). Then, in March 2018, the government informed the court that the President had issued the new memorandum, which revoked his 2017 memorandum (and any similar directive) and allowed the military to adopt Secretary Mattis's proposed policy. D. Ct. Doc. 223, at 3 (Mar. 29, 2018); see D. Ct. Doc. 213 (Mar. 23, 2018). In light of that new policy, the government moved to dissolve the December 2017 injunction. D. Ct. Doc. 223, at 1-27.

In April 2018, the district court ruled on the pending motions. App., *infra*, 36a-72a. The court struck the government’s motion to dissolve, *id.* at 72a, and extended the injunction to enjoin the Mattis policy.³ The court characterized the Mattis policy as simply “a plan to implement” the “ban on military service by openly transgender people” that the President had supposedly announced in his 2017 tweets and memorandum. *Id.* at 37a; see *id.* at 38a n.1, 49a-50a. The court upheld respondents’ standing to challenge that “Ban.” *Id.* at 52a-59a. And despite having previously found “transgender people” to be “a quasi-suspect class,” the court concluded that they are “a suspect class,” *id.* at 59a, such that “[t]he Ban * * * must satisfy strict scrutiny if it is to survive,” *id.* at 64a.

The district court declined, however, to grant in full respondents’ motions for summary judgment. App., *infra*, 36a-37a. The court identified “an unresolved question of fact” regarding whether the “justifications for the Ban” found in the Mattis policy were entitled to “deference.” *Id.* at 66a. The court stated that it could not determine, “[o]n the present record,” “whether the [Department’s] deliberative process—including the timing and thoroughness of its study and the soundness of the medical and other evidence it relied upon—is of the type to which Courts typically should defer.” *Id.* at 66a-67a. The court also reasoned that “facts related to Defendants’ deliberative process” would be necessary to determine “[w]hether Defendants have satisfied their burden

³ The district court granted the government’s cross-motion for summary judgment “with respect to injunctive relief against President Trump,” but stated that “[t]he preliminary injunction previously entered otherwise remains in full force and effect.” App., *infra*, 71a; see *id.* at 37a (“[T]he preliminary injunction will remain in effect.”).

of showing that the Ban is constitutionally adequate (*i.e.*, that it was sincerely motivated by compelling state interests, rather than by prejudice or stereotype).” *Id.* at 68a. The court therefore directed the parties “to proceed with discovery and prepare for trial on the issues of whether, and to what extent, deference is owed to the Ban and whether the Ban violates equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment.” *Id.* at 72a.

4. The government promptly appealed and sought a stay of the preliminary injunction from the district court. App., *infra*, 73a-74a; D. Ct. Doc. 238 (Apr. 30, 2018). After the court rejected the government’s request for an expedited ruling, D. Ct. Doc. 240, at 1 (May 2, 2018); see D. Ct. Doc. 238, at 6, the government filed a stay motion in the court of appeals, 18-35347 C.A. Doc. 3-1 (May 4, 2018).

For six weeks, neither court acted on the government’s request for a stay. Then, in June 2018, more than two months after having extended the injunction, the district court denied the government’s stay motion. App., *infra*, 75a-81a. After another month passed and the parties finished briefing the merits of the appeal on an expedited basis, see 9th Cir. R. 3-3, the court of appeals likewise denied a stay, App., *infra*, 82a-83a, and notified the parties that it had scheduled oral argument in the case for October 2018, 18-35347 C.A. Doc. 92 (July 20, 2018).

The following business day, the government asked the court of appeals to expedite the date of oral argument. 18-35347 C.A. Doc. 93 (July 23, 2018). The government explained that “[e]xpedition is all the more necessary now that [the court] has denied the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal.” *Id.* at 4. The government urged the court to resolve the appeal as

soon as possible because the injunction requires the military to maintain a policy that, in its own professional judgment, risks undermining readiness, disrupting unit cohesion, and weakening military effectiveness and lethality. *Ibid.* The government also emphasized that, absent expedition, it would “be difficult for the government, if it loses the appeal, to seek and obtain review during the Supreme Court’s 2018 Term.” *Ibid.*

The court of appeals denied the government’s request for expedition, 18-35347 C.A. Doc. 102 (Aug. 6, 2018), and heard oral argument on October 10, 2018, 18-35347 C.A. Docket entry No. 119 (Oct. 10, 2018).⁴ The court has not yet issued a decision as of the printing of this petition.⁵

⁴ On the same day that it heard argument in the government’s preliminary-injunction appeal, the court of appeals also heard argument on the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking vacatur of an order of the district court requiring the Executive Branch to produce a detailed privilege log of presidential communications and disclose many thousands of documents withheld under the deliberative-process privilege. 18-72159 C.A. Docket entry No. 43 (Oct. 10, 2018). After the government filed an application in this Court seeking a stay of the district court’s order pending disposition of the government’s mandamus petition, see *Trump v. United States Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Wash.*, No. 18A276 (Sept. 14, 2018), the court of appeals granted a stay, 18-72159 C.A. Doc. 36 (Sept. 17, 2018), and the government withdrew its stay application in this Court. The court of appeals has not yet ruled on the government’s mandamus petition.

⁵ On November 7, 2018, the government informed the court of appeals that, “in order to preserve th[is] Court’s ability to hear and decide the case this Term,” it intended to file a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment on November 23 if the court of appeals had not issued its judgment by then. 18-35347 C.A. Doc. 124, at 1-2. As explained more fully in a letter filed simultaneously with this petition, the government’s filing of the petition on November 23 would

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This case and related cases in California and the District of Columbia involve constitutional challenges to a policy that Secretary Mattis announced earlier this year after an extensive review of military service by transgender individuals. In arriving at that new policy, Secretary Mattis and a panel of senior military leaders and other experts determined that the prior policy, adopted by Secretary Carter, posed too great a risk to military effectiveness and lethality. As a result of nationwide preliminary injunctions issued by various district courts, however, the military has been forced to maintain that prior policy for nearly a year. And absent this Court's prompt intervention, it is unlikely that the military will be able to implement its new policy any time soon.

Accordingly, the government is filing this petition and two other petitions for writs of certiorari before judgment to the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, which have before them a total of three injunctions enjoining the military from implementing the Mattis policy nationwide. The decisions imposing those injunctions are wrong, and they warrant this Court's immediate review. The government presents each of the petitions to ensure that the Court has an adequate vehicle in which to resolve the question presented in a timely and definitive manner. The government respectfully submits that the Court should grant the petitions for writs of certiorari

allow the petition to be distributed on December 26, 2018, for consideration at the Court's January 11, 2019 conference, without a motion for expedition.

before judgment, consolidate the cases for decision, and consider this important dispute this Term.⁶

I. THE QUESTION PRESENTED WARRANTS THIS COURT'S IMMEDIATE REVIEW

Congress has vested this Court with jurisdiction to review “[c]ases in the courts of appeals * * * [b]y writ of certiorari * * * *before or* after rendition of judgment or decree.” 28 U.S.C. 1254(1) (emphasis added). “An application * * * for a writ of certiorari to review a case before judgment has been rendered in the court of appeals may be made at any time before judgment.” 28 U.S.C. 2101(e). This Court will grant certiorari before judgment “only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 11.

This case satisfies that standard. It involves an issue of imperative public importance: the authority of the U.S. military to determine who may serve in the Nation’s armed forces. After an extensive process of consultation and review involving senior military officials

⁶ The government has previously sought stays in the lower courts of the preliminary injunction in this case, and the government intends to do the same in *Stockman* and *Doe*. In the event that the lower courts do not stay the injunctions, the government intends to file applications in this Court, seeking, as an alternative to certiorari before judgment, stays of the injunctions or, at a minimum, stays of the nationwide scope of the injunctions. Should the Court decline to grant certiorari before judgment, such stays would at least allow the military to implement the Mattis policy in whole or in part while litigation proceeds through the Court’s 2019 Term. Either way, whether through certiorari before judgment or stays of the injunctions, what is of paramount importance is permitting the Secretary of Defense to implement the policy that, in his judgment after consultation with experts, best serves the military’s interests.

and other experts, the Secretary of Defense determined that individuals with a history of a medical condition called gender dysphoria should be presumptively disqualified from military service, particularly if they have undergone the treatment of gender transition or seek to do so. See pp. 7-8, *supra*. The district court in this case entered a nationwide preliminary injunction nullifying that exercise of professional military judgment and blocking the implementation of a policy that the Secretary has deemed necessary to “place the Department of Defense in the strongest position to protect the American people, to fight and win America’s wars, and to ensure the survival and success of our Service members around the world.” App., *infra*, 208a; see *Goldman v. Weinberger*, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (“[C]ourts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.”).

Although the government has appealed the district court’s injunction, an immediate grant of certiorari is warranted to ensure that the injunction does not remain in place any longer than is necessary. Even if the government were immediately to seek certiorari from an adverse decision of the court of appeals, this Court would not be able to review that decision in the ordinary course until next Term at the earliest. And even if the government were to prevail in the Ninth Circuit—where two appeals are pending—the government would still need to proceed with its appeal before the D.C. Circuit. And even then, the government would still be subject to a fourth nationwide preliminary injunction, issued by the district court in Maryland. See *Stone v. Trump*, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D. Md. 2017). Although the government moved eight months ago to dissolve

that injunction in light of the new Mattis policy, the district court in Maryland has not ruled on the government's pending motion. See p. 9 n.2, *supra*.

Absent an immediate grant of certiorari, there is thus little chance of a prompt resolution of the validity of Secretary Mattis's proposed policy. And so long as this or any other injunction remains in place, the military will be forced nationwide to maintain the Carter policy—a policy that the military has concluded poses a threat to “readiness, good order and discipline, sound leadership, and unit cohesion,” which “are essential to military effectiveness and lethality.” App., *infra*, 197a; see *id.* at 206a (stating that the Carter policy poses “substantial risks” and threatens to “undermine readiness, disrupt unit cohesion, and impose an unreasonable burden on the military that is not conducive to military effectiveness and lethality”); *id.* at 202a (explaining that the “risks” associated with maintaining the Carter policy should not be incurred “given the Department’s grave responsibility to fight and win the Nation’s wars in a manner that maximizes the effectiveness, lethality, and survivability” of servicemembers).

This Court has previously granted certiorari before judgment to promptly resolve important and time-sensitive disputes. See, e.g., *Dames & Moore v. Regan*, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981); *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 686-687 (1974); *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 584 (1952); cf. Stephen M. Shapiro et al., *Supreme Court Practice* § 4.20, at 287-288 (10th ed. 2013) (collecting cases where “[t]he public interest in a speedy determination” warranted certiorari before judgment). The Court should follow the same course here and grant this petition.

II. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG

Review is also warranted because the district court erred in enjoining implementation of the Mattis policy nationwide. Respondents' constitutional challenges to the Mattis policy lack merit, and in any event, the injunction is vastly overbroad.

A. The Mattis Policy Is Consistent With Equal Protection

1. For decades, transgender status alone was a basis for disqualification from military service. See pp. 2-3, *supra*. The Mattis policy departs from that practice. Under the Mattis policy, individuals may “not be disqualified from service solely on account of their transgender status.” App., *infra*, 149a.

Like Secretary Carter before him, however, Secretary Mattis recognized the need for “[m]edical standards” to “help to ensure that those entering service are free of medical conditions or physical defects that may require excessive time lost from duty.” App., *infra*, 91a. Thus, under the Mattis policy, as under the Carter policy before it, a history of gender dysphoria would be presumptively disqualifying. *Id.* at 92a, 121a-124a. Because the Mattis policy turns on a medical condition (gender dysphoria) and related treatment (gender transition)—not any suspect or quasi-suspect classification—the policy is subject only to rational-basis review. See, *e.g.*, *Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett*, 531 U.S. 356, 365-368 (2001).

A more searching form of review would be particularly inappropriate given the military context in which the policy arises. This Court has long accorded “a healthy deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs.” *Rostker v. Goldberg*, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981). That deference reflects the recognition “[n]ot only” that “courts [are] ‘ill-equipped

to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have,” but also that “military authorities have been charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with carrying out our Nation’s military policy.” *Goldman*, 475 U.S. at 507-508 (citation omitted); see *Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (explaining that “complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition * * * of a military force” are “essentially professional military judgments”) (citation omitted). The Mattis policy would thus warrant deferential review even if an analogous policy in the civilian context would call for closer scrutiny. See *Rostker*, 453 U.S. at 67 (“[T]he tests and limitations to be applied may differ because of the military context.”); cf. *Goldman*, 475 U.S. at 507 (explaining that judicial “review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society”).

2. The Mattis policy satisfies the deferential standard that applies here. As explained, the Mattis policy would disqualify individuals with a history of gender dysphoria, unless they meet certain criteria. App., *infra*, 121a-124a. Gender dysphoria is a medical condition recognized by the APA and defined by “clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” C.A. E.R. 417. In presumptively disqualifying individuals with a history of this condition from service, the Mattis policy serves the same compelling interest as the Carter policy: ensuring that those serving in the armed forces are “free of medical conditions or physical defects that may require excessive time lost from duty.” App., *infra*, 91a, 130a.

It is true that the Mattis and the Carter policies differ in the circumstances under which they would permit individuals with a history of gender dysphoria to serve. The Carter policy, for example, allows certain individuals who have undergone gender transition to enter the military and serve in their preferred gender; it likewise allows current servicemembers with gender dysphoria to serve in their preferred gender upon transitioning. App., *infra*, 92-93a.⁷ The Mattis policy, by contrast, would disqualify from service any individual who has undergone gender transition or seeks to do so, unless that individual obtains a waiver or falls within the reliance exemption. *Id.* at 122a-124a.

Those differences, however, are of no constitutional significance. That is because the Mattis policy reflects the military’s reasoned and considered judgment that “making accommodations for gender transition” would “not [be] conducive to, and would likely undermine, the inputs—readiness, good order and discipline, sound leadership, and unit cohesion—that are essential to military effectiveness and lethality.” App., *infra*, 197a; see *id.* at 122a. For three reasons, the Department concluded that individuals with a history of gender dysphoria who seek or have undergone “gender transition generally should not be eligible for accession or retention in the Armed Forces absent a waiver.” *Id.* at 197a-198a.

First, the Department found that accommodating gender transition as a treatment for gender dysphoria would “present a significant challenge for unit readiness.” App., *infra*, 185a. The Department noted the

⁷ Under the Carter policy, transgender servicemembers *without* a diagnosis of gender dysphoria would be required to serve in their biological sex; they would *not* be permitted to serve in their preferred gender. See App., *infra*, 128a; C.A. E.R. 221-222.

existence of “considerable scientific uncertainty” concerning whether transition-related treatment, such as cross-sex hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery, “fully remedy * * * the mental health problems associated with gender dysphoria.” *Id.* at 178a; see *id.* at 155a-166a. The Department reasoned, however, that even if such treatment could fully remedy the “serious problems associated with gender dysphoria,” most servicemembers undergoing such treatment could be rendered “non-deployable for a potentially significant amount of time.” *Id.* at 184a-185a. The Department noted, for example, that some servicemembers would have to leave their “theater of operations” to be able to undergo transition-related therapy or surgery. *Id.* at 179a.

Second, the Department determined that accommodating gender transition as a treatment for gender dysphoria would be incompatible with sex-based standards governing various aspects of military life. App., *infra*, 185a. The military maintains separate berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities for each sex. *Ibid.* The Department was concerned that allowing individuals who retained the anatomy of their biological sex to use the facilities of their preferred gender “would invade the expectations of privacy” of the other servicemembers sharing those facilities. *Id.* at 188a; see *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 550 n.19 (1996) (recognizing that it is “necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements”). The military also maintains different sets of physical-fitness, body-fat, uniform, and grooming standards for biological males and biological females. App., *infra*, 185a. The Department was concerned, among other things, that allowing a “biological male” to “compete

against females in gender-specific physical training” would pose a serious safety risk and generate perceptions of unfairness, *id.* at 174a-175a; see *id.* at 171a, thus undermining “unit cohesion and good order and discipline,” *id.* at 185a; see *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 550 n.19 (acknowledging that it is “necessary” to “adjust aspects of the physical training programs” for servicemembers to address biological differences between the sexes).

Third, the Department determined that accommodating gender transition as a treatment for gender dysphoria would be “disproportionately costly on a per capita basis.” App., *infra*, 196a. That determination rested on the Department’s own experience under the Carter policy. *Ibid.* The Department explained that, since implementation of the Carter policy, medical costs for servicemembers with gender dysphoria had increased nearly 300% compared to servicemembers without gender dysphoria. *Ibid.* Several commanders had also reported that providing servicemembers in their units with transition-related treatment required the use of “operations and maintenance funds to pay for * * * extensive travel throughout the United States to obtain specialized medical care.” *Id.* at 197a. Particularly “in light of the absence of solid scientific support for the efficacy of [transition-related] treatment,” the Department found the costs of accommodating gender transition disproportionate. *Id.* at 196a.

In concluding that individuals with a history of gender dysphoria who seek or have undergone gender transition generally should not be eligible for accession or retention in the military, the Department specifically considered—and rejected—the Carter policy’s contrary approach to gender transition. App., *infra*, 120a, 168a-

169a, 173a, 202a-203a. That “studied choice of one alternative in preference to another,” *Rostker*, 453 U.S. at 72, in light of “military operations and needs,” *id.* at 68, is precisely the type of judgment deserving of deference, *ibid.* The Department’s decision to replace the Carter policy with the Mattis policy was thus a decision well within constitutional bounds. Given the close fit between the military’s reasons for not accommodating gender transition and the military’s compelling interests in readiness, unit cohesion, good order and discipline, and effectiveness, the Mattis policy would satisfy constitutional review under even a heightened level of scrutiny.

3. In enjoining the military from implementing the Mattis policy, the district court here failed to consider that policy on its own terms. Instead, the court characterized the Mattis policy as simply “a plan to implement” the “ban on military service by openly transgender people” that the President supposedly announced in his 2017 tweets and memorandum. App., *infra*, 37a. But the Mattis policy would not ban military service by openly transgender people. Quite the opposite, the Mattis policy reflects the Department’s conclusion that “transgender persons should *not* be disqualified from service solely on account of their transgender status.” *Id.* at 149a (emphasis added). That is why the President had to “revoke” his 2017 memorandum and “any other directive [he] may have made with respect to military service by transgender individuals” to allow the military to implement the Mattis policy. *Id.* at 211a; see *id.* at 208a-209a. That policy, moreover, reflects the exercise of Secretary Mattis’s “independent judgment,” *id.* at 210a, following an “independent multi-disciplinary review” by a panel of experts, *id.* at 106a. The district

court erred in failing to consider the Mattis policy on its own terms.

B. The Mattis Policy Does Not Violate Respondents' Due Process Or First Amendment Rights

Respondents' substantive-due-process and First Amendment challenges likewise lack merit. The Mattis policy satisfies the deferential review that applies to such challenges. See, e.g., *Goldman*, 475 U.S. at 507; *Brown v. Glines*, 444 U.S. 348, 353-359 (1980).

With respect to their substantive-due-process claim, respondents cannot point to any fundamental right that the Mattis policy implicates. There is no fundamental right to serve in the military, much less to do so in a particular manner. As for their First Amendment claim, respondents cannot point to any restriction on speech. Like the Carter policy before it, the Mattis policy turns not on speech, but on a medical condition and related treatment. Taken to their logical conclusion, respondents' claims would mean that the Carter policy itself violates the substantive-due-process and First Amendment rights of the transgender individuals it precludes from either serving in their preferred gender or serving at all, see pp. 5-6, *supra*—and yet the district court in this case, at respondents' request, ordered the military to maintain that policy.

C. The Nationwide Injunction Against The Mattis Policy Is Vastly Overbroad

The district court further erred in enjoining the implementation of the Mattis policy on a nationwide basis. See *Gill v. Whitford*, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018) (“The Court’s constitutionally prescribed role is to vindicate the individual rights of the people appearing before it.”); *Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2429 (2018)

(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[U]niversal injunctions are legally and historically dubious.”).

Both Article III and equitable principles require that injunctive relief be limited to redressing a plaintiff’s own injuries stemming from a violation of his own rights. “[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross,” and “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing * * * for each form of relief that is sought.” *Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (citations omitted). The remedy sought thus “must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.” *Whitford*, 138 S. Ct. at 1931 (quoting *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)); see *id.* at 1934 (“A plaintiff’s remedy must be tailored to redress the plaintiff’s particular injury.”). Principles of equity independently require that injunctions be no broader than “necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” *Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc.*, 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citation omitted); see *Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. at 2426 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that universal injunctions “do not seem to comply” with “longstanding principles of equity”). That is especially so in the context of military affairs and national security.

This Court has previously stayed a nationwide injunction against a military policy to the extent it swept beyond the parties to the case. *United States Dep’t of Def. v. Meinhold*, 510 U.S. 939 (1993). Indeed, this case is materially indistinguishable from *Meinhold*, which involved a facial constitutional challenge by a discharged Navy servicemember to the Department’s “then-existing policy regarding homosexuals.” *Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Def.*, 34 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994). After the district court enjoined the Department from

“taking any actions against gay or lesbian servicemembers based on their sexual orientation” nationwide, this Court stayed that order “to the extent it conferred relief on persons other than Meinhold.” *Ibid.*; see *Meinhold*, 510 U.S. at 939. The Court’s grant of a stay in *Meinhold* reflects the principle that injunctive relief should not extend beyond the parties to the case.

III. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IN ALL THREE CASES

To ensure an adequate vehicle for the timely and definitive resolution of this overall dispute, the Court should grant the government’s petitions in *Karnoski*, *Doe*, and *Stockman*, and consolidate the cases for further review.

Karnoski is before the Ninth Circuit. In issuing the injunction in *Karnoski*, the district court determined that respondents are likely to succeed on their equal-protection, substantive-due-process, and First Amendment claims. A grant of certiorari before judgment in *Karnoski* would therefore bring before this Court all the relevant claims. Accordingly, the petition in *Karnoski* should be granted.

Doe is before the D.C. Circuit. In issuing the injunction in *Doe*, the district court addressed only respondents’ equal-protection claim. But to ensure that no developments in the Ninth Circuit between the filing of these petitions and the Court’s resolution of these cases undermine the Court’s ability to address the equal-protection challenge to the Mattis policy, the government respectfully submits that the Court should also issue a writ of certiorari to the D.C. Circuit.

Stockman, like *Karnoski*, is before the Ninth Circuit. In issuing the injunction in *Stockman*, the district court addressed only respondents’ equal-protection

claim. Because an order vacating the injunctions issued in the other cases would have no practical consequence unless the injunction in *Stockman* were similarly vacated, the Court should at least hold the petition in *Stockman* pending disposition of the other two petitions and any further proceedings in this Court.⁸ But to ensure that no intervening developments in the lower courts—for example, vacatur of the preliminary injunctions in *Karnoski* and *Doe*—deprive this Court of an adequate vehicle, the government respectfully submits that the Court should also grant certiorari in *Stockman*.

⁸ If this Court were to vacate the injunctions in these cases in whole or in part, that decision would be binding precedent requiring the district court to similarly vacate the injunction in *Stone*.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

Case No. C17-1297-MJP

RYAN KARNOSKI, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Filed: Dec. 11, 2017

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Ryan Karnoski, et al.'s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 32) and Defendants Donald J. Trump, et al.'s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 69). Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Defendant President Donald J. Trump's Presidential Memorandum excluding transgender individuals from the military. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs lack standing, that their claims are neither properly plead nor ripe for review, and that they are not entitled to injunctive relief. Having reviewed the Motions (Dkt. Nos. 32, 69), the Responses (Dkt. Nos. 69,

84), the Replies (Dkt. Nos. 84, 90), and all related papers, and having considered the arguments made in proceedings before the Court, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

ORDER SUMMARY

On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced on Twitter that “the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” A Presidential Memorandum followed, directing the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to “return” to the military’s policy authorizing the discharge of openly transgender service members (the “Retention Directive”); to prohibit the accession (bringing into service) of openly transgender individuals (the “Accession Directive”); and to prohibit the funding of certain surgical procedures for transgender service members (the “Medical Care Directive”). Plaintiffs filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the policy prohibiting military service by openly transgender individuals. Plaintiffs contend the policy violates their equal protection and due process rights and their rights under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs include transgender individuals currently serving in the military and seeking to join the military; the Human Rights Campaign, the Gender Justice League, and the American Military Partner Association; and the State of Washington. Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent implementation of the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum, and Defendants have moved to dismiss.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action, and that their claims for violation of equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment are properly plead and ripe for resolution. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' claim for violation of procedural due process is defective. The Court finds that the policy prohibiting openly transgender individuals from serving in the military is likely unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

BACKGROUND

I. Presidential Memorandum and Interim Guidance

On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced on Twitter that the United States government will no longer allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the military. (Dkt. No. 34, Ex. 6.) President Trump's announcement read as follows:

 **Donald J. Trump**  @realDonaldTrump · 4h
....victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail. Thank you

 39K  25K  73K 

 **Donald J. Trump**  @realDonaldTrump · 4h
....Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming.....

 24K  27K  71K 

 **Donald J. Trump**  @realDonaldTrump · 4h
After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government will not accept or allow.....

 14K  26K  66K 

Thereafter, President Trump issued a memorandum (the “Presidential Memorandum”) directing the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to “return” to the military’s policy authorizing the discharge of openly transgender service members (the “Retention Directive”); to prohibit the accession (bringing into service) of openly transgender individuals (the “Accession Directive”); and to prohibit the funding of certain surgical procedures for transgender service members (the “Medical Care Directive”). (*Id.* at §§ 1-3.) The Accession Directive takes effect on January 1, 2018; the Retention and Medical Care Directives take effect on March 23, 2018. (*Id.* at § 3.)

On September 14, 2017, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis issued a memorandum providing interim guidance to the military (the “Interim Guidance”). (Dkt. No. 69, Ex. 1.) The Interim Guidance identified the intent of the Department of Defense (“DoD”) to “carry out the President’s policy and directives” and to identify “a plan to implement the policy and directives in the Presidential Memorandum.” (*Id.* at 2.) The Interim Guidance explained that transgender individuals would be prohibited from accession effective immediately. (*Id.* at 3.)

II. Policy on Transgender Service Members Prior to July 26, 2017

Prior to President Trump’s announcement, the military concluded that transgender individuals should be permitted to serve openly and was in the process of implementing a policy to this effect (the “June 2016 Policy”). (Dkt. Nos. 32 at 9-10; 46 at ¶¶ 8-27; 48 at ¶¶ 8-36, Ex. C.) The June 2016 Policy was preceded by extensive research, including an independent study to evaluate the implications of military service by transgender

individuals. (Dkt. Nos. 30 at ¶¶ 159-162; 32 at 9-10; 46 at ¶ 11.) This study concluded that allowing transgender individuals to serve would not negatively impact military effectiveness, readiness, or unit cohesion, and that the costs of providing transgender service members with transition-related healthcare would be “exceedingly small” compared with DoD’s overall healthcare expenditures. (Dkt. No. 32 at 30; 46 at ¶¶ 15-20.) After consulting with medical experts, personnel experts, readiness experts, commanders whose units included transgender service members, and others, the working group concluded that transgender individuals should be allowed to serve openly. (Dkt. Nos. 30 at ¶ 161; 46 at ¶ 10.) The Secretary of Defense issued a directive-type memorandum on June 30, 2016 affirming that “service in the United States military should be open to all who can meet the rigorous standards for military service and readiness,” including transgender individuals. (Dkt. No. 48, Ex. C.) The memorandum established procedures for accession, retention, in-service transition, and medical coverage, and provided that “[e]ffective immediately, no otherwise qualified Service member may be involuntarily separated, discharged or denied reenlistment or continuation of service, solely on the basis of their gender identity.” (*Id.*) Relying upon the June 2016 Policy, transgender service members disclosed their transgender status to the military and were serving openly at the time of President Trump’s announcement. (*See* Dkt. Nos. 30 at ¶¶ 101-102, 112-114; 48 at ¶ 37.)

III. Plaintiffs Challenge to the Presidential Memorandum

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the policy prohibiting military service by openly transgender individuals and seek declaratory and injunctive relief.¹ (Dkt. No. 30 at 39.) Plaintiffs contend the policy violates their equal protection and due process rights, and their rights under the First Amendment. (Id. at ¶¶ 214-238.)

Plaintiffs include nine individuals (the “Individual Plaintiffs”), three organizations (the “Organizational Plaintiffs”), and Washington State. (See id. at ¶¶ 7-18; Dkt. No. 101.) Plaintiffs Ryan Karnoski, D.L., and Connor Callahan seek to pursue a military career, and contend that the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum forecloses this opportunity. (Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 38-49, 64-73, 130-139.) Plaintiffs Staff Sergeant Cathrine Schmid, Chief Warrant Officer Lindsey Muller, Petty Officer First Class Terece Lewis, Petty Officer Second Class Phillip Stephens, and Petty Officer Second Class Megan Winters currently serve openly in the military. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-63, 74-120.) Plaintiff Jane Doe currently serves in the military, but does not serve openly. (Id. at ¶¶ 121-129.) The Human Rights Campaign (“HRC”), the Gender Justice League (“GJL”), and

¹ Plaintiffs’ suit is one of four lawsuits filed in response to President Trump’s policy prohibiting transgender individuals from serving openly. See Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17-1597 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Aug. 9, 2017); Stone v. Trump, No. MJG-17-2459 (D. Md. filed Aug. 8, 2017); Stockman v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1799-JGB-KK (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2017). The District Courts for the Districts of Columbia and Maryland have issued preliminary injunctions suspending enforcement of the policy. See Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017); Stone, 2017 WL 5589122 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2017).

the American Military Partner Association (“AMPA”) join as Organizational Plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 140-145.) After the Individual and Organization Plaintiffs filed this action, Washington State moved to intervene to protect its sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests, which it alleged were harmed by the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 55; see also Dkt. No. 97.) On November 27, 2017, the Court granted Washington State’s motion. (Dkt. No. 101.) Washington State now joins in Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction based upon its interests in protecting “the health, and physical and economic well-being of its residents” and “securing residents from the harmful effects of discrimination.” (Id. at 4.) Defendants include President Donald J. Trump, Secretary James N. Mattis, the United States, and the DoD. (Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 19-22.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (See Dkt. No. 69 at 16-22.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Presidential Memorandum and have stated valid claims upon which relief may be granted. However, Plaintiffs have failed to state a valid claim for violation of procedural due process. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ equal protection, substantive due process, and First Amendment claims; and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim.

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Defendants contend the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction for two reasons: First, they contend Plaintiffs lack standing because they have not suffered injuries in fact. (Id. at 18-20.) Second, they contend Plaintiffs' claims are not ripe for resolution. (Id. at 20-22.) Plaintiffs respond that the Presidential Memorandum gives rise to current harm and credible threats of impending harm sufficient for both standing and ripeness. (See Dkt. No. 84 at 11-27.)

i. Individual Plaintiffs

The Court finds that the Individual Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Presidential Memorandum. To establish standing, Individual Plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) an "injury in fact"; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that it is likely their injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). "At the preliminary injunction stage, a plaintiff must make a 'clear showing' of his injury in fact." Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). An "injury in fact" exists where there is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Each of the Individual Plaintiffs satisfies these requirements: As a result of the Retention Directive,

Plaintiffs Schmid, Muller, Lewis, Stephens, Winters, and Doe face a credible threat of discharge. (See Dkt. No. 84 at 14-15.) As a result of the Accession Directive, Plaintiff Schmid has been refused consideration for appointment as a warrant officer and faces a credible threat of being denied opportunities for career advancement. (See Dkt. Nos. 36 at ¶¶ 28-30; 70 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs Karnoski, D.L., and Callahan also face a credible threat of being denied opportunities to compete for accession on equal footing with non-transgender individuals. (See Dkt. Nos. 35 at ¶¶ 16-22; 37 at ¶¶ 3-16; 42 at ¶¶ 3-5, 10-21; see also Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *18-19 (finding the Accession and Retention Directives impose competitive barriers on transgender individuals who intend to accede). As a result of the Medical Care Directive, Plaintiff Stephens faces a credible threat of being denied surgical treatment, as he is currently ineligible for surgery until after March 23, 2018, the date upon which DoD is to cease funding of transition-related surgical procedures.² (Dkt. Nos. 30 at ¶ 102; 34, Ex. 7 at § 3; 40 at ¶ 14.)

In addition to these threatened harms, the Individual Plaintiffs face current harms in the form of stigmatization and impairment of free expression. The policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum currently denies Individual Plaintiffs the opportunity to serve in the military on the same terms as other service members, deprives them of dignity, and subjects them to stigma-

² While the Medical Care Directive includes an exception where necessary “to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex” (Dkt. No. 34, Ex. 7 at § 2), the exception does not apply to Plaintiff Stephens and does not diminish the threat of harm he faces. (Dkt. No. 40 at ¶ 14.)

tization. (Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 217, 222, 238.) Policies that “stigmatiz[e] members of the disfavored group as ‘in-nately inferior’ . . . can cause serious non-economic injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group.” Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737-740 (1984). The Presidential Memorandum currently impairs Plaintiff Jane Doe’s rights to express her authentic gender identity, as she fears discharge from the military as a result. (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶¶ 3-15.) Plaintiff Doe’s self-censorship is a “constitutionally sufficient injury,” as it is based on her “actual and well-founded fear” that the Retention Directive will take effect. See Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (“an actual and well-founded fear that [a] law will be enforced against [him or her]” may create standing to bring pre-enforcement claims based on the First Amendment) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988)).

Each of Defendants’ arguments to the contrary is unavailing. First, Defendants claim the harms facing Plaintiffs are not certain, as the Presidential Memorandum directs “further study before the military changes its longstanding policies regarding service by transgender individuals.” (See Dkt. No. 69 at 18.) However, the Accession Directive is already in place, and the restrictions set forth in the Medical Care Directive are final and will be implemented on March 23, 2018. (See Dkt. No. 34, Ex. 7 at § 3.) The Court finds that “[t]he directives of the Presidential Memorandum, to the extent they are definitive, are the operative policy toward military service by transgender service members.” Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *17. Similarly, the Court reads the Interim Guidance “as implement-

ing the directives of the Presidential Memorandum,” and concludes that “any protections afforded by the Interim Guidance are necessarily limited to the extent they conflict with the express directives of the memorandum.” Id.

Second, Defendants claim Plaintiffs Karnoski, D.L., and Callahan have not suffered injury in fact as they have yet to enlist in the military. (Dkt. No. 69 at 19.) However, as a result of the Accession Directive, Plaintiffs Karnoski, D.L., and Callahan cannot compete for accession on equal footing with non-transgender individuals. Denial of this opportunity constitutes injury in fact. See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-66 (1977) (“When a person’s desire for a job is not translated into a formal application solely because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as much a victim of discrimination as is he who goes through the motions of submitting an application.”).³

Third, Defendants rely on Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) to claim that Plaintiffs have not suffered stigmatic injury. (Dkt. No. 69 at 18.) But unlike the claimants in Allen, who raised abstract instances of stigmatic injury only, the Individual Plaintiffs have iden-

³ Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff Karnoski and D.L. would not be able to accede under the June 2016 Policy because they have recently taken steps to transition does not compel a different finding. Plaintiffs’ injury “lies in the denial of an equal *opportunity* to compete, not the denial of the job itself,” and thus the Court does not “inquire into the plaintiffs’ qualifications (or lack thereof) when assessing standing.” Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 & n.14 (1978) (emphasis in original)).

tified concrete interests in accession, career advancement, and medical treatment, and have demonstrated that they are “‘personally denied equal treatment’ by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (quoting Heckler, 465 U.S. at 739-40). Such stigmatic injury is “one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in some circumstances to support standing.” Id.⁴

ii. *Organizational Plaintiffs*

The Court finds that Organizational Plaintiffs HRC, GJL, and AMPA have standing to challenge the Presidential Memorandum. An organization has standing where “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Each of the Organizational Plaintiffs satisfies these requirements. Individual Plaintiffs Karnoski and Schmid are members of HRC, GJL, and AMPA, and Individual Plaintiffs Muller, Stephens, and Winters are also members of AMPA. (See Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 141-145.) The interests each Organizational Plaintiff seeks to protect are germane to their organizational purposes, which include ending discrimination against LGBTQ individuals (HRC and GJL) and supporting families and allies of LGBT service members and veterans (AMPA). (Id. at ¶¶ 16-18.) As Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief,

⁴ Allen addressed racial discrimination specifically. However, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged stigmatic injury arising from gender-based discrimination. See Heckler, 465 U.S. at 737-40.

participation by the organizations' individual members is not required. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991) (participation of individual members not required where “the claims proffered and relief requested [by an organization] do not demand individualized proof on the part of its members”).

iii. *Washington State*

The Court finds that Washington State has standing to challenge the Presidential Memorandum. A state has standing to sue the federal government to vindicate its sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 518-520 (2007). Sovereign interests include a state's interest in protecting the natural resources within its boundaries. Id. at 518-519. Quasi-sovereign interests include a state's interest in the health and physical and economic well-being of its residents, and in “securing residents from the harmful effects of discrimination.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 609 (1982). Washington State is home to approximately 45,000 active duty service members and approximately 32,850 transgender adults. (Dkt. No. 97 at 6.) The Washington National Guard is comprised of service members who assist with emergency preparedness and disaster recovery planning, including protecting Washington State's natural resources from wildfires, landslides, flooding, and earthquakes. (Id. at 8.) Washington State contends that prohibiting transgender individuals from serving openly adversely impacts its ability to recruit and retain members of the Washington National Guard, and thereby impairs its ability to protect its territory and natural resources.

(Id.) Additionally, Washington State contends that the prohibition implicates its interest in maintaining and enforcing its anti-discrimination laws, protecting its residents from discrimination, and ensuring that employment and advancement opportunities are not unlawfully restricted based on transgender status. (Id. at 8-9.) The Court agrees.

The injuries to the Individual Plaintiffs, the Organizational Plaintiffs, and to Washington State are indisputably traceable to the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum, and may be redressed by a favorable ruling from this Court. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing.

iv. *Ripeness*

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims are ripe for review. Ripeness "ensure[s] that courts adjudicate live cases or controversies" and do not "issue advisory opinions [or] declare rights in hypothetical cases." Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cnty., 863 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). "A proper ripeness inquiry contains a constitutional and a prudential component." Id. (citation omitted). Because Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Presidential Memorandum, their claims satisfy the requirement for constitutional ripeness. See id. (constitutional ripeness "is often treated under the rubric of standing"). Because they raise purely legal issues (i.e., whether the Presidential Memorandum violates their constitutional rights), and because withholding consideration of these issues will subject Plaintiffs to hardships (i.e., denial of career opportunities and transition-related medical care, stigmatic injury, and impairment of self-expression), they also

satisfy the requirement for prudential ripeness. See id. at 1154 (prudential ripeness is “guided by two overarching considerations: the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants claim this case is not ripe for resolution because the policy on military service by transgender individuals is “still being studied, developed, and implemented.” (Dkt. No. 69 at 20.) However, President Trump’s announcement on Twitter and his Presidential Memorandum did not order a study, but instead unilaterally proclaimed a prohibition on transgender service members. See Stone, 2017 WL 5589122, at *10 (“The Court cannot interpret the plain text of the President’s Memorandum as being a request for a study to determine whether or not the directives should be implemented. Rather, it orders the directives to be implemented by specified dates.”). Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs must first exhaust administrative remedies before the Court can consider their claims is also unavailing, as the Ninth Circuit has explained that “[r]esolving a claim founded solely upon a constitutional right is singularly suited to a judicial forum and clearly inappropriate to an administrative board.” Downen v. Warner, 481 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1973).

Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This requirement is met where the complaint “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint need not include detailed allegations, but it must have “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as true, and makes all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint states valid claims for violation of equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to each of these claims (see discussion of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, infra), and for the same reasons, these claims survive under Rule 12(b)(6). However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails to state a valid claim for violation of procedural due process. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges neither a “protectible liberty or property interest” nor a “denial of adequate procedural protections” as required for a procedural due process claim. (See Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 225-230;

Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1103 (9th Cir. 2012).⁵

Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs' equal protection, substantive due process and First Amendment claims, and GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim.

II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo that existed prior to the change in policy announced by President Trump on Twitter and in his Presidential Memorandum. The Court considers four factors in evaluating Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) the balance of equities; and (4) the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. "When the government is a party, these last two factors merge." Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their equal protection, substantive due process, and First Amendment claims.

⁵ The Court notes that the procedural due process claim is elaborated upon in detail in Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Reply. (See Dkt. Nos. 32 at 22-23; 84 at 39-40.)

i. Equal Protection

Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their equal protection challenge. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits government action “denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). Plaintiffs contend the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum denies them equal protection in that it impermissibly classifies individuals based on transgender status and gender identity and is not substantially related to an important government interest. (Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 217-224.)

The Court must first determine whether the policy burdens “a ‘suspect’ or ‘quasi-suspect’ class.” See Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court concludes that the policy distinguishes on the basis of transgender status, a quasi-suspect classification, and is therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny. See id. (noting that gender is a quasi-suspect classification); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that discrimination based on a person’s failure “to conform to socially-constructed gender expectations” is a form of gender discrimination) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989)).⁶

Next, the Court must determine whether the policy satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Id. A policy subject to intermediate scrutiny must be supported by an “ex-

⁶ The June 2016 Policy also stated it was DoD’s position “consistent with the U.S. Attorney General’s opinion, that discrimination based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination.” (See Dkt. No. 48, Ex. C at 6.)

ceedingly persuasive justification.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). The policy must serve important governmental objectives, and the government must show “that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Id. at 533 (citation omitted). While Defendants identify important governmental interests including military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and preservation of military resources, they fail to show that the policy prohibiting transgender individuals from serving openly is related to the achievement of those interests. (See Dkt. No. 69 at 33-35.) Indeed, “all of the reasons proffered by the President for excluding transgender individuals from the military [are] not merely unsupported, but [are] actually *contradicted* by the studies, conclusions, and judgment of the military itself.” Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *30 (emphasis in original). Not only did the DoD previously conclude that allowing transgender individuals to serve openly would not impact military effectiveness and readiness, the working group tasked to evaluate the issue also concluded that *prohibiting* open service would have negative impacts including loss of qualified personnel, erosion of unit cohesion, and erosion of trust in command. (See Dkt. Nos. 46 at ¶¶ 25-26; 48 at ¶¶ 45-47.)

Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. While Defendants raise concerns about transition-related medical conditions and costs, their concerns “appear to be hypothetical and extremely overbroad.” Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *29. For instance, Defendants claim that “at least some transgender individuals suffer from medical conditions that could impede the performance of their duties,” including gender dysphoria, and complications from hormone therapy and sex

reassignment surgery. (See Dkt. No. 69 at 33-34.) But *all* service members might suffer from medical conditions that could impede performance, and indeed the working group found that it is common for service members to be non-deployable for periods of time due to an array of such conditions. (Dkt. No. 46 at ¶ 22.) Defendants claim that accommodating transgender service members would “impose costs on the military.” (Dkt. No. 69 at 34.) But the study preceding the June 2016 Policy indicates that these costs are exceedingly minimal. (Dkt. Nos. 48, Ex. B at 57 (“[E]ven in the most extreme scenario . . . we expect only a 0.13-percent (\$8.4 million out of \$6.2 billion) increase in [active component] health care spending.”); 48 at ¶ 41 (“[T]he maximum financial impact . . . is an amount so small it was considered to be ‘budget dust,’ hardly even a rounding error, by military leadership.”).) Indeed, the cost to discharge transgender service members is estimated to be *more than 100 times greater* than the cost to provide transition-related healthcare. (See Dkt. Nos. 32 at 20; 46 at ¶ 32; 48 at ¶ 18.)

Defendants’ claim that the policy prohibiting transgender individuals from serving openly is entitled to substantial deference is also unavailing. (See Dkt. No. 69 at 29.) Defendants rely on Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). In Rostker the Supreme Court considered whether the Military Selective Service Act (“MSSA”), which compelled draft registration for men only, was unconstitutional. Id. at 59. Finding that the MSSA was enacted after extensive review of legislative testimony, floor debates, and committee reports, the Supreme Court held that Congress was entitled to deference when, in “exercising the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules for their

governance,” it does not act “unthinkingly” or “reflexively and not for any considered reason.” See id. at 71-72. In contrast, the prohibition on military service by transgender individuals was announced by President Trump on Twitter, abruptly and without any evidence of considered reason or deliberation. (See Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 172-184.) The policy is therefore not entitled to Rostker deference.⁷

Because Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the policy prohibiting transgender individuals from serving openly is substantially related to important government interests, it does not survive intermediate scrutiny.⁸ Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim.

ii. *Substantive Due Process*⁹

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their substantive due process challenge. Substantive due process protects fundamental liberty interests in individual dignity, autonomy, and privacy from unwarranted government intrusion. See U.S. Const., amend. V. These fundamental interests include the right to make decisions concerning bodily integrity and self-definition central to an individual’s identity. See Obergefell v.

⁷ Defendants’ reliance on Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), is also misplaced. See Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *30 n.11 (distinguishing the policy at issue in Weinberger as having been “based on the ‘considered professional judgment’ of the military”).

⁸ For the same reasons, the policy is also unlikely to survive rational basis review.

⁹ Having granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with regard to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process challenge, the Court does not reach the merits of that claim at this time.

Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015) (“The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons . . . to define and express their identity.”); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (due process “safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty”). To succeed on their substantive due process challenge, Plaintiffs must establish a governmental intrusion upon a fundamental liberty interest. The Court concludes that the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum constitutes such an intrusion. The policy directly interferes with Plaintiffs’ ability to define and express their gender identity, and penalizes Plaintiffs for exercising their fundamental right to do so openly by depriving them of employment and career opportunities. As discussed in the context of Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, supra, Defendants have not demonstrated that this intrusion is necessary to further an important government interest. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their substantive due process challenge.

iii. *First Amendment*

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment challenge. In general, laws that regulate speech based on its content (i.e., because of “the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed”) are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226-27 (2015). Military regulations on speech are permitted so long as they “restrict speech no more than is reasonably neces-

sary to protect the substantial governmental interest.” Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 355 (1980).

Plaintiffs contend the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum impermissibly burdens “speech or conduct that ‘openly’ discloses a transgender individual’s identity or transgender status” by subjecting openly transgender individuals to discharge and other adverse actions. (See Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 196-197, 234-236.) The Court agrees. The policy penalizes transgender service members—but not others—for disclosing their gender identity, and is therefore a content-based restriction. Even giving the government the benefit of a more deferential standard of review under Brown, 444 U.S. at 355, the policy does not survive. As discussed in the context of Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, supra, Defendants have not demonstrated that the intrusion upon protected expression furthers an important government interest.

B. Irreparable Harm

The Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue. The Individual and Organizational Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm in the form of current and threatened injuries in fact, including denial of career opportunities and transition-related medical care, stigmatic injury, and impairment of self-expression. While Defendants claim these harms can be remedied with money damages (Dkt. No. 69 at 23-24), they are incorrect. Unlike the plaintiffs in Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112 (9th Cir. 1979) and Hartikka v. United States, 754 F.2d 1516 (9th Cir. 1985), who alleged harms “common to most discharged employees” (e.g., loss of income, loss of retirement, loss of reloca-

tion pay, and damage to reputation) and not “attributable to any unusual actions relating to the discharge itself,” Hartikka, 754 F.2d at 1518, the harms facing the Individual Plaintiffs are directly attributable to the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum. Back pay and other monetary damages proposed by Defendants will not remedy the stigmatic injury caused by the policy, reverse the disruption of trust between service members, nor cure the medical harms caused by the denial of timely health care. (See Dkt. No. 84 at 28.) Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims, these violations are yet another form of irreparable harm. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 950 F.2d at 1412 (“alleged constitutional infringement will often alone constitute irreparable harm.”) (citation omitted); see also Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2009) (“loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).

Plaintiff Washington State has demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm to its sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests if it is “forced to continue to expend its scarce resources to support a discriminatory policy when it provides funding or deploys its National Guard.” (See Dkt. No. 97 at 8-9.) Washington State has also demonstrated that its ability to recruit and retain service personnel for the Washington National Guard may be irreparably harmed. See Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991) (“intangible injuries, such as damage to ongoing recruitment efforts and goodwill, qualify as irreparable harm.”).

C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest

The Court finds that the balance of equities and the public interest are in Plaintiffs' favor. If a preliminary injunction does not issue, Plaintiffs will continue to suffer injuries as a result of the Presidential Memorandum, including deprivation of their constitutional rights. On the other hand, Defendants will face no serious injustice in maintaining the June 2016 Policy pending resolution of this action on the merits. Defendants claim they are in the process of "gathering a panel of experts" to study the military's policy on transgender service members and assert, without explanation, that an injunction will "directly interfere with the panel's work and the military's ability to thoroughly study a complex and important issue regarding the composition of the armed forces." (Dkt. No. 69 at 40.) The Court is not convinced that reverting to the June 2016 Policy, which was voluntarily adopted by DoD after extensive study and review, and which has been in place for over a year without documented negative effects, will harm Defendants. See Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *33 (recognizing "considerable evidence that it is the *discharge* and *banning* of [transgender] individuals that would have such [negative] effects") (emphasis in original).

Injunctive relief furthers the public interest as it "is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights." Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Defendants' contention that the public has a strong interest in national defense does not change this analysis, as "[a] bare invocation of 'national defense' simply cannot defeat every motion for preliminary injunction

that touches on the military.” Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *33; Stone, 2017 WL 5589122, at *16.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs have standing to bring this lawsuit challenging Defendants’ policy of prohibiting transgender individuals from serving openly in the military. Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment are properly plead and ripe for resolution, and Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction to protect the status quo with regard to each of these claims. Plaintiffs have not properly plead a claim for violation of procedural due process. Therefore, the Court rules as follows:

1. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim;

2. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ equal protection, substantive due process, and First Amendment claims;

3. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and hereby enjoins Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other person or entity subject to their control or acting directly or indirectly in concert or participation with Defendants from taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump’s July 26, 2017 announcement. This Preliminary Injunction shall take effect immediately and shall remain in effect pending resolution of this action on the merits or further order of this Court.

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The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.

Dated Dec. 11, 2017.

/s/ MARSHA J. PECHMAN
MARSHA J. PECHMAN
United States District Judge

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

Case No. C17-1297-MJP

RYAN KARNOSKI, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

STATE OF WASHINGTON, INTERVENOR

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Filed: Dec. 29, 2017

**ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION AND PARTIAL STAY OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL**

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Clarification and Motion for Partial Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. (Dkt. No. 106.) Having reviewed the Motion, the Responses (Dkt. Nos. 114, 119), and all related papers, the Court DENIES the proposed clarification set forth in Defendants' Motion for Clarification and DENIES Defendant's Motion for Partial Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal.

BACKGROUND

On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced on Twitter that the United States government will no longer allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the military. (Dkt. No. 34, Ex. 6.) Prior to this announcement, the military concluded that transgender individuals should be permitted to serve openly. On June 30, 2016, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive-type memorandum stating that “[n]ot later than July 1, 2017,” the military would begin accession of transgender enlistees. (Dkt. No. 48, Ex. C at § 2.) On June 30, 2017, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis deferred the deadline to January 1, 2018. (Dkt. No. 34-3.) President Trump’s July 26, 2017 announcement and the August 25, 2017 Presidential Memorandum thereafter prohibited the accession of openly transgender enlistees indefinitely (the “Accessions Directive”). (Dkt. No. 34, Exs. 6, 7.)

On December 11, 2017, the Court entered an order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. No. 103.) The order enjoined Defendants from “taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump’s July 26, 2017 announcement” regarding military service by transgender individuals. (Id. at 23.)

Defendants now request clarification as to the terms of the Court’s Order. (Dkt. No. 106.) Specifically, Defendants seek clarification as to whether Secretary Mattis may exercise “independent discretion” to further postpone the January 1, 2018 deadline for accession by transgender enlistees “to further study whether the policy will impact military readiness and lethality

or to complete further steps needed to implement the policy.” (*Id.* at 2.) In the alternative, Defendants move for a partial stay of the preliminary injunction as to the Accessions Directive. (*Id.* at 4.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Clarification

Defendants move for clarification of the Court’s Order as to the Accessions Directive. Essentially, Defendants contend that the Court’s Order does not prohibit Secretary Mattis from implementing a policy this Court has already enjoined. This claim is without merit. The Court’s Order clearly enjoined Defendants from “taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump’s July 26, 2017 announcement” regarding military service by transgender individuals. (Dkt. No. 103 at 23.) Prior to July 26, 2017, the status quo was a policy permitting accession of transgender individuals no later than January 1, 2018. (See Dkt. No. 48, Ex. C; Dkt. No. 34-3.) Any action by any Defendant that is inconsistent with this status quo is preliminarily enjoined.

II. Motion for Partial Stay

In the alternative, Defendants move for a partial stay of the Court’s Order granting a preliminary injunction as to the Accessions Directive, pending review by the Ninth Circuit. Defendants contend—for the first time during these proceedings—that they are not prepared to begin accessions of transgender enlistees by January 1, 2018. (Dkt. No. 106 at 4-6.) Defendants contend that Plaintiffs will not be harmed by a stay, and that they are likely to prevail on the merits of

their appeal. (Id. at 6-8.) The Court will not stay its preliminary injunction pending appeal.

A stay pending appeal “is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (citation omitted). In determining whether to grant a stay, the Court considers: (1) whether Defendants have made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether Defendants will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure Plaintiffs and Washington State; and (4) whether the public interest supports a stay. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. The first two factors are the most critical. Id.; see also Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017).

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Court finds that Defendants have not made a “strong showing” that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. Each of the arguments raised by Defendants already has been considered and rejected by the Court, and Defendants have taken no action to remedy the constitutional violations that supported entry of a preliminary injunction in the first place. (See Dkt. No. 103 at 15-20.) Defendants’ argument that Secretary Mattis has “independent authority to extend the effective date” for accessions by transgender enlistees is also unpersuasive. (Dkt. No. 106 at 7.) Secretary Mattis does not have authority to effectuate an unconstitutional policy, and certainly not one which has been enjoined.

B. Irreparable Injury to Defendants

The Court finds that Defendants have not shown that they will be irreparably harmed without a stay. Defendants contend that complying with the Court's Order will "impose extraordinary burdens" on the military as accession by transgender enlistees "necessitates preparation, training, and communication to ensure those responsible for application of the accession standards are thoroughly versed in the policy and its implementation procedures." (Dkt. 107 at ¶ 5; see also Dkt. No. 106 at 4-5.) In particular, Defendants claim that "the military will need to promulgate new, complex, and interdisciplinary medical standards that will necessarily require evaluation across several medical specialties, including behavior and mental health, surgical procedures, and endocrinology." (Dkt. No. 106 at 4-5.) Defendants have had since June 2016 to prepare for accessions of transgender enlistees into the military, and the record indicates that considerable progress has been made toward this end. (See Dkt. No. 115 at ¶¶ 4-5; Dkt. No. 116 at ¶¶ 2-4; Dkt. No. 117 at ¶ 3.) In fact, on December 8, 2017, the Department of Defense issued a policy memorandum setting forth specific guidance for "processing transgender applicants for military service," including guidelines for medical personnel. (Dkt. No. 120-1.) Notwithstanding their implementation efforts to date, Defendants claim that "the Department still would not be adequately and properly prepared to begin processing transgender applicants for military service by January 1, 2018." (Dkt. No. 107 at 107.) However, Defendants have provided no evidence that the accessions criteria for transgender enlistees are any more complex or burdensome than the criteria for non-transgender enlistees. (Dkt. No. 107 at ¶ 9.) Defend-

ants' conclusory claims are unsupported by evidence and insufficient to establish a likelihood of irreparable harm.

C. Injury to Plaintiffs and Washington State and Impact on Public Interest

Having found that Defendants have not shown either a likelihood of success on the merits or a likelihood of irreparable injury absent a stay, the Court need not reach the remaining factors. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1164. However, the Court also finds that these remaining factors do not support entry of a stay.

The Court already found that Plaintiffs and Washington State are likely to suffer irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, and for the same reasons, will be injured by a stay. With regard to the Individual Plaintiffs, the Court found that the Accessions Directive violates their constitutional rights, denies them dignity, and subjects them to stigmatization. (Id. at 8, 20-21.) With regard to Washington State, the Court found that the policy threatens the State's ability to recruit and retain members of the Washington National Guard (and thereby protect its territory and natural resources) and to protect its residents from discrimination. (Id. at 11-12, 21.) For similar reasons, the Court found that a preliminary injunction furthers the public interest. (Dkt. No. 103 at 21-22.) Defendants have provided no evidence to the contrary.

CONCLUSION

Because Defendants have been enjoined from "taking *any action* relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump's July 26, 2017 announcement" regarding military service by transgender individuals,

the Court CLARIFIES that *any action* intended to further delay the January 1, 2018 deadline for accession by transgender enlistees is enjoined, whether taken by Secretary Mattis or any other government agency or employee. Because Defendants have not demonstrated that a partial stay of the Court's Order is warranted, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion.

The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.

Dated Dec. 29, 2017.

/s/ MARSHA J. PECHMAN
MARSHA J. PECHMAN
United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

Case No. C17-1297-MJP

RYAN KARNOSKI, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Filed: Apr. 13, 2018

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING
IN PART PLAINTIFFS' AND WASHINGTON'S
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 129); the State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 150); and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 194.) Having reviewed the Motions, the Responses (Dkt. Nos. 194, 207, 209), the Replies (Dkt. Nos. 201, 202, 212) and all related papers, and having considered arguments made in proceedings before the Court, the Court rules as follows: The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs' and Washington's Motions and

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Cross-Motion.

ORDER SUMMARY

In July 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced on Twitter a ban on military service by openly transgender people (the “Ban”). Plaintiffs and the State of Washington (“Washington”) challenged the constitutionality of the Ban, and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent it from being carried out.

In December 2017, the Court—along with three other federal judges—entered a nationwide preliminary injunction preventing the military from implementing the Ban. The effect of the order was to maintain the status quo, allowing transgender people to join and serve in the military and receive transition-related medical care. For the past few months, they have done just that.

In March 2018, President Trump announced a plan to implement the Ban. With few exceptions, the plan excludes from military service people “with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria” and people who “require or have undergone gender transition.” The plan provides that transgender people may serve in the military only if they serve in their “biological sex.” Defendants claim that this plan resolves the constitutional issues raised by Plaintiffs and Washington.

In the following order, the Court concludes otherwise, and rules that the preliminary injunction will remain in effect. Each of the claims raised by Plaintiffs and Washington remains viable. The Court also rules that, because transgender people have long been subjected to systemic oppression and forced to live in silence, they are a protected class. Therefore, any attempt to

exclude them from military service will be looked at with the highest level of care, and will be subject to the Court’s “strict scrutiny.” This means that before Defendants can implement the Ban, they must show that it was sincerely motivated by compelling interests, rather than by prejudice or stereotype, and that it is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.


The case continues forward on the issue of whether the Ban is well-supported by evidence and entitled to deference, or whether it fails as an impermissible violation of constitutional rights. The Court declines to dismiss President Trump from the case and allows Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s claims for declaratory relief to go forward against him.

BACKGROUND

I. The Ban on Military Service by Openly Transgender People¹

President Trump’s Announcement on Twitter: On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) announced over Twitter that the United States would no longer “accept or allow” transgender people “to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military” (the “Twitter Announcement”):

¹ As used throughout this Order, and as explained in greater detail in this section, the “Ban” refers to Defendants’ policy generally prohibiting military service by openly transgender people, as announced in President Trump’s twitter Announcement and 2017 Memorandum and as further detailed in the Implementation Plan and 2018 Memorandum.



(Dkt. No. 149, Ex. 1.)

The 2017 Memorandum: On August 25, 2017, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum (the “2017 Memorandum”) formalizing his Twitter Announcement, and directing the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to “return” to an earlier policy excluding transgender service members. (Dkt. No. 149, Ex. 2.) The 2017 Memorandum authorized the discharge of openly transgender service members (the “Retention Directive”); prohibited the accession of openly transgender service members (the “Accession Directive”); and prohibited the use of Department of Defense (“DoD”) and Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) resources to fund “sex reassignment” surgical procedures (the “Medical Care Directive”). (*Id.* at §§ 1-3.) The Accession Directive was to take effect on January 1, 2018; the Retention and Medical Care Directives on March 23, 2018. (*Id.* at § 3.) The 2017 Memorandum also ordered the Secretary of Defense to “submit to [President Trump] a plan for implementing both [its] general policy . . . and [its] specific directives . . . ” no later than February 21, 2018. (*Id.*)

Secretary Mattis’ Press Release and Interim Guidance: On August 29, 2017, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis issued a press release confirming that the DoD had received the 2017 Memorandum and, as directed, would “carry out” its policy direction. (Dkt. No. 197, Ex. 2.) The press release explained that Secretary Mattis would “develop a study and implementation plan” and “establish a panel of experts . . . to provide advice and recommendation on the implementation of the [P]resident’s direction.” (*Id.*)

On September 14, 2017, Secretary Mattis issued interim guidance regarding President Trump’s Twitter

Announcement and 2017 Memorandum to the military (the “Interim Guidance”). (Dkt. No. 149, Ex. 3.) The Interim Guidance again identified the DoD’s intent to “carry out the President’s policy and directives” and “present the President with a plan to implement the policy and directives in the [2017] Memorandum.” (*Id.* at 2.) The Interim Guidance provided (1) that transgender people would be prohibited from accession effective immediately; (2) that service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria would be provided “treatment,” however, “no new sex reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel [would] be permitted after March 22, 2018”; and (3) that no action would be taken “to involuntarily separate or discharge an otherwise qualified Service member solely on the basis of a gender dysphoria diagnosis or transgender status.” (*Id.* at 3.)

The Implementation Plan: On February 22, 2018, as directed, Secretary Mattis delivered to President Trump a plan for carrying out the policies set forth in his Twitter Announcement and 2017 Memorandum (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1) along with a “Report and Recommendations on Military Service by Transgender Persons” (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2) (collectively, the “Implementation Plan”). The Implementation Plan recommended the following policies:

- Transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are disqualified from military service, except under the following limited circumstances: (1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering into

service may be retained if they do not require a change of gender and remain deployable within applicable retention standards; and (3) currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration's policy took effect and prior to the effective date of this new policy, may continue to serve in their preferred gender and receive medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria.

- Transgender persons who require or have undergone gender transition are disqualified from military service.
- Transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria, who are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all other Service members, in their biological sex.

(Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1 at 3-4.)

The 2018 Memorandum: On March 23, 2018, President Trump issued another Presidential Memorandum (the “2018 Memorandum”). (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 3.) The 2018 Memorandum confirms his receipt of the Implementation Plan, purports to “revoke” the 2017 Memorandum and “any other directive [he] may have made with respect to military service by transgender individuals,” and directs the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to “exercise their authority to implement any appropriate policies concerning military service by transgender individuals.” (Id. at 2-3.)

II. The Carter Policy

In 2010, Congress repealed the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that had previously prevented gay, lesbian, and bisexual people from serving openly in the military. (Dkt. No. 145 at ¶ 10.) The repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” raised questions about the military’s policy on transgender service members, as commanders became increasingly aware that there were capable and experienced transgender service members in every branch of the military. (*Id.* at ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 146 at ¶ 7.) In August 2014, the DoD eliminated its categorical ban on retention of transgender service members, enabling each branch of military service to reassess its own policies. (Dkt. No. 145 at ¶ 12; Dkt. No. 146 at ¶ 8.) In July 2015, then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter convened a group to evaluate policy options regarding openly transgender service members (the “Working Group”). (Dkt. No. 142 at ¶ 8.) The Working Group included senior uniformed officials from each branch, a senior civilian official, and various staff members. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) It sought to “identify and address all relevant issues relating to service by openly transgender persons.” (*Id.* at ¶ 22.) To do so, it consulted with medical experts, personnel experts, readiness experts, and commanders whose units included transgender service members, and commissioned an independent study by the RAND Corporation to assess the implications of allowing transgender people to serve openly (the “RAND Study”). (*Id.* at ¶¶ 10-11, 22-27.) In particular, the RAND Study focused on: (1) the health care needs of transgender service members and the likely costs of providing coverage for transition-related care; (2) the readiness implications of allowing transgender service members to serve openly; and

(3) the experiences of foreign militaries that allow for open service. (Dkt. No. 144, Ex. B at 4.) The RAND Study found “no evidence” that allowing transgender people to serve openly would adversely impact military effectiveness, readiness, or unit cohesion. (Dkt. No. 144 at ¶ 14.) Instead, the RAND Study found that discharging transgender service members would reduce productivity and result in “significant costs” associated with replacing skilled and qualified personnel. (Dkt. No. 142 at ¶ 21.) The results of the RAND Study were published in a 113-page report titled “Assessing the Implications of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly.” (See Dkt. No. 144, Ex. B.)

After reviewing the results of the RAND Study and other evidence, the Working Group unanimously agreed that (1) transgender people should be allowed to serve openly and (2) excluding them from service based on a characteristic unrelated to their fitness to serve would undermine military efficacy. (Dkt. No. 142 at ¶¶ 26-27.) On June 30, 2016, Secretary Carter accepted the recommendations of the Working Group and issued Directive-type Memorandum 16-005 (the “Carter Policy”), which affirmed that “service in the United States military should be open to all who can meet the rigorous standards for military service and readiness.” (Dkt. No. 144, Ex. C.) The Carter Policy provided that “[e]ffective immediately, no otherwise qualified service member may be involuntarily separated, discharged or denied reenlistment or continuation of service, solely on the basis of their gender identity,” and further provided that transgender people would be allowed to accede into the military not later

than July 1, 2017.² (*Id.* at 5.) Consistent with the Carter Policy, each branch of military service issued detailed instructions, policies, and regulations regarding separation and retention, accession, in-service transition, and medical care. (Dkt. No. 144 at ¶¶ 24-36, Exs. D, E, F; Dkt. No. 145 at ¶¶ 41-50, Exs. A, B; Dkt. No. 146 at ¶¶ 27-34, Ex. A.)

In reliance upon the Carter Policy and the DoD’s assurances that it would not discharge them for being transgender, many service members came out to the military and had been serving openly for more than a year when President Trump issued his Twitter Announcement and 2017 Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 144, ¶ 37; Dkt. No. 145 at ¶ 51; Dkt. No. 146 at ¶ 35.)

III. Procedural History

On August 28, 2017, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Ban, as set forth in the Twitter Announcement and the 2017 Memorandum. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiffs include nine transgender individuals (the “Individual Plaintiffs”) and three organizations (the “Organizational Plaintiffs”). (Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 7-18.) Individual Plaintiffs Ryan Karnoski, D.L., and Connor Callahan aspire to enlist in the military; Staff Sergeant Cathrine Schmid, Chief Warrant Officer Lindsey Muller, Petty Officer First Class Terece Lewis, Petty Officer Second Class Phillip Stephens, and Petty Officer Second Class Megan Winters currently serve openly in the military. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 7-13.) Individual Plaintiff Jane Doe currently serves in the military, but

² On June 30, 2017, Secretary Mattis extended the effective date for accepting transgender recruits to January 1, 2018. (Dkt. No. 197, Ex. 3.)

does not serve openly. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Organizational Plaintiffs include the Human Rights Campaign (“HRC”), the Gender Justice League (“GJL”), and the American Military Partner Association (“AMPA”). (Id. at ¶¶ 16-18.) Defendants include President Trump, Secretary Mattis, the United States, and the DoD. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-22.)

On November 27, 2017, the Court granted intervention to Washington, which joined to protect its sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests in its natural resources and in the health and physical and economic well-being of its residents. (See Dkt. No. 101.)

On December 11, 2017, the Court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction barring Defendants from “taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump’s July 26, 2017 announcement.”³ (Dkt. No. 103 at 23.) The Court found that Plaintiffs and Washington had standing to challenge the Ban and were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims for violation of equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment. (Id. at 6-12, 15-20.)

On January 25, 2018, Plaintiffs and Washington filed separate motions for summary judgment.⁴ (Dkt. Nos.

³ Three other district courts also entered preliminary injunctions against the Ban. See Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D. Md. 2017); Stockman v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1799-JGB-KK, Dkt. No. 79 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017).

⁴ Plaintiffs are joined by amici the Constitutional Accountability Center (Dkt. No. 163, Ex. 1); Legal Voice (Dkt. No. 169); Retired Military Officers and Former National Security Officials (Dkt. No. 152, Ex. A); and the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Penn-

129, 150.) Both seek an order declaring the Ban unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its implementation. (Dkt. No. 129 at 28-29; Dkt. No. 150-1.)

On February 28, 2018, Defendants filed an opposition and cross-motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of all claims brought against President Trump. (Dkt. No. 194.)

On March 23, 2018, as these motions were pending and only days before the Court was set to hear oral argument, President Trump issued the 2018 Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 214, Ex. 1.) On March 27, the Court ordered the parties to present supplemental briefing on the effect of the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan. (Dkt. No. 221.) That briefing has now been completed and this matter is ready for ruling. (See Dkt. Nos. 226, 227, 228.)

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must point to facts supported by the record which demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federa-

sylvania, the States of California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the District of Columbia (Dkt. No. 170, Ex. A.)

tion, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). Conclusory, non-specific statements are not sufficient. *Id.* Similarly, “a party cannot manufacture a genuine issue of material fact merely by making assertions in its legal memoranda.” S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982).

II. Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s Motions for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs and Washington contend that summary judgment is proper because the Ban is unsupported by any constitutionally adequate government interest as a matter of law, and therefore violates equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment. (Dkt. No. 129 at 15-28; Dkt. No. 150 at 13-23.) Defendants respond that disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment, including disputes as to (1) whether Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s challenges are moot as a result of the 2018 Memorandum; (2) whether Plaintiffs and Washington have standing; and (3) whether the Ban satisfies the applicable level of scrutiny. (Dkt. No. 194 at 5-24; Dkt. No. 226 at 3-11.) The Court addresses each of these issues in turn:

A. Mootness

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s challenges are now moot, as the policy set forth in the 2017 Memorandum has been “revoked” and replaced by that in the 2018 Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 226 at 3-7.) Defendants claim the “new policy” has “changed substantially,” such that it presents a “substantially different controversy.” (*Id.* at 6 (citations omitted.)) Plaintiffs and Washington respond that there is no “new policy” at all, as the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementa-

tion Plan merely implement the directives of the 2017 Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 227 at 2; Dkt. No. 228 at 7-8.)

“The burden of demonstrating mootness ‘is a heavy one.’” Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953)). The Ninth Circuit has explained that a case is not moot unless “subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,” McCormack v. Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env'tl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)), such that “the litigant no longer ha[s] any need of the judicial protection that is sought.” Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Adairand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 224 (2000)). Accordingly, courts find cases moot only where the challenged policy has been completely revoked or rescinded, not merely voluntarily ceased. See Davis, 440 U.S. at 631 (holding that a case is moot only where “there can be no reasonable expectation” that the alleged violation will recur and “interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation”); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982) (holding that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice”); see also McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1025 (noting that a case is not moot where the government never “repudiated . . . as unconstitutional” the challenged policy).

The Court finds that the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan do not substantively rescind or

revoke the Ban, but instead threaten the very same violations that caused it and other courts to enjoin the Ban in the first place. The 2017 Memorandum prohibited the accession and authorized the discharge of openly transgender service members (the Accession and Retention Directives); prohibited the use of DoD and DHS resources to fund transition-related surgical procedures (the Medical Care Directive); and directed Secretary Mattis to submit “a plan for implementing” both its “general policy” and its “specific directives” no later than February 21, 2018. (Dkt. No. 149, Ex. 2 at §§ 1-3.) The 2017 Memorandum did not direct Secretary Mattis to determine *whether* or not the directives should be implemented, but instead ordered the directives to be implemented by specific dates and requested a plan for *how* to do so.

The Implementation Plan adheres to the policy and directives set forth in the 2017 Memorandum with few exceptions: With regard to the Accession and Retention Directives, the Implementation Plan excludes from military service and authorizes the discharge of transgender people who “require or have undergone gender transition” and those “with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria” unless they have been “stable for 36 consecutive months in their biological sex prior to accession.” (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1 at 3-4.) With regard to the Medical Care Directive, the Implementation Plan provides that the military will, with few exceptions, no longer provide transition-related surgical care (as people who “require . . . gender transition” will no longer be permitted to serve and those who are currently serving will be subject to discharge). (Id.)

Defendants claim that the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan differ from the 2017 Memorandum in that they do not mandate a “categorical” prohibition on service by openly transgender people and “contain[] several exceptions allowing some transgender individuals to serve.” (Dkt. No. 226 at 6-7). The Court is not persuaded. The Implementation Plan prohibits transgender people—including those who have neither transitioned nor been diagnosed with gender dysphoria—from serving, unless they are “willing and able to adhere to all standards associated with their biological sex.” (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1 at 4, Ex. 2 at 7.) Requiring transgender people to serve in their “biological sex”⁵ does not constitute “open” service in any meaningful way, and cannot reasonably be considered an “exception” to the Ban. Rather, it would force transgender service members to suppress the very characteristic that defines them as transgender in the first place.⁶ (See Dkt. No. 143 at ¶ 19 (“The term ‘trans-

⁵ The Court notes that the Implementation Plan uses the term “biological sex,” apparently to refer to the sex one is assigned at birth. This is somewhat misleading, as the record indicates that gender identity—“a person’s internalized, inherent sense of who they are as a particular gender (i.e., male or female)”—is also widely understood to have a “biological component.” (See Dkt. No. 143 at ¶¶ 20-21.)

⁶ While the Implementation Plan contains an exception that allows current service members to serve openly and in their preferred gender and receive “medically necessary” treatment for gender dysphoria, the exception is narrow, and applies only to those service members who “were diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a military medical provider after the effective date of the Carter [P]olicy” (i.e., June 30, 2016) but “before the effective date” of the policy set forth in the Implementation Plan. (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 7-8.) Further, this exception is severable from the re-

gender’ is used to describe someone who experiences any significant degree of misalignment between their gender identity and their assigned sex at birth.”); Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 9 n.10 (“[T]ransgender” is “an umbrella term used for individuals who have sexual identity or gender expression that differs from their assigned sex at birth.”)

Therefore, the Court concludes that the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan do not moot Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s existing challenges.

B. Standing

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs and Washington lack standing to challenge the Ban, and that the 2018 Memorandum and Implementation Plan “have significantly changed the analysis.” (Dkt. No. 194 at 6-12; Dkt. No. 226 at 7.)

Standing requires (1) an “injury in fact”; (2) a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) a likelihood “that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). An “injury in fact” exists where there is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

mainder of the Implementation Plan. (Id. at 7 (“[S]hould [the DoD]’s decision to exempt these Service members be used by a court as a basis for invalidating the entire policy, this exemption is and should be deemed severable from the rest of the policy.”).)

While the Court previously concluded that both Plaintiffs and Washington established standing at the preliminary injunction stage (Dkt. No. 103 at 7-12), their burden for doing so on summary judgment is more exacting and requires them to set forth “by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts’” such that a “fair-minded jury” could find they have standing. *Id.* at 561; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

The Court considers standing for the Individual Plaintiffs, the Organizational Plaintiffs, and Washington in turn:

1. Individual Plaintiffs

Each of the Individual Plaintiffs has submitted an affidavit detailing the ways in which they have already been harmed by the Ban, and would be further harmed were it to be implemented. (See Dkt. Nos. 130-138.) While Defendants claim that “Plaintiffs are obviously not suffering any harm from the revoked 2017 Memorandum,” and “would neither sustain an actual injury nor face an imminent threat of future injury” as a result of the 2018 Memorandum, the Court disagrees and concludes that each of the Individual Plaintiffs has standing to challenge the Ban.

Karnoski, D.L, and Callahan have “taken clinically appropriate steps to transition” and would be excluded from acceding under the Implementation Plan. (Dkt. No. 130 at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 132 at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 137 at ¶ 8.) Whether they could have acceded under the Carter Policy and whether they might be able to obtain “waivers,” as Defendants suggest, are irrelevant. (See Dkt. No. 226 at 8.) As the Court previously

found, their injury “lies in the denial of an equal *opportunity* to compete, not the denial of the job itself,” and the Court need not “inquire into the plaintiff’s qualifications (or lack thereof) when assessing standing.” (Dkt. No. 103 at 10 n.3 (citing Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (emphasis in original).)

Doe does not currently serve openly, but was intending to come out and to transition surgically before President Trump’s Twitter Announcement. (Dkt. No. 138 at ¶¶ 8-11.) The Ban unambiguously subjects her to discharge should she seek to do either. (See Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1.) Schmid, Muller, Lewis, Stephens, and Winters have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, and likewise would be subject to discharge under the Ban.⁷

⁷ Defendants claim that the currently serving Plaintiffs were “diagnosed with gender dysphoria within the relevant time period” and “therefore would be able to continue serving in their preferred gender, change their gender marker, and receive all medically necessary treatment” under the Implementation Plan’s narrow exception. (Dkt. No. 226 at 8.) The record does not support this claim. As noted previously, the exception applies only to current service members who “were diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a military medical provider *after* the effective date of the Carter [P]olicy” (*i.e.*, June 30, 2016) but “before the effective date” of the policy set forth in the Implementation Plan. (See *supra*, n.6; Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 7-8 (emphasis added).) The record suggests that many, if not all, of the currently serving Plaintiffs were diagnosed *before* June 30, 2016. For example, Schmid was diagnosed “approximately four years ago.” (Dkt. No. 131 at ¶ 9.) Muller was diagnosed “approximately six years ago.” (Dkt. No. 133 at ¶ 15.) Lewis, Stephens, and Winters were diagnosed “approximately three years ago,” “approximately two and a half years ago,” and “approximately two years ago” respectively. (Dkt. No. 134 at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 135 at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 136 at ¶ 10.) There is also no indication that any of the currently serving Plaintiffs received their diagnosis from a “military medical provider.”

(Dkt. No. 131 at ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 133 at ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 134 at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 135 at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 136 at ¶ 10.) The threat of discharge facing Doe, Schmid, Muller, Lewis, Stephens, and Winters is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” and clearly gives rise to standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Importantly, even if each of the Individual Plaintiffs were granted waivers or otherwise not excluded, discharged, or denied medical care, there can be no dispute that they would nevertheless have standing to challenge the Ban. This is because the Ban already has denied them the opportunity to serve in the military on the same terms as others; has deprived them of dignity; and has subjected them to stigmatization. (See Dkt. No. 103 at 8.) Policies that “stigmatiz[e] members of [a] disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’ . . . can cause serious non-economic injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group.” Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737-740 (1984) (citation omitted). Such stigmatic injury, when identified in specific terms, is “one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in some circumstances to support standing.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984), abrogated on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).

Each of the Individual Plaintiffs has detailed the stigmatic injuries they have suffered through affidavits. For example, Karnoski has explained that the Ban has caused him “great distress, discomfort, and pain.” (Dkt. No. 130 at ¶ 21.) Schmid has explained that the Ban’s “abrupt change in policy and implicit

commentary on [her] value to the military and competency to serve has caused [her] to feel tremendous anguish,” and that since it was announced, she has lost sleep and suffered “an immense amount of anxiety.” (Dkt. No. 131 at ¶¶ 23-24, 26.) Muller has explained that the Ban was “devastating” and “wounded [her] more than any combat injury could.” (Dkt. No. 133 at ¶¶ 30-31.) Doe has explained that the Ban precludes her from expressing her authentic gender identity, and that as a result, she has not come out. (Dkt. No. 138 at ¶¶ 10-11.) Doe’s self-censorship alone is a “constitutionally sufficient injury,” as it is based on her “actual and well-founded fear” of discharge. See Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a person’s “actual and well-founded fear that [a] law will be enforced against him or her” may give rise to standing to bring pre-enforcement claims under the First Amendment and that “self-censorship is ‘a harm that can be realized even without an actual prosecution’”) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988)).

Therefore, the Court concludes that each of the Individual Plaintiffs has standing.

2. Organizational Plaintiffs

As each of the Individual Plaintiffs has standing, so too do the organizations they represent. An organization has standing where “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).

Each of the Organizational Plaintiffs satisfies these requirements. Karnoski and Schmid are members of HRC, GJL, and AMPA, and Muller, Stephens, and Winters are also members of AMPA. (Dkt. No. 130 at ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 131 at ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 133 at ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 135 at ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 136 at ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 140 at ¶ 3.) The interests each Organizational Plaintiff seeks to protect are germane to their organizational purposes, which include ending discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (“LGBTQ”) individuals (HRC and GJL) and supporting families and allies of LGBT service members and veterans (AMPA). (Dkt. No. 139 at ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 140 at ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 141 at ¶ 2.)

Therefore, the Court concludes that each of the Organizational Plaintiffs has standing.

3. Washington

Defendants claim that “Washington has not even attempted to satisfy its burden to demonstrate standing,” and that “in granting Washington’s motion to intervene, the Court expressly declined to decide whether Washington possessed standing to sue.” (Dkt. No. 194 at 12.) To the contrary, the Court explicitly found that Washington had standing in its own right, and not merely as an intervenor. (Dkt. No. 103 at 11-12.)

A state has standing to sue the federal government to vindicate its sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 518-520 (2007). Sovereign interests include a state’s interest in protecting the natural resources within its boundaries. Id. at 518-19. Quasi-sovereign interests include its interest in “the health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents,” and in “securing

residents from the harmful effects of discrimination.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 609 (1982).

Washington contends that the Ban will impede its ability to protect its residents and natural resources and will undermine the efficacy of its National Guard. (Dkt. No. 150 at 9-10.) Washington is home to approximately 60,000 active, reserve, and National Guard members, and the military is the second largest public employer in the state. (Id. at 9.) Washington is also home to approximately 32,850 transgender adults, and its laws protect these residents against discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, and gender identity. (Id. at 9-10); RCW §§ 49.60.030; 49.60.040(25)-(26).

Washington relies on the National Guard to assist with emergency preparedness and disaster recovery planning, and to protect the state’s residents and natural resources from wildfires, landslides, flooding, and earthquakes. (Dkt. No. 150 at 9.) When the Governor deploys the National Guard for state active duty, Washington pays its members’ wages and provides disability and life insurance benefits for injuries they may sustain while serving the state. (Id.); RCW § 38.24.050. The state also oversees recruitment efforts and exercises day-to-day command over Guard members in training and most forms of active duty. (Dkt. No. 170, Ex. A at 20.) Further, the Governor must ensure that the Guard conforms to both federal and state laws and regulations, including the state’s anti-discrimination laws and, were the Ban to be implemented, conflicting DoD policies regarding accession and retention. (Dkt. No. 150 at 9-10; Dkt. No. 170, Ex. A at 21-22.) Thus, in addition to diminishing the number of eligible mem-

bers for the National Guard, the Ban threatens Washington’s ability to (1) protect its residents and natural resources in times of emergency and (2) “assur[e] its residents that it will act” to protect them from “the political, social, and moral damage of discrimination.” See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609. Defendants have not offered any contrary evidence with respect to Washington’s sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests. Therefore, the Court concludes that Washington has standing.

C. Constitutional Violations

Plaintiffs contend that the Ban violates equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment. (Dkt. No. 129 at 15-28.) Washington contends that the Ban violates equal protection and substantive due process. (Dkt. No. 150 at 13-23.) Before it can reach the merits of these constitutional claims, the Court must determine (1) the applicable level of scrutiny and (2) the applicable level of deference owed to the Ban, if any. The Court addresses each of these issues in turn:

1. Level of Scrutiny

At the preliminary injunction stage, the Court found that transgender people were, at minimum, a quasi-suspect class. (Dkt. No. 103 at 15-16.) In light of additional evidence before it at this stage, the Court today concludes that they are a suspect class, such that the Ban must satisfy the most exacting level of scrutiny if it is to survive.

In determining whether a classification is suspect or quasi-suspect, the Supreme Court has observed that relevant factors include: (1) whether the class has been “[a]s a historical matter . . . subjected to discrimination,” Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602

(1987); (2) whether the class has a defining characteristic that “frequently bears [a] relation to ability to perform or contribute to society,” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985); (3) whether the class exhibits “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define [it] as a discrete group,” Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602; and (4) whether the class is “a minority or politically powerless.” Id.; see also Windsor v. U.S., 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). While “[t]he presence of any of the factors is a signal that the particular classification is ‘more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective,’” the first two factors alone may be dispositive. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Pylar v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)).

The Court considers each of these factors in turn:

i. History of Discrimination

The history of discrimination and systemic oppression of transgender people in this country is long and well-recognized. Transgender people have suffered and continue to suffer endemic levels of physical and sexual violence, harassment, and discrimination in employment, education, housing, criminal justice, and access to health care. (See Dkt. No. 169, Ex. A at 9-12.) According to a nationwide survey conducted by the National Center for Transgender Equality in 2015, 48 percent of transgender respondents reported being “denied equal treatment, verbally harassed, and/or physically attacked in the past year because of being transgender” and 47 percent reported being “sexually as-

saulted at some point in their lifetime.” (Id. at 10.) Seventy-seven (77) percent report being “verbally harassed, prohibited from dressing according to their gender identity, or physically or sexually assaulted” in grades K-12. (Id. at 10-11.) Thirty (30) percent reported being “fired, denied a promotion, or experiencing some other form of mistreatment in the workplace related to their gender identity or expression, such as being harassed or attacked.” (Id. at 11.) Finally, “it is generally estimated that transgender women face *4.3 times the risk* of becoming homicide victims than the general population.” (Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).)

ii. Contributions to Society

Discrimination against transgender people clearly is unrelated to their ability to perform and contribute to society. See Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 209 (noting the absence of any “argument or evidence suggesting that being transgender in any way limits one’s ability to contribute to society”); Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting the absence of “any data or argument suggesting that a transgender person, simply by virtue of transgender status, is any less productive than any other member of society”). Indeed, the Individual Plaintiffs in this case contribute not only to society as a whole, but to the military specifically. For years, they have risked their lives serving in combat and non-combat roles, fighting terrorism around the world, and working to secure the safety and security of our forces overseas. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 133 at ¶¶ 7-9; Dkt. No. 134 at ¶¶ 5-6; Dkt. No. 135 at ¶¶ 6-7; Dkt. No. 136 at ¶¶ 6-7.) Their exemplary service has been recognized by the military itself, with many having received awards and distinc-

tions. (See Dkt. No. 131 at ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 133 at ¶ 12; Dkt. No. 134 at ¶ 7.)

iii. Immutability

Transgender people clearly have “immutable” and “distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.” Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)). Experts agree that gender identity has a “biological component,” and there is a “medical consensus that gender identity is deep-seated, set early in life, and *impervious to external influences.*” (Dkt. No. 143 at ¶¶ 21-22 (emphasis added).) In other contexts, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[s]exual orientation and sexual identity” are “immutable” and are “so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be required to abandon them.” Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005).

iv. Political Power

Despite increased visibility in recent years, transgender people as a group lack the relative political power to protect themselves from wrongful discrimination. While the exact number is unknown, transgender people make up less than 1 percent of the nation’s adult population. (Dkt. No. 143, Ex. B at 3 (estimating 0.3 percent)); see also Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 209 (estimating 0.6 percent). Fewer than half of the states have laws that explicitly prohibit discrimination against transgender people. (Dkt. No. 169, Ex. A at 12.) Further, recent actions by President Trump’s administration have removed many of the limited protections

afforded by federal law. (*Id.* at 12-13.) Finally, openly transgender people are vastly underrepresented in and have been “systematically excluded from the most important institutions of self-governance.” SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014). There are no openly transgender members of the United States Congress or the federal judiciary, and only one out of more than 7,000 state legislators is openly transgender. (Dkt. No. 169, Ex. A at 14); see also Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 140.

Recognizing these factors, courts have consistently found that transgender people constitute, at minimum, a quasi-suspect class.⁸ See, e.g., Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 208-10; Stone, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 768; Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139-40; Highland, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 873-74; Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Today, the Court concludes that transgender people constitute a suspect class. Transgender people have long been forced to live in silence, or to come out and face the threat of overwhelming discrimination.

⁸ The Ninth Circuit applies heightened scrutiny to equal protection claims involving discrimination based on sexual orientation. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 484; Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 468 (9th Cir. 2014). This reasoning further supports the Court’s conclusion as to the applicable level of scrutiny, as discrimination based on transgender status burdens a group that has in many ways “experienced even greater levels of societal discrimination and marginalization.” Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 n.8; see also Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (“Particularly in comparison to gay people . . . transgender people lack the political strength to protect themselves. . . . [A]lthough there are and were gay members of the United States Congress . . . as well as gay federal judges, there is no indication that there have ever been any transgender members of the United States Congress or federal judiciary.”)

Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in Plaintiffs' and Washington's favor as to the applicable level of scrutiny. The Ban specifically targets one of the most vulnerable groups in our society, and must satisfy strict scrutiny if it is to survive.

2. Level of Deference

Defendants claim that “considerable deference is owed to the President and the DoD in making military personnel decisions,” and that for this reason, Plaintiffs' and Washington's constitutional claims necessarily fail. (Dkt. No. 194 at 16.)

The Court previously found that the Ban—as set forth in President Trump's Twitter Announcement and 2017 Memorandum—was not owed deference, as it was not supported by “any evidence of considered reason or deliberation.” (Dkt. No. 103 at 17-18.) Indeed, at the time he announced the Ban, “all of the reasons proffered by the President for excluding transgender individuals from the military were not merely unsupported, but were actually *contradicted* by the studies, conclusions, and judgment of the military itself.” Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 212 (emphasis in original); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67-72 (1981) (concluding that deference is owed to well-reasoned policies that are not adopted “unthinkingly” or “reflexively and not for any considered reason”); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986) (concluding that deference is owed where a policy results from the “professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest”); compare Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 305 (D.D.C. 1978) (concluding that deference is not owed

where a policy is adopted “casually, over the military’s objections and without significant deliberation”).

Now that the specifics of the Ban have been further defined in the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan, whether the Court owes deference to the Ban presents a more complicated question. Any justification for the Ban must be “genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). However, the Court is mindful that “complex[,] subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition . . . and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments,” reserved for the Legislative and Executive Branches. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). The Court’s entry of a preliminary injunction was not intended to prevent the military from continuing to review the implications of open service by transgender people, nor to preclude it from *ever* modifying the Carter Policy.

Defendants claim that the military has done just that, and that the Ban—as set forth in the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan—is now the product of a deliberative review. In particular, Defendants claim the Ban has been subjected to “an exhaustive study” and is consistent with the recommendations of a “Panel of Experts” convened by Secretary Mattis to study “military service by transgender individuals, focusing on military readiness, lethality, and unit cohesion,” and tasked with “conduct[ing] an independent multi-disciplinary review and study of relevant data and information pertaining to transgender Service members.” (See Dkt. No. 226 at 9-10; Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 19.) Defendants claim that the Panel was com-

prised of senior military leaders who received “support from medical and personnel experts from across the [DoD] and [DHS],” and considered “input from transgender Service members, commanders of transgender Service members, military medical professionals, and civilian medical professionals with experience in the care and treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria.” (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 20.) “Unlike previous reviews on military service by transgender individuals,” Defendants claim that the Panel’s analysis was “informed by the [DoD]’s own data obtained since the new policy began to take effect last year.” (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1 at 3.) The Panel’s findings are set forth in a 44-page “Report and Recommendations on Military Service by Transgender Persons,” which concludes that “the realities associated with service by transgender individuals are far more complicated than the prior administration or RAND had assumed,” and that because gender transition “would impede readiness, limit deployability, and burden the military with additional costs . . . the risks associated with maintaining the Carter [P]olicy . . . counsel in favor of” the Ban. (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 46.)

Having carefully considered the Implementation Plan—including the content of the DoD’s “Report and Recommendations on Military Service by Transgender Persons”—the Court concludes that whether the Ban is entitled to deference raises an unresolved question of fact. The Implementation Plan was not disclosed until March 29, 2018. (See Dkt. No. 224, Exs. 1, 2.) As Defendants’ claims and evidence regarding their justifications for the Ban were presented to the Court only recently, Plaintiffs and Washington have not yet had an opportunity to test or respond to these claims. On the

present record, the Court cannot determine whether the DoD's deliberative process—including the timing and thoroughness of its study and the soundness of the medical and other evidence it relied upon—is of the type to which Courts typically should defer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1).

Accordingly, the Court DENIES summary judgment as to the level of deference due. The Court notes that, even in the event it were to conclude that deference is owed, it would not be rendered powerless to address Plaintiffs' and Washington's constitutional claims, as Defendants seem to suggest. "The military has not been exempted from constitutional provisions that protect the rights of individuals' and, indeed, '[i]t is precisely the role of the courts to determine whether those rights have been violated.'" Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 210 (quoting Emory v. Sec'y of Navy, 819 F.2d 291, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) ("This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service."); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70 ("[D]eference does not mean abdication."). Indeed, the Court notes that Defendants' claimed justifications for the Ban—to promote "military lethality and readiness" and avoid "disrupt[ing] unit cohesion, or tax[ing] military resources"—are strikingly similar to justifications offered in the past to support the military's exclusion and segregation of African American service members, its "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, and its policy preventing women from serving in combat roles. (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1 at 2-4; see also Dkt. No. 163, Ex. 1 at 8-16.)

3. Equal Protection, Due Process, and First Amendment Claims

A policy will survive strict scrutiny only where it is motivated by a “compelling state interest” and “the means chosen ‘fit’ the compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate . . . prejudice or stereotype.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (citation omitted). In making this determination, the Court must carefully evaluate “the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced” by the government for the use of a particular classification in a particular context. Id. at 327. Whether Defendants have satisfied their burden of showing that the Ban is constitutionally adequate (i.e., that it was sincerely motivated by compelling state interests, rather than by prejudice or stereotype) necessarily turns on facts related to Defendants’ deliberative process. As discussed previously, these facts are not yet before the Court. (See supra, § II.C.2.) Further, Defendants’ responsive briefing addresses only the constitutionality of the Interim Guidance, a document that has never been, and is not now, the applicable policy before the Court. (See Dkt. No. 194 at 19-24.)

For the same reasons it cannot grant summary judgment as to the level of deference due at this stage, the Court cannot reach the merits of the alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, the Court DENIES summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s equal protection, due process, and First Amendment claims.

IV. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Defendants contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to impose injunctive or declaratory relief against President Trump in his official capacity, and move for partial summary judgment on all claims against him individually. (Dkt. No. 194 at 25-27.) Plaintiffs and Washington do not oppose summary judgment as to injunctive relief, but respond that declaratory relief against President Trump is proper. (Dkt. No. 207 at 8-10; Dkt. No. 209 at 6-8.)

The Court is aware of no case holding that the President is immune from declaratory relief—Rather, the Supreme Court has explicitly affirmed the entry of such relief. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 425 n.9 (1998) (affirming entry of declaratory judgment against President Clinton stating that Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional); NTEU v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 609 (1974) (“[N]o immunity established under any case known to this Court bars every suit against the president for injunctive, declaratory or mandamus relief.”); see also Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 788 (9th Cir. 2017) (vacating injunctive relief against President Trump, but not dismissing him in suit for declaratory relief), vacated as moot, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017).

The Court concludes that, not only does it have jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief against the President, but that this case presents a “most appropriate instance” for such relief. See NTEU, 492 F.2d at 616. The Ban was announced by President Trump (@realDonaldTrump) on Twitter, and was memorialized in the 2017 and 2018 Presidential Memorandums, which were each signed by President Trump. (Dkt. No. 149, Exs. 1, 2; Dkt.

No. 224, Ex. 3.) While President Trump’s Twitter Announcement suggests he authorized the Ban “[a]fter consultation with [his] Generals and military experts” (Dkt. No. 149, Ex. 1), Defendants to date have failed to identify even one General or military expert he consulted, despite having been ordered to do so repeatedly. (See Dkt. Nos. 204, 210, 211.) Indeed, the *only* evidence concerning the lead-up to his Twitter Announcement reveals that military officials were entirely unaware of the Ban, and that the abrupt change in policy was “unexpected.” (See Dkt. No. 208, Ex. 1 at 9 (General Joseph F. Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating on July 27, 2017 “Chiefs, I know yesterday’s announcement was unexpected . . . ”); Dkt. No. 152, Ex. A at 11-12 (“The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted at all on the decision . . . The decision was announced so abruptly that White House and Pentagon officials were unable to explain the most basic of details about how it would be carried out.”).) Even Secretary Mattis was given only one day’s notice before President Trump’s Twitter Announcement. (*Id.*; Dkt. No. 163, Ex. 1 at 26.) As no other persons have ever been identified by Defendants—despite repeated Court orders to do so—the Court is led to conclude that the Ban was devised by the President, and the President alone.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment with regard to injunctive relief and DENIES the motion with regard to declaratory relief.

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that all Plaintiffs and Washington have standing; that the 2018 Memorandum and Implementation Plan do not moot their claims; and that transgender people constitute a suspect class necessitating a strict scrutiny standard of review. The Court concludes that questions of fact remain as to whether, and to what extent, deference is owed to the Ban, and whether the Ban, when held to strict scrutiny, survives constitutional review.

Accordingly, the Court rules as follows:

1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' and Washington's motions for summary judgment with respect to the applicable level of scrutiny, which is strict scrutiny;
2. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' and Washington's motions for summary judgment with respect to the applicable level of deference;
3. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' and Washington's motions for summary judgment with respect to violations of equal protection, due process, and the First Amendment;
4. The Court GRANTS Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to injunctive relief against President Trump and DENIES the cross-motion with respect to declarative relief against President Trump.
5. The preliminary injunction previously entered otherwise remains in full force and effect. Defendants (with the exception of President Trump), their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other person or entity subject to their control or acting directly or indirectly in concert or participation with

Defendants are enjoined from taking any action relative to transgender people that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump's July 26, 2017 announcement.

6. The Court's ruling today eliminates the need for Plaintiffs and Washington to respond to Defendants' Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 223), which is hereby STRICKEN.

7. The parties are directed to proceed with discovery and prepare for trial on the issues of whether, and to what extent, deference is owed to the Ban and whether the Ban violates equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment.

The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.

Dated Apr. 13, 2018.

/s/ MARSHA J. PECHMAN
MARSHA J. PECHMAN
United States District Judge

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

No. 2:17-cv-1297-MJP

RYAN KARNOSKI, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Filed: Apr. 30, 2018

**DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL—
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION APPEAL**

Notice is hereby given that all Defendants appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from this Court's Order of April 13, 2018, ECF No. 233, granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' and Washington's motions for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, and striking Defendants' motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

Date: Apr. 30, 2018

Respectfully submitted,
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APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

Case No. C17-1297-MJP
RYAN KARNOSKI, PLAINTIFF

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, DEFENDANT

Filed: June 15, 2018

**ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. (Dkt. No. 238.) Having reviewed the Motion, the Responses (Dkt. Nos. 250, 257), the Reply (Dkt. No. 261), the Jurisdictional Briefing (Dkt. Nos. 275, 276, 277) and all related papers, the Court DENIES the Motion.

Background

On December 11, 2017, the Court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction barring Defendants from "taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo" that existed prior to President Trump's July 26, 2017 announcement" of a policy excluding transgender people from

serving openly in the military (the “Ban”). (Dkt. No. 103 at 23.)

On March 23, 2018, Defendants released an Implementation Plan and a 2018 Memorandum which purported to “revoke” the 2017 Memorandum and replace it with a “new policy” that does not mandate a “categorical prohibition on transgender service members,” but rather targets those who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria. (Dkt. No. 226 at 3-7; see also Dkt. No. 224, Exs. 1, 3.)

On April 13, 2018, the Court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs and the State of Washington, and ordered the preliminary injunction to remain in effect. (See Dkt. No. 233.) In so doing, the Court rejected Defendants’ claim that the subsequent Implementation Plan and 2018 Memorandum represented a “new policy.” (Id. at 12.) Instead, the Court found that the Implementation Plan and 2018 Memorandum “threaten the very same violations that caused it and others to enjoin the Ban in the first place.” (Id.)

On April 30, 2018, Defendants filed a notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit. (See Dkt. No. 236.) On the same day, Defendants filed this motion requesting an expedited ruling no later than May 4, 2018. (Dkt. No. 238.) After the Court declined to issue an expedited ruling (Dkt. No. 240), Defendants filed a separate Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal in the Ninth Circuit. See Karnoski v. Trump, No. 18-35347, Dkt. No. 3 (9th Cir. May 4, 2018). The Ninth Circuit has yet to issue a ruling.

Discussion

I. Jurisdiction

While the filing of a notice of appeal generally divests a district court of jurisdiction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) allows the Court “to issue further orders with respect to an injunction, even pending appeal, in order to preserve the status quo or ensure compliance with its earlier orders.” Doe v. Trump, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court’s exercise of jurisdiction may not “adjudicate anew the merits of the case” nor “materially alter the status of the case on appeal.” Southwest Marine, 242 F.3d at 1166.

II. Motion to Stay

A stay pending appeal “is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether to grant a stay, the Court considers: (1) whether Defendants have made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether Defendants will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether a stay will substantially injure Plaintiffs and Washington; and (4) whether the public interest supports a stay. Id. at 434.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Court finds that Defendants have not made a “strong showing” that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal.

First, each of the arguments raised by Defendants already has been considered and rejected by the Court, and Defendants have done nothing to remedy the constitutional violations that supported entry of a preliminary injunction in the first instance. Instead, Defendants attempt, once again, to characterize the Implementation Plan and 2018 Memorandum as a “new and different” policy, distinct from the one this Court and others enjoined. (See Dkt. No. 261 at 3.) The Court was not persuaded by this argument before, and it is not persuaded now.

Second, while Defendants claim—without explanation—that “the Ninth Circuit and/or this Court ultimately . . . are highly likely to conclude that significant deference is appropriate” (Dkt. No. 238 at 5), whether *any* deference is due remains unresolved. (See Dkt. No. 233 at 24-27.) Defendants bear the burden of providing a “genuine” justification for the Ban. To withstand judicial scrutiny, that justification must “describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations” and must not be “hypothesized or invented *post hoc* in response to litigation.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 535-36 (1996); see also Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1696-97 (2012). To date, Defendants have steadfastly refused to put before the Court evidence of any justification that predates this litigation. (See Dkt. No. 211.)

Finally, the Court notes that the Ban currently is enjoined by four separate courts. See Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D. Md. 2017); Stockman v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1799-JGB-KK, Dkt. No. 79 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017). As a practical matter, Defendants face the

challenge of convincing each of these courts to lift their injunctions before they may implement the Ban.

B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm

The Court finds that Defendants have not shown that they will be irreparably harmed without a stay. Defendants contend that unless stayed, the injunction “will irreparably harm the government (and the public) by compelling the military to adhere to a policy it has concluded poses substantial risks.” (Dkt. No. 238 at 2.) In particular, Defendants contend that allowing transgender people to serve openly—as they have for nearly two years—threatens to “undermine readiness, disrupt unit cohesion, and impose an unreasonable burden on the military that is not conducive to military effectiveness and lethality.” (*Id.* at 3.)

Since the preliminary injunction has been in effect, the Senate Committee on Armed Services has heard testimony from high-ranking military officials on the effect of open service by transgender people. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley testified that he “monitor[s] very closely” the situation and had received “precisely zero” reports of problems related to unit cohesion, discipline, and morale. (Dkt. No. 255, Ex. 14 at 6.) Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson testified that he, too, had received no negative reports, and that in his experience, “[i]t’s steady as she goes.” (Dkt. No. 255, Ex. 15.) As this testimony makes clear, Defendants’ hypothetical and conclusory claims are unsupported by evidence and do not establish a likelihood of irreparable harm.

C. Injury to Plaintiffs and Washington and Impact on Public Interest

Having found that Defendants have not established either a likelihood of success on the merits or a likelihood of irreparable harm absent a stay, the Court need not reach these remaining factors. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1164. However, the Court also finds that these factors do not support entry of a stay.

The Court already found that Plaintiffs and Washington are likely to suffer irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, and for the same reasons, will be injured by a stay. (See Dkt. No. 103 at 20-21.) Further, maintaining the injunction pending appeal advances the public's interest in a strong national defense, as it allows skilled and qualified service members to continue to serve their country.

D. Scope of the Preliminary Injunction

The Court declines to stay the preliminary injunction insofar as it grants nationwide relief. While Defendants contend that the injunction should be limited to the nine Individual Plaintiffs (Dkt. No. 238 at 2), the Court disagrees. The scope of injunctive relief is to be "dictated by the extent of the violation established." Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). The Ban, like the Constitution, would apply nationwide. Accordingly, a nationwide injunction is appropriate.

Conclusion

Because Defendants have not established that a stay of the preliminary injunction is appropriate, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion. The status quo shall remain "steady as she goes," and the preliminary in-

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junction shall remain in full force and effect nationwide.

The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.

Dated June 15, 2018.

/s/ MARSHA J. PECHMAN
THE HONORABLE MARSHA J. PECHMAN
United States Senior District Court Judge

APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-35347

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01297-MJP
Western District of Washington, Seattle

RYAN KARNOSKI, ET AL.; PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT,
INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; ET. AL.,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Filed: July 18, 2018

ORDER

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit
Judges.

On December 11, 2017, the district court granted appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction. On March 29, 2018, appellants moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction in light of the March 23, 2018 presidential memorandum and proposed Department of Defense policy. On April 13, 2018, the district court declined to dissolve the preliminary injunction and struck

appellants' motion. On April 30, 2018, appellants' filed the instant appeal.

Before the court is appellants' motion for a stay of the December 11, 2017 preliminary injunction pending this appeal of the April 13, 2018 order striking appellant's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Appellant's motion in this court requests neither emergency nor expedited treatment.

A stay pending appeal "is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review." *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The district court's December 11, 2017 preliminary injunction preserves the status quo, allowing transgender service members to serve in the military in their preferred gender and receive transition-related care. Appellants ask this court to stay the preliminary injunction, pending the outcome of this appeal, in order to implement a new policy. Accordingly, a stay of the preliminary injunction would upend, rather than preserve, the status quo.

Therefore, we deny the motion for a stay of the December 11, 2017 preliminary injunction (Docket Entry No. 3).

Briefing is complete.

APPENDIX G



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

[JUL 28 2015]

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Transgender Service Members

Effective as of July 13, 2015, no Service member shall be involuntarily separated or denied reenlistment or continuation of active or reserve service on the basis of their gender identity, without the personal approval of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. This approval authority may not be further delegated.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness will chair a working group composed of senior representatives from each of the Military Departments, Joint Staff, and relevant components from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to formulate policy options for the DoD regarding the military service of transgender Service members. The working group will start with the presumption that transgender persons can serve openly without adverse impact on military effectiveness and readiness, unless and except where objective, practical impediments are identified, and shall present its recommendations to me within 180 days. Pending the issuance of DoD-wide policy following the submission of the working group's report, any interim guidance issued by the Military Departments will be

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coordinated with, and subject to the prior personal approval of, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. If questions relating to the service of transgender members arise, the Military Departments should address them to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

/s/ ASH CARTER
ASH CARTER

cc:

DepSecDef
CJCS
USDs
DoD, GC
ASD(LA)
ATSD(PA)

APPENDIX H



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000**

[JUN 30 2016]

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF
DEFENSE
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT
OFFICER
CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD
BUREAU
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND
PROGRAM EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND
EVALUATION
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHIEF
INFORMATION OFFICER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT**

DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE
AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD
ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Directive-type Memorandum (DTM) 16-005,
“Military Service of Transgender Service
Members”

References: DoD Directive 1020.02E, “Diversity Man-
agement and Equal Opportunity in the
DoD,” June 8, 2015

DoD Directive 1350.2, “Department of De-
fense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO)
Program,” August 18, 1995

DoD Instruction 6130.03, “Medical Stand-
ards for Appointment, Enlistment, or In-
duction in the Military Services,” April 28,
2010, as amended

Purpose. This DTM:

- Establishes policy, assigns responsibili-
ties, and prescribes procedures for the
standards for retention, accession, sep-
aration, in-service transition, and medical
coverage for transgender personnel serv-
ing in the Military Services.
- Except as otherwise noted, this DTM will
take effect immediately. It will be con-
verted to a new DoDI. This DTM will
expire effective June 30, 2017.

Applicability. This DTM applies to OSD, the Military
Departments (including the Coast Guard at all times, in-
cluding when it is a Service in the Department of Home-

land Security by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD.

Policy.

- The defense of the Nation requires a well-trained, all-volunteer force comprised of Active and Reserve Component Service members ready to deploy worldwide on combat and operational missions.
- The policy of the Department of Defense is that service in the United States military should be open to all who can meet the rigorous standards for military service and readiness. Consistent with the policies and procedures set forth in this memorandum, transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve in the military.
- These policies and procedures are premised on my conclusion that open service by transgender Service members while being subject to the same standards and procedures as other members with regard to their medical fitness for duty, physical fitness, uniform and grooming, deployability, and retention, is consistent with military readiness and with strength through diversity.

Responsibilities

- The Secretaries of the Military Departments will:
 - o Take immediate action to identify all DoD, Military Department, and Service issuances, the content of which relate to, or may be affected by, the open service of transgender Service members.
 - o Draft revisions to the issuances identified, and, as necessary and appropriate, draft new issuances, consistent with the policies and procedures in this memorandum.
 - o Submit to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) the text of any proposed revisions to existing Military Department and Service regulations, policies, and guidance, and of any proposed new issuance, no later than 30 days in advance of the proposed publication date of each.
- The USD(P&R) will:
 - o Take immediate action to identify all DoD, Military Department, and Service issuances, the content of which relate to, or may be affected by, the open service of transgender Service members.

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- o Draft revisions to the issuances identified in this memorandum and, as necessary, and, as necessary and appropriate, draft new issuances, consistent with the policies and procedures in this memorandum.

Procedures. See Attachment.

Releasability. **Cleared for public release.** This DTM is available on the DoD Issuances Website at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

/s/ ASH CARTER
ASH CARTER

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
Secretary of Homeland Security
Commandant, United States Coast Guard

ATTACHMENT
PROCEDURES

1. SEPARATION AND RETENTION

a. Effective immediately, no otherwise qualified Service member may be involuntarily separated, discharged or denied reenlistment or continuation of service, solely on the basis of their gender identity.

b. Transgender Service members will be subject to the same standards as any other Service member of the same gender; they may be separated, discharged, or denied reenlistment or continuation of service under existing processes and basis, but not due solely to their gender identity or an expressed intent to transition genders.

c. A Service member whose ability to serve is adversely affected by a medical condition or medical treatment related to their gender identity should be treated, for purposes of separation and retention, in a manner consistent with a Service member whose ability to serve is similarly affected for reasons unrelated to gender identity or gender transition.

2. ACCESSIONS

a. Medical standards for accession into the Military Services help to ensure that those entering service are free of medical conditions or physical defects that may require excessive time lost from duty. Not later than July 1, 2017, the USD(P&R) will update DoD Instruction 6130.03 to reflect the following policies and procedures:

(1) A history of gender dysphoria is disqualifying, **unless**, as certified by a licensed medical provider, the applicant has been stable without clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning for 18 months.

(2) A history of medical treatment associated with gender transition is disqualifying, **unless**, as certified by a licensed medical provider:

(a) the applicant has completed all medical treatment associated with the applicant's gender transition; and

(b) the applicant has been stable in the preferred gender for 18 months; and

(c) If the applicant is presently receiving cross-sex hormone therapy post-gender transition, the individual has been stable on such hormones for 18 months.

(3) A history of sex reassignment or genital reconstruction surgery is disqualifying, **unless**, as certified by a licensed medical provider:

(a) a period of 18 months has elapsed since the date of the most recent of any such surgery; and

(b) no functional limitations or complications persist, nor is any additional surgery required.

b. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commandant, United States Coast Guard, may waive or reduce the 18-month periods, in whole or in part, in individual cases for applicable reasons.

c. The standards for accession described in this memorandum will be reviewed no later than 24 months

from the effective date of this memorandum and may be maintained or changed, as appropriate, to reflect applicable medical standards and clinical practice guidelines, ensure consistency with military readiness, and promote effectiveness in the recruiting and retention policies and procedures of the Armed Forces.

3. IN-SERVICE TRANSITION

a. Effective October 1, 2016, DoD will implement a construct by which transgender Service members may transition gender while serving, in accordance with DoDI 1300.28, which I signed today.

b. Gender transition while serving in the military presents unique challenges associated with addressing the needs of the Service member in a manner consistent with military mission and readiness needs.

4. MEDICAL POLICY. Not later than October 1, 2016, the USD(P&R) will issue further guidance on the provision of necessary medical care and treatment to transgender Service members. Until the issuance of such guidance, the Military Departments and Services will handle requests from transgender Service members for particular medical care or to transition on a case-by-case basis, following the spirit and intent of this memorandum and DoDI 1300.28.

5. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

a. All Service members are entitled to equal opportunity in an environment free from sexual harassment and unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. It is the Department's position, consistent with the U.S. Attorney General's opinion, that discrimina-

tion based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination.

b. The USD(P&R) will revise DoD Directives (DoDDs) 1020.02E, "Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity in the DoD," and 1350.2, "Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program," to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and to incorporate such prohibitions in all aspects of the DoD MEO program. The USD(P&R) will prescribe the period of time within which Military Department and Service issuances implementing the MEO program must be conformed accordingly.

6. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

a. The USD(P&R) will expeditiously develop and promulgate education and training materials to provide relevant, useful information for transgender Service members, commanders, the force, and medical professionals regarding DoD policies and procedures on transgender service. The USD(P&R) will disseminate these training materials to all Military Departments and the Coast Guard not later than October 1, 2016.

b. Not later than November 1, 2016, each Military Department will issue implementing guidance and a written force training and education plan. Such plan will detail the Military Department's plan and program for training and educating its assigned force (to include medical professionals), including the standards to which such education and training will be conducted, and the period of time within which it will be completed.

7. IMPLEMENTATION AND TIMELINE

a. Not later than October 1, 2016, the USD(P&R) will issue a Commander's Training Handbook, medical guidance, and guidance establishing procedures for changing a Service member's gender marker in DEERS.

b. In the period between the date of this memorandum and October 1, 2016, the Military Departments and Services will address requests for gender transition from serving transgender Service members on a case-by-case basis, following the spirit and intent of this memorandum and DoDI 1300.28.

APPENDIX I



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

[JUN 30, 2017]

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Accession of Transgender Individuals
into the Military Services

Since becoming the Secretary of Defense, I have emphasized that the Department of Defense must measure each policy decision against one critical standard: will the decision affect the readiness and lethality of our armed forces? Put another way, how will the decision affect the ability of America's military forces to defend the Nation? It is against this standard that I provide the following guidance on the way forward in accessing transgender individuals into the military Services.

Under existing DoD policy, such accessions were anticipated to begin on July 1, 2017. The Deputy Secretary directed the Services to assess their readiness to begin accessions. Building upon that work and after consulting with the Service Chiefs and Secretaries, I have determined that it is necessary to defer the start of accessions for six months. We will use this additional time to evaluate more carefully the impact of such accessions on readiness and lethality. This review will include all relevant considerations.

My intent is to ensure that I personally have the benefit of the views of the military leadership and of the senior civilian officials who are now arriving in the Department. This action in no way presupposes the outcome of the review, nor does it change policies and procedures currently in effect under DoD Instruction 1300.28, "In-Service Transition for Transgender Service Members." I am confident we will continue to treat all Service members with dignity and respect.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness will lead this review and will report the results to me not later than December 1, 2017.

/s/ JAMES N. MATTIS
JAMES N. MATTIS

APPENDIX J

Donald J. Trump  @realDonaldTrump · 4h
....victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail. Thank you

39K  25K  73K 

Donald J. Trump  @realDonaldTrump · 4h
....Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming....

24K  27K  71K 

Donald J. Trump  @realDonaldTrump · 4h
After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government will not accept or allow.....

14K  26K  66K 

APPENDIX K

Federal Register/Vol. 82, No. 167/
Wednesday, Aug. 30, 2017/
Presidential Documents

41319

Presidential Documents**Memorandum of Aug. 25, 2017****Military Service by Transgender Individuals****Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense [and] the Secretary of Homeland Security**

Section 1. Policy. (a) Until June 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (collectively, the Departments) generally prohibited openly transgender individuals from accession into the United States military and authorized the discharge of such individuals. Shortly before President Obama left office, however, his Administration dismantled the Departments' established framework by permitting transgender individuals to serve openly in the military, authorizing the use of the Departments' resources to fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures, and permitting accession of such individuals after July 1, 2017. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security have since extended the deadline to alter the currently effective accession policy to January 1, 2018, while the Departments continue to study the issue.

In my judgment, the previous Administration failed to identify a sufficient basis to conclude that terminating the Departments' longstanding policy and practice would not hinder military effectiveness and lethality,

disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military resources, and there remain meaningful concerns that further study is needed to ensure that continued implementation of last year's policy change would not have those negative effects.

(b) Accordingly, by the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States under the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including Article II of the Constitution, I am directing the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, to return to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016 until such time as a sufficient basis exists upon which to conclude that terminating that policy and practice would not have the negative effects discussed above. The Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security, may advise me at any time, in writing, that a change to this policy is warranted.

Sec. 2. Directives. The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, shall:

(a) maintain the currently effective policy regarding accession of transgender individuals into military service beyond January 1, 2018, until such time as the Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security, provides a recommendation to the contrary that I find convincing; and

(b) halt all use of DoD or DHS resources to fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex.

Sec. 3. *Effective Dates and Implementation.* Section 2(a) of this memorandum shall take effect on January 1, 2018. Sections 1(b) and 2(b) of this memorandum shall take effect on March 23, 2018. By February 21, 2018, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to me a plan for implementing both the general policy set forth in section 1(b) of this memorandum and the specific directives set forth in section 2 of this memorandum. The implementation plan shall adhere to the determinations of the Secretary of Defense, made in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, as to what steps are appropriate and consistent with military effectiveness and lethality, budgetary constraints, and applicable law. As part of the implementation plan, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall determine how to address transgender individuals currently serving in the United States military. Until the Secretary has made that determination, no action may be taken against such individuals under the policy set forth in section 1(b) of this memorandum.

Sec. 4. *Severability.* If any provision of this memorandum, or the application of any provision of this memorandum, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this memorandum and other dissimilar applications of the provision shall not be affected.

Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

- (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
- (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d) The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the *Federal Register*.

/s/ DONALD J. TRUMP
DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, Aug. 25, 2017

APPENDIX L



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

[9/14/17]

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF
DEFENSE
COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT
OFFICER
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT
AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST
AND EVALUATION
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT

DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES
OFFICE
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF DOD FIELD
ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference—Implementation of
Presidential Memorandum on Military Ser-
vice by Transgender Individuals

Reference: Military Service by Transgender Individuals
—Interim Guidance

I direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to lead the Department of Defense (DoD) in developing an Implementation Plan on military service by transgender individuals, to effect the policy and directives in Presidential Memorandum, *Military Service by Transgender Individuals*, dated August 25, 2017 (“Presidential Memorandum”). The implementation plan will establish the policy, standards and procedures for service by transgender individuals in the military, consistent with military readiness, lethality, deployability, budgetary constraints, and applicable law.

The Deputy Secretary and the Vice Chairman, supported by a panel of experts drawn from DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (“Panel”), shall propose for my consideration recommendations supported by appropriate evidence and information, not later than January 15, 2018. The Deputy Secretary and the Vice Chairman will be supported by the

[IMAGE OMITTED]

Panel, which will be comprised of the Military Department Under Secretaries, Service Vice Chiefs, and Service Senior Enlisted Advisors. The Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman shall designate personnel to support the Panel's work to ensure Panel recommendations reflect senior civilian experience, combat experience, and expertise in military operational effectiveness. The Panel and designated support personnel shall bring a comprehensive, holistic, and objective approach to study military service by transgender individuals, focusing on military readiness, lethality, and unit cohesion, with due regard for budgetary constraints and consistent with applicable law. The Panel will be chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and will report to the Deputy Secretary and the Vice Chairman at least every 30 days and address, at a minimum, the following three areas:

Accessions: The Presidential Memorandum directs DoD to maintain the policy currently in effect, which generally prohibits accession of transgender individuals into military service. The Panel will recommend updated accession policy guidelines to reflect currently accepted medical terminology.

Medical Care: The Presidential Memorandum halts the use of DoD or DHS resources to fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel, effective March 23, 2018, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex. The implementation plan will enumerate the specific surgical procedures associated with sex reassignment treatment that shall be prohibited from DoD or DHS re-

sourcing unless necessary to protect the health of the Service member.

Transgender Members Serving in the Armed Forces: The Presidential Memorandum directs that the Department return to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016. The Presidential Memorandum also allows the Secretary to determine how to address transgender individuals currently serving in the Armed Forces. The Panel will set forth, in a single policy document, the standards and procedures applicable to military service by transgender persons, with specific attention to addressing transgender persons currently serving. The Panel will develop a universal retention standard that promotes military readiness, lethality, deployability, and unit cohesion.

To support its efforts, the Panel will conduct an independent multi-disciplinary review and study of relevant data and information pertaining to transgender Service members. The study will be planned and executed to inform the Implementation Plan. The independent multi-disciplinary review and study will address aspects of medical care and treatment, personnel management, general policies and practices, and other matters, including the effects of the service of transgender persons on military readiness, lethality, deployability, and unit cohesion.

The Panel may obtain advice from outside experts on an individual basis. The recommendations of the Deputy Secretary and the Vice Chairman will be coordinated with senior civilian officials, the Military Departments, and the Joint Staff.

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All DoD Components will cooperate fully in, and will support the Deputy Secretary and the Vice Chairman in their efforts, by making personnel and resources available upon request in support of their efforts.

/s/ JAMES N. MATTIS
JAMES N. MATTIS

cc:
Secretary of Homeland Security

APPENDIX M



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

[9/14/17]

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
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STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF
DEFENSE
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF
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DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES
OFFICE
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF DOD FIELD
ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Military Service by Transgender Individuals
—Interim Guidance

The Department of Defense (“DoD”) has received the Presidential Memorandum, *Military Service by Transgender Individuals*, dated August 25, 2017 (“Presidential Memorandum”). DoD will carry out the President’s policy and directives in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard. Not later than February 21, 2018, I will present the President with a plan to implement the policy and directives in the Presidential Memorandum. Consistent with military effectiveness and lethality, budgetary constraints, and applicable law, the implementation plan will establish the policy, standards and procedures for transgender individuals serving in the military. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by a panel of experts (“Panel”), shall propose for my consideration recommendations supported by appropriate evidence and information.

To comply with the Presidential Memorandum, ensure the continued combat readiness of the force, and maximize flexibility in the development of the implementation plan, the attached Interim Guidance takes effect immediately and will remain in effect until I promulgate DoD’s final policy in this matter. By agree-

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ment with the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, this Interim Guidance also applies to the U.S. Coast Guard.

/s/ JAMES N. MATTIS
JAMES N. MATTIS

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
Secretary of Homeland Security

Interim Guidance

First and foremost, we will continue to treat every Service member with dignity and respect.

Accessions: The procedures set forth in Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6130.03, *Medical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Military Services*, dated April 28, 2010 (Change 1), which generally prohibit the accession of transgender individuals into the Military Services, remain in effect because current or history of gender dysphoria or gender transition does not meet medical standards, subject to the normal waiver process.

Medical Care and Treatment: Service members who receive a gender dysphoria diagnosis from a military medical provider will be provided treatment for the diagnosed medical condition. As directed by the Memorandum, no new sex reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel will be permitted after March 22, 2018, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex.

In-Service Transition for Transgender Service Members: The policies and procedures set forth in DoDI 1300.28, *In-Service Transition for Transgender Service Members*, dated July 1, 2016, remain in effect until I promulgate DoD's final guidance in this matter.

Separation and Retention of Transgender Service members:

Service members who have completed their gender transition process and whose gender marker has been changed in DEERS will continue to serve in their pre-

ferred gender while this Interim Guidance remains in effect.

An otherwise qualified transgender Service member whose term of service expires while this Interim Guidance remains in effect, *may*, at the Service member's request, be re-enlisted in service under existing procedures.

As directed by the Memorandum, no action may be taken to involuntarily separate or discharge an otherwise qualified Service member solely on the basis of a gender dysphoria diagnosis or transgender status. Transgender Service members are subject to the same standards as any other Service member of the same gender; they may be separated or discharged under existing bases and processes, but not on the basis of a gender dysphoria diagnosis or transgender status.

Reestablishment of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) Central Coordination Cell: The OUSD(P&R) will reestablish the Central Coordination Cell (CCC) to provide expert advice and assistance to the Military Departments and Services and to commanders with regard to this Interim Guidance. The CCC may be reached at <https://ra.sp.pentagon.mil/DoDCCC/SitePages/HomePage.aspx>.

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APPENDIX N

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
ON
MILITARY SERVICE BY TRANSGENDER PERSONS**



Feb. 2018

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Executive Summary

It is a bedrock principle of the Department of Defense that any eligible individual¹ who can meet the high standards for military service without special accommodations should be permitted to serve. This is no less true for transgender persons than for any other eligible individual. This report, and the recommendations contained herein, proceed from this fundamental premise.

The starting point for determining a person's qualifications for military duty is whether the person can meet the standards that govern the Armed Forces. Federal law requires that anyone entering into military service be "qualified, effective, and able-bodied."² Military standards are designed not only to ensure that this statutory requirement is satisfied but to ensure the overall military effectiveness and lethality of the Armed Forces.

The purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the Nation's wars. No human endeavor is more physically, mentally, and emotionally demanding than the life and death struggle of battle. Because the stakes in war can be so high—both for the success and survival of individual units in the field and for the success and survival of the Nation—it is imperative that all Service members are physically and mentally able to execute their duties and responsibilities without fail, even while exposed to extreme danger, emotional stress, and harsh environments.

¹ 10 U.S.C. §§ 504, 505(a), 12102(b).

² 10 U.S.C. § 505(a).

Although not all Service members will experience direct combat, standards that are applied universally across the Armed Forces must nevertheless account for the possibility that any Service member could be thrust into the crucible of battle at any time. As the Department has made clear to Congress, “[c]ore to maintaining a ready and capable military force is the understanding that each Service member is required to be available and qualified to perform assigned missions, including roles and functions outside of their occupation, in any setting.”³ Indeed, there are no occupations in the military that are exempt from deployment.⁴ Moreover, while non-combat positions are vital to success in war, the physical and mental requirements for those positions should not be the barometer by which the physical and mental requirements for all positions, especially combat positions, are defined. Fitness for combat must be the metric against which all standards and requirements are judged. To give all Service members the best chance of success and survival in war, the Department must maintain the highest possible standards of physical and mental health and readiness across the force.

While individual health and readiness are critical to success in war, they are not the only measures of military effectiveness and lethality. A fighting unit is not a mere collection of individuals; it is a unique social organism that, when forged properly, can be far more powerful than the sum of its parts. Human experience

³ Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Fiscal Year 2016 Report to Congress on the Review of Enlistment of Individuals with Disabilities in the Armed Forces,” pp. 8-9 (Apr. 2016).

⁴ *Id.*

over millennia—from the Spartans at Thermopylae to the band of brothers of the 101st Airborne Division in World War II, to Marine squads fighting building-to-building in Fallujah—teaches us this. Military effectiveness requires transforming a collection of individuals into a single fighting organism—merging multiple individual identities into one. This transformation requires many ingredients, including strong leadership, training, good order and discipline, and that most intangible, but vital, of ingredients—unit cohesion or, put another way, human bonding.

Because unit cohesion cannot be easily quantified, it is too often dismissed, especially by those who do not know what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes called the “incommunicable experience of war.”⁵ But the experience of those who, as Holmes described, have been “touched with fire” in battle and the experience of those who have spent their lives studying it attest to the enduring, if indescribable, importance of this intangible ingredient. As Dr. Jonathan Shay articulated it in his study of combat trauma in Vietnam, “[s]urvival and success in combat often require soldiers to virtually read one another’s minds, reflexively covering each other with as much care as they cover themselves, and going to one another’s aid with little thought for safety.”⁶ Not only is unit cohesion essential to the health of the unit, Dr. Shay found that it was essential to the health of the individual soldier as well. “Destruction of unit cohesion,” Dr. Shay concluded, “cannot be overemphasized

⁵ *The Essential Holmes: Selections from the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.*, p. 93 (Richard Posner, ed., University of Chicago Press 1992).

⁶ Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam*, p. 61 (Atheneum 1994).

as a reason why so many psychological injuries that might have healed spontaneously instead became chronic.”⁷

Properly understood, therefore, military effectiveness and lethality are achieved through a combination of inputs that include individual health and readiness, strong leadership, effective training, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion. To achieve military effectiveness and lethality, properly designed military standards must foster these inputs. And, for the sake of efficiency, they should do so at the least possible cost to the taxpayer.

To the greatest extent possible, military standards—especially those relating to mental and physical health—should be based on scientifically valid and reliable evidence. Given the life-and-death consequences of warfare, the Department has historically taken a conservative and cautious approach in setting the mental and physical standards for the accession and retention of Service members.

Not all standards, however, are capable of scientific validation or quantification. Instead, they are the product of professional military judgment acquired from hard-earned experience leading Service members in peace and war or otherwise arising from expertise in military affairs. Although necessarily subjective, this judgment is the best, if not only, way to assess the impact of any given military standard on the intangible ingredients of military effectiveness mentioned above—leadership, training, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion.

⁷ Id. at 198

For decades, military standards relating to mental health, physical health, and the physiological differences between men and women operated to preclude from military service transgender persons who desired to live and work as the opposite gender.

Relying on a report by an outside consultant, the RAND National Defense Research Institute, the Department, at the direction of Secretary Ashton Carter, reversed that longstanding policy in 2016. Although the new policy—the “Carter policy”—did not permit all transgender Service members to change their gender to align with their preferred gender identity, it did establish a process to do so for transgender Service members who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria—that is, the distress or impairment of functioning that is associated with incongruity between one’s biological sex and gender identity. It also set in motion a new accession policy that would allow applicants who had a history of gender dysphoria, including those who had already transitioned genders, to enter into military service, provided that certain conditions were met. Once a change of gender is authorized, the person must be treated in all respects in accordance with the person’s preferred gender, whether or not the person undergoes any hormone therapy or surgery, so long as a treatment plan has been approved by a military physician.

The new accession policy had not taken effect when the current administration came into office. Secretary James Mattis exercised his discretion and approved the recommendation of the Services to delay the Carter accession policy for an additional six months so that the Department could assess its impact on military effectiveness and lethality. While that review was ongoing,

President Trump issued a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard expressing that further study was needed to examine the effects of the prior administration's policy change. The memorandum directed the Secretaries to reinstate the longstanding preexisting accession policy until such time that enough evidence existed to conclude that the Carter policy would not have negative effects on military effectiveness, lethality, unit cohesion, and military resources. The President also authorized the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to address the disposition of transgender individuals who were already serving in the military.

Secretary Mattis established a Panel of Experts that included senior uniformed and civilian leaders of the Department and U.S. Coast Guard, many with experience leading Service members in peace and war. The Panel made recommendations based on each Panel member's independent military judgment. Consistent with those recommendations, the Department, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security, recommends the following policy to the President:

A. Transgender Persons Without a History or Diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria, Who Are Otherwise Qualified for Service, May Serve, Like All Other Service Members, in Their Biological Sex. Transgender persons who have not transitioned to another gender and do not have a history or current diagnosis of gender dysphoria—i.e., they identify as a gender other than their biological sex but do not currently experience distress or impairment of functioning in meeting the standards associated with their biological sex—are quali-

fied for service, provided that they, like all other persons, satisfy all standards and are capable of adhering to the standards associated with their biological sex. This is consistent with the Carter policy, under which transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria must serve, like everyone else, in their biological sex.

B. Transgender Persons Who Require or Have Undergone Gender Transition Are Disqualified. Except for those who are exempt under this policy, as described below, and except where waivers or exceptions to policy are otherwise authorized, transgender persons who are diagnosed with gender dysphoria, either before or after entry into service, and require transition-related treatment, or have already transitioned to their preferred gender, should be ineligible for service. For reasons discussed at length in this report, the Department concludes that accommodating gender transition could impair unit readiness; undermine unit cohesion, as well as good order and discipline, by blurring the clear lines that demarcate male and female standards and policies where they exist; and lead to disproportionate costs. Underlying these conclusions is the considerable scientific uncertainty and overall lack of high quality scientific evidence demonstrating the extent to which transition-related treatments, such as cross-sex hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery—interventions which are unique in psychiatry and medicine—remedy the multifaceted mental health problems associated with gender dysphoria.

C. Transgender Persons With a History or Diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria Are Disqualified, Except Under Certain Limited Circumstances. Transgender persons who are diagnosed with, or have a history of, gender dysphoria are generally disqualified from accession or retention in the Armed Forces. The standards recommended here are subject to the same procedures for waiver or exception to policy as any other standards. This is consistent with the Department's handling of other mental conditions that require treatment. As a general matter, only in the limited circumstances described below should persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria be accessed or retained.

1. *Accession of Individuals Diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria.* Persons with a history of gender dysphoria may access into the Armed Forces, provided that they can demonstrate 36 consecutive months of stability (i.e., absence of gender dysphoria) immediately preceding their application; they have not transitioned to the opposite gender; and they are willing and able to adhere to all standards associated with their biological sex.

2. *Retention of Service Members Diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria.* Consistent with the Department's general approach of applying less stringent standards to retention than to accession in order to preserve the Department's substantial investment in trained personnel, Service members who are diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering military service may be retained without waiver, provided that they are willing and able to adhere to all standards associated with their biological sex, the Service member does not require gender transition, and the Service member is not otherwise non-deployable for more than 12 months or for a

period of time in excess of that established by Service policy (which may be less than 12 months).⁸

3. *Exempting Current Service Members Who Have Already Received a Diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria.* Transgender Service members who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a military medical provider after the effective date of the Carter policy, but before the effective date of any new policy, may continue to receive all medically necessary care, to change their gender marker in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS), and to serve in their preferred gender, even after the new policy commences. This includes transgender Service members who entered into military service after January 1, 2018, when the Carter accession policy took effect by court order. The Service member must, however, adhere to the Carter policy procedures and may not be deemed to be non-deployable for more than 12 months or for a period of time in excess of that established by Service policy (which may be less than 12 months). While the Department believes that its solemn promise to these Service members, and the investment it has made in them, outweigh the risks identified in this report, should its decision to exempt these Service members be used by a court as a basis for invalidating the entire policy, this exemption is and should be deemed severable from the rest of the policy.

Although the precise number is unknown, the Department recognizes that many transgender persons who desire to serve in the military experience gender

⁸ Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DoD Retention Policy for Non-Deployable Service Members” (Feb. 14, 2018).

dysphoria and, as a result, could be disqualified under the recommended policy set forth in this report. Many transgender persons may also be unwilling to adhere to the standards associated with their biological sex as required by longstanding military policy. But others have served, and are serving, with distinction under the standards for their biological sex, like all other Service members. Nothing in this policy precludes service by transgender persons who do not have a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria and are willing and able to meet all standards that apply to their biological sex.

Moreover, nothing in this policy should be viewed as reflecting poorly on transgender persons who suffer from gender dysphoria, or have had a history of gender dysphoria, and are accordingly disqualified from service. The vast majority of Americans from ages 17 to 24—that is, 71%—are ineligible to join the military without a waiver for mental, medical, or behavioral reasons.⁹ Transgender persons with gender dysphoria are no less valued members of our Nation than all other categories of persons who are disqualified from military service. The Department honors all citizens who wish to dedicate, and perhaps even lay down, their lives in defense of the Nation, even when the Department, in the best interests of the military, must decline to grant their wish.

Military standards are high for a reason—the trauma of war, which all Service members must be prepared to face, demands physical, mental, and moral standards that will give all Service members the greatest chance to survive the ordeal with their bodies, minds, and moral

⁹ The Lewin Group, Inc., “Qualified Military Available (QMA) and Interested Youth: Final Technical Report,” p. 26 (Sept. 2016).

character intact. The Department would be negligent to sacrifice those standards for any cause. There are serious differences of opinion on this issue, even among military professionals, but in the final analysis, given the uncertainty associated with the study and treatment of gender dysphoria, the competing interests involved, and the vital interests at stake—our Nation’s defense and the success and survival of our Service members in war—the Department must proceed with caution.

History of Policies Concerning Transgender Persons

For decades, military standards have precluded the accession and retention of certain transgender persons.¹⁰

¹⁰ For purposes of this report, the Department uses the broad definition of “transgender” adopted by the RAND National Defense Institute in its study of transgender service: “an umbrella term used for individuals who have sexual identity or gender expression that differs from their assigned sex at birth.” RAND National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Implications of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly*, p. 75 (RAND Corporation 2016), available at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1530/RAND_RR1530.pdf (“RAND Study”). According to the Human Rights Campaign, “[t]he transgender community is incredibly diverse. Some transgender people identify as male or female, and some identify as genderqueer, nonbinary, agender, or somewhere else on or outside of the spectrum of what we understand gender to be.” Human Rights Campaign, “Understanding the Transgender Community,” <https://www.hrc.org/resources/understanding-the-transgender-community> (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). A subset of transgender persons are those who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria. According to the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* published by the American Psychiatric Association, “gender dysphoria” is a “marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender” that “is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” American Psychiatric Asso-

Accession standards—i.e., standards that govern induction into the Armed Forces—have historically disqualified persons with a history of “transsexualism.” Also disqualified were persons who had undergone genital surgery or who had a history of major abnormalities or defects of the genitalia. These standards prevented transgender persons, especially those who had undergone a medical or surgical gender transition, from accessing into the military, unless a waiver was granted.

Although retention standards—i.e., standards that govern the retention and separation of persons already serving in the Armed Forces—did not require the mandatory processing for separation of transgender persons, it was a permissible basis for separation processing as a physical or mental condition not amounting to a disability. More typically, however, such Service members were processed for separation because they suffered from other associated medical conditions or

ciation, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)*, pp. 452-53 (5th ed. 2013). Based on these definitions, a person can be transgender without necessarily having gender dysphoria (i.e., the transgender person does not suffer “clinically significant distress or impairment” on account of gender incongruity). A 2016 survey of active duty Service members estimated that approximately 1% of the force—8,980 Service members—identify as transgender. Office of People Analytics, Department of Defense, “2016 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members, Transgender Service Members,” pp. 1-2. Currently, there are 937 active duty Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since June 30, 2016. In addition, when using the term “biological sex” or “sex,” this report is referring to the definition of “sex” in the RAND study: “a person’s biological status as male or female based on chromosomes, gonads, hormones, and genitals (intersex is a rare exception).” RAND Study at 75.

comorbidities, such as depression, which were also a basis for separation processing.

At the direction of Secretary Carter, the Department made significant changes to these standards. These changes—i.e., the “Carter policy”—prohibit the separation of Service members on the basis of their gender identity and allow Service members who are diagnosed with gender dysphoria to transition to their preferred gender.

Transition-related treatment is highly individualized and could involve what is known as a “medical transition,” which includes cross-sex hormone therapy, or a “surgical transition,” which includes sex reassignment surgery. Service members could also forego medical transition treatment altogether, retain all of their biological anatomy, and live as the opposite gender—this is called a “social transition.”

Once the Service member’s transition is complete, as determined by the member’s military physician and commander in accordance with his or her individualized treatment plan, and the Service member provides legal documentation of gender change, the Carter policy allows for the Service member’s gender marker to be changed in the DEERS. Thereafter, the Service member must be treated in every respect—including with respect to physical fitness standards; berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities; and uniform and grooming standards—in accordance with the Service member’s preferred gender. The Carter policy, however, still requires transgender Service members who have not changed their gender marker in DEERS, including persons who identify as other than male or female, to meet the standards associated with their biological sex.

The Carter policy also allows accession of persons with gender dysphoria who can demonstrate stability in their preferred gender for at least 18 months. The accession policy did not take effect until required by court order, effective January 1, 2018.

The following discussion describes in greater detail the evolution of accession and retention standards pertaining to transgender persons.

Transgender Policy Prior to the Carter Policy

A. Accession Medical Standards

DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6130.03, *Medical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Military Services*, establishes baseline accession medical standards used to determine an applicant's medical qualifications to enter military service. This instruction is reviewed every three to four years by the Accession Medical Standards Working Group (AMSWG), which includes medical and personnel subject matter experts from across the Department, its Military Services, and the U.S. Coast Guard. The AMSWG thoroughly reviews over 30 bodily systems and medical focus areas while carefully considering evidence-based clinical information, peer-reviewed scientific studies, scientific expert consensus, and the performance of existing standards in light of empirical data on attrition, deployment readiness, waivers, and disability rates. The AMSWG also considers inputs from non-government sources and evaluates the applicability of those inputs against the military's mission and operational environment, so that the Department and the Military Services can formally coordinate updates to these standards.

Accession medical standards are based on the operational needs of the Department and are designed to ensure that individuals are physically and psychologically “qualified, effective, and able-bodied persons”¹¹ capable of performing military duties. Military effectiveness requires that the Armed Forces manage an integrated set of unique medical standards and qualifications because all military personnel must be available for worldwide duty 24 hours a day without restriction or delay. Such duty may involve a wide range of demands, including exposure to danger or harsh environments, emotional stress, and the operation of dangerous, sensitive, or classified equipment. These duties are often in remote areas lacking immediate and comprehensive medical support. Such demands are not normally found in civilian occupations, and the military would be negligent in its responsibility if its military standards permitted admission of applicants with physical or emotional impairments that could cause harm to themselves or others, compromise the military mission, or aggravate any current physical or mental health conditions that they may have.

In sum, these standards exist to ensure that persons who are under consideration for induction into military service are:

- free of contagious diseases that probably will endanger the health of other personnel;
- free of medical conditions or physical defects that may require excessive time lost from duty for necessary treatment or hospitalization, or prob-

¹¹ 10 U.S.C. § 505(a).

ably will result in separation from service for medical unfitness;

- medically capable of satisfactorily completing required training;
- medically adaptable to the military environment without the necessity of geographical area limitations; and
- medically capable of performing duties without aggravation of existing physical defects or medical conditions.¹²

Establishing or modifying an accession standard is a risk management process by which a health condition is evaluated in terms of the probability and effect on the five listed outcomes above. These standards protect the applicant from harm that could result from the rigors of military duty and help ensure unit readiness by minimizing the risk that an applicant, once inducted into military service, will be unavailable for duty because of illness, injury, disease, or bad health.

Unless otherwise expressly provided, a current diagnosis or verified past medical history of a condition listed in DoDI 6130.03 is presumptively disqualifying.¹³ Accession standards reflect the considered opinion of the Department's medical and personnel experts that an applicant with an identified condition should only be able to serve if they can qualify for a waiver. Waivers

¹² Department of Defense Instruction 6130.03, *Medical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Military Services* (Apr. 28, 2010), incorporating Change 1, p. 2 (Sept. 13, 2011) ("DoDI 6130.03").

¹³ *Id.* at 10.

are generally only granted when the condition will not impact the individual's assigned specialty or when the skills of the individual are unique enough to warrant the additional risk. Waivers are not generally granted when the conditions of military service may aggravate the existing condition. For some conditions, applicants with a past medical history may nevertheless be eligible for accession if they meet the requirements for a certain period of "stability"—that is, they can demonstrate that the condition has been absent for a defined period of time prior to accession.¹⁴ With one exception,¹⁵ each accession standard may be waived in the discretion of the accessing Service based on that Service's policies and practices, which are driven by the unique requirements of different Service missions, different Service occupations, different Service cultures, and at times, different Service recruiting missions.

Historically, mental health conditions have been a great concern because of the unique mental and emotional stresses of military service. Mental health conditions frequently result in attrition during initial entry training and the first term of service and are routinely considered by in-service medical boards as a basis for separation. Department mental health accession standards have typically aligned with the conditions identified in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM), which is published by the Ameri-

¹⁴ See, e.g., *id.* at 47.

¹⁵ The accession standards for applicants with HIV are not waivable absent a waiver from both the accessing Service and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. See Department of Defense Instruction 6485.01, *Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in Military Service Members* (Jun. 7, 2013).

can Psychiatric Association (APA). The DSM sets forth the descriptions, symptoms, and other criteria for diagnosing mental disorders. Health care professionals in the United States and much of the world use the DSM as the authoritative guide to the diagnosis of mental disorders.

Prior to implementation of the Carter policy, the Department's accession standards barred persons with a "[h]istory of psychosexual conditions, including but not limited to transsexualism, exhibitionism, transvestism, voyeurism, and other paraphilias."¹⁶ These standards were consistent with DSM-III, which in 1980, introduced the diagnosis of transsexualism.¹⁷ In 1987, DSM-III-R added gender identity disorder, non-transsexual type.¹⁸ DSM-IV, which was published in 1994, combined these two diagnoses and called the resulting condition "gender identity disorder."¹⁹ Due to challenges associated with updating and publishing a new iteration of DoDI 6130.03, the DoDI's terminology has not changed to reflect the changes in the DSM, including further changes that will be discussed later.

DoDI 6130.03 also contains other disqualifying conditions that are associated with, but not unique to, transgender persons, especially those who have under-

¹⁶ DoDI 6130.03 at 48.

¹⁷ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III)*, pp. 261-264 (3rd ed. 1980).

¹⁸ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R)*, pp. 76-77 (3rd ed. revised 1987).

¹⁹ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV)*, pp. 532-538 (4th ed. 1994).

taken a medical or surgical transition to the opposite gender. These include:

- a history of chest surgery, including but not limited to the surgical removal of the breasts,²⁰ and genital surgery, including but not limited to the surgical removal of the testicles;²¹
- a history of major abnormalities or defects of the genitalia, including but not limited to change of sex, hermaphroditism, penis amputation, and pseudohermaphroditism;²²
- mental health conditions such as suicidal ideation, depression, and anxiety disorder;²³ and
- the use of certain medications, or conditions requiring the use of medications, such as hormone therapies and anti-depressants.²⁴

Together with a diagnosis of transsexualism, these conditions, which were repeatedly validated by the AMSWG, provided multiple grounds for the disqualification of transgender persons.

B. Retention Standards

The standards that govern the retention of Service members who are already serving in the military are generally less restrictive than the corresponding accession standards due to the investment the Depart-

²⁰ DoDI 6130.03 at 18.

²¹ *Id.* at 25-27.

²² *Id.*

²³ *Id.* at 47-48.

²⁴ *Id.* at 48.

ment has made in the individual and their increased capability to contribute to mission accomplishment.

Also unlike the Department's accession standards, each Service develops and applies its own retention standards. With respect to the retention of transgender Service members, these Service-specific standards may have led to inconsistent outcomes across the Services, but as a practical matter, before the Carter policy, the Services generally separated Service members who desired to transition to another gender. During that time, there were no express policies allowing individuals to serve in their preferred gender rather than their biological sex.

Previous Department policy concerning the retention (administrative separation) of transgender persons was not clear or rigidly enforced. DoDI 1332.38, *Physical Disability Evaluation*, now cancelled, characterized "sexual gender and identity disorders" as a basis for allowing administrative separation for a condition not constituting a disability; it did not require mandatory processing for separation. A newer issuance, DoDI 1332.18, *Disability Evaluation System (DES)*, August 5, 2014, does not reference these disorders but instead reflects changes in how such medical conditions are characterized in contemporary medical practice.

Earlier versions of DoDI 1332.14, *Enlisted Administrative Separations*, contained a cross reference to the list of conditions not constituting a disability in former DoDI 1332.38. This was how "transsexualism," the older terminology, was used as a basis for administrative separation. Separation on this basis required formal counseling and an opportunity to address the issue, as well as a finding that the condition was inter-

fering with the performance of duty. In practice, transgender persons were not usually processed for administrative separation on account of gender dysphoria or gender identity itself, but rather on account of medical comorbidities (e.g., depression or suicidal ideation) or misconduct due to cross dressing and related behavior.

The Carter Policy

At the direction of Secretary Carter, the Department began formally reconsidering its accession and retention standards as they applied to transgender persons with gender dysphoria in 2015. This reevaluation, which culminated with the release of the Carter policy in 2016, was prompted in part by amendments to the DSM that appeared to change the diagnosis for gender identity disorder from a disorder to a treatable condition called gender dysphoria. Starting from the assumption that transgender persons are qualified for military service, the Department sought to identify and remove the obstacles to such service. This effort resulted in substantial changes to the Department's accession and retention standards to accommodate transgender persons with gender dysphoria who require treatment for transitioning to their preferred gender.

A. Changes to the DSM

When the APA published the fifth edition of the DSM in May 2013, it changed “gender identity disorder” to “gender dysphoria” and designated it as a “condition”—a new diagnostic class applicable only to gender dysphoria—rather than a “disorder.”²⁵ This change

²⁵ See American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)* pp. 451-459 (5th ed. 2013) (“DSM-5”).

was intended to reflect the APA’s conclusion that gender nonconformity alone—without accompanying distress or impairment of functioning—was not a mental disorder.²⁶ DSM-5 also decoupled the diagnosis for gender dysphoria from diagnoses for “sexual dysfunction and paraphilic disorders, recognizing fundamental differences between these diagnoses.”²⁷

According to DSM-5, gender dysphoria in adolescents and adults is “[a] marked incongruence between one’s experience/expressed gender and assigned gender, of at least 6 months’ duration, as manifested by at least two of the following”:

- A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents, the anticipated secondary sex characteristics).
- A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics because of a marked

²⁶ RAND Study at 77; see also Hayes Directory, “Sex Reassignment Surgery for the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria” (May 15, 2014), p. 1 (“This change was intended to reflect a consensus that gender nonconformity is not a psychiatric disorder, as it was previously categorized. However, since the condition may cause clinically significant distress and since a diagnosis is necessary for access to medical treatment, the new term was proposed.”); Irene Folaron & Monica Lovasz, “Military Considerations in Transsexual Care of the Active Duty Member,” *Military Medicine*, Vol. 181, pp. 1182-83 (2016) (“In the DSM-5, [gender dysphoria] has replaced the diagnosis of ‘gender identity disorder’ in order to place the focus on the dysphoria and to diminish the pathology associated with identity incongruence.”).

²⁷ Irene Folaron & Monica Lovasz, “Military Considerations in Transsexual Care of the Active Duty Member,” *Military Medicine*, Vol. 181, p. 1183 (2016).

incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender (or in young adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of the anticipated secondary sex characteristics).

- A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other gender.
- A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).
- A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).
- A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).

Importantly, DSM-5 observed that gender dysphoria “is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”²⁸

B. The Department Begins Review of Transgender Policy

On July 28, 2015, then Secretary Carter issued a memorandum announcing that no Service members would be involuntarily separated or denied reenlistment or continuation of service based on gender identity or a diagnosis of gender dysphoria without the personal approval of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel

²⁸ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)*, p. 453 (5th ed. 2013).

and Readiness.²⁹ The memorandum also created the Transgender Service Review Working Group (TSRWG) “to study the policy and readiness implications of welcoming transgender persons to serve openly.”³⁰ The memorandum specifically directed the working group to “start with the presumption that transgender persons can serve openly without adverse impact on military effectiveness and readiness, unless and except where objective practical impediments are identified.”³¹

As part of this review, the Department commissioned the RAND National Defense Research Institute to conduct a study to “(1) identify the health care needs of the transgender population, transgender Service members’ potential health care utilization rates, and the costs associated with extending health care coverage for transition-related treatments; (2) assess the potential readiness impacts of allowing transgender Service members to serve openly; and (3) review the experiences of foreign militaries that permit transgender Service members to serve openly.”³² The resulting report, entitled *Assessing the Implications of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly*, reached several conclusions. First, the report estimated that there are between 1,320 and 6,630 transgender Service members already serving in the active component of the Armed Forces and 830 to 4,160 in the Selected Reserve.³³ Second, the report predicted “annual gender

²⁹ Memorandum from Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, “Transgender Service Members” (July 28, 2015).

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ *Id.*

³² RAND Study at 1.

³³ *Id.* at x-xi.

transition-related health care to be an extremely small part of the overall health care provided to the [active component] population.”³⁴ Third, the report estimated that active component “health care costs will increase by between \$2.4 million and \$8.4 million annually—an amount that will have little impact on and represents an exceedingly small proportion of [active component] health care expenditures (approximately \$6 billion in FY 2014).”³⁵ Fourth, the report “found that less than 0.0015 percent of the total available labor-years would be affected, based on estimated gender transition-related health care utilization rates.”³⁶ Finally, the report concluded that “[e]xisting data suggest a minimal impact on unit cohesion as a result of allowing transgender personnel to serve openly.”³⁷ “Overall,” according to RAND, “our study found that the number of U.S. transgender Service members who are likely to seek transition-related care is so small that a change in policy will likely have a marginal impact on health care costs and the readiness of the force.”³⁸

The RAND report thus acknowledged that there will be an adverse impact on health care utilization and costs, readiness, and unit cohesion, but concluded nonetheless that the impact will be “negligible” and “marginal” because of the small estimated number of transgender Service members relative to the size of the active component of the Armed Forces. Because of the RAND re-

³⁴ Id. at xi.

³⁵ Id. at xi-xii.

³⁶ Id. at xii.

³⁷ Id.

³⁸ Id. at 69.

port's macro focus, however, it failed to analyze the impact at the micro level of allowing gender transition by individuals with gender dysphoria. For example, as discussed in more detail later, the report did not examine the potential impact on unit readiness, perceptions of fairness and equity, personnel safety, and reasonable expectations of privacy at the unit and sub-unit levels, all of which are critical to unit cohesion. Nor did the report meaningfully address the significant mental health problems that accompany gender dysphoria—from high rates of comorbidities and psychiatric hospitalizations to high rates of suicide ideation and suicidality—and the scope of the scientific uncertainty regarding whether gender transition treatment fully remedies those problems.

C. New Standards for Transgender Persons

Based on the RAND report, the work of the TSRWG, and the advice of the Service Secretaries, Secretary Carter approved the publication of DoDI 1300.28, *In-service Transition for Service Members Identifying as Transgender*, and Directive-type Memorandum (DTM) 16-005, "Military Service of Transgender Service Members," on June 30, 2016. Although the new retention standards were effective immediately upon publication of the above memoranda, the accession standards were delayed until July 1, 2017, to allow time for training all Service members across the Armed Forces, including recruiters, Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) personnel, and basic training cadre, and to allow time for modifying facilities as necessary.

1. *Retention Standards.* DoDI 1300.28 establishes the procedures by which Service members who are diagnosed with gender dysphoria may administra-

tively change their gender. Once a Service member receives a gender dysphoria diagnosis from a military physician, the physician, in consultation with the Service member, must establish a treatment plan. The treatment plan is highly individualized and may include cross-sex hormone therapy (i.e., medical transition), sex reassignment surgery (i.e., surgical transition), or simply living as the opposite gender but without any cross-sex hormone or surgical treatment (i.e., social transition). The nature of the treatment is left to the professional medical judgment of the treating physician and the individual situation of the transgender Service member. The Department does not require a Service member with gender dysphoria to undergo cross-sex hormone therapy, sex reassignment surgery, or any other physical changes to effectuate an administrative change of gender. During the course of treatment, commanders are authorized to grant exceptions from physical fitness, uniform and grooming, and other standards, as necessary and appropriate, to transitioning Service members. Once the treating physician determines that the treatment plan is complete, the Service member's commander approves, and the Service member produces legal documentation indicating change of gender (e.g., certified birth certificate, court order, or U.S. passport), the Service member may request a change of gender marker in DEERS. Once the DEERS gender marker is changed, the Service member is held to all standards associated with the member's transitioned gender, including uniform and grooming standards, body composition assessment, physical readiness testing, Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program participation, and other military standards congruent to the member's gender. Indeed, the Service member must

be treated in all respects in accordance with the member's transitioned gender, including with respect to berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities. Transgender Service members who do not meet the clinical criteria for gender dysphoria, by contrast, remain subject to the standards and requirements applicable to their biological sex.

2. *Accession Standards.* DTM 16-005 directed that the following medical standards for accession into the Military Services take effect on July 1, 2017:

- (1) A history of gender dysphoria is disqualifying, unless, as certified by a licensed medical provider, the applicant has been stable without clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning for 18 months.
- (2) A history of medical treatment associated with gender transition is disqualifying, unless, as certified by a licensed medical provider:
 - (a) the applicant has completed all medical treatment associated with the applicant's gender transition; and
 - (b) the applicant has been stable in the preferred gender for 18 months; and
 - (c) if the applicant is presently receiving cross-sex hormone therapy post-gender transition, the individual has been stable on such hormones for 18 months.
- (3) A history of sex reassignment or genital reconstruction surgery is disqualifying, unless, as certified by a licensed medical provider:

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- (a) a period of 18 months has elapsed since the date of the most recent of any such surgery; and
- (b) no functional limitations or complications persist, nor is any additional surgery required.³⁹

³⁹ Memorandum from Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, “Directive-type Memorandum (DTM) 16-005, ‘Military Service of Transgender Service Members.’” Attachment, pp. 1-2 (June 30, 2016).

Panel of Experts Recommendation

The Carter policy's accession standards for persons with a history of gender dysphoria were set to take effect on July 1, 2017, but on June 30, after consultation with the Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff of each Service, Secretary Mattis postponed the new standards for an additional six months "to evaluate more carefully the impact of such accessions on readiness and lethality."⁴⁰ Secretary Mattis specifically directed that the review would "include all relevant considerations" and would last for five months, with a due date of December 1, 2017.⁴¹ The Secretary also expressed his desire to have "the benefit of the views of the military leadership and of the senior civilian officials who are now arriving in the Department."⁴²

While Secretary Mattis's review was ongoing, President Trump issued a memorandum, on August 25, 2017, directing the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, to reinstate longstanding policy generally barring the accession of transgender individuals "until such time as a sufficient basis exists upon which to conclude that terminating that policy and practice" would not "hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military resources."⁴³ The President

⁴⁰ Memorandum from James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense, "Accession of Transgender Individuals into the Military Services" (June 30, 2017).

⁴¹ Id.

⁴² Id.

⁴³ Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, "Military Service by Transgender Individuals" (Aug. 25, 2017).

found that “further study is needed to ensure that continued implementation of last year’s policy change would not have those negative effects.”⁴⁴ Accordingly, the President directed both Secretaries to maintain the prohibition on accession of transgender individuals “until such time as the Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security, provides a recommendation to the contrary” that is convincing.⁴⁵ The President made clear that the Secretaries may advise him “at any time, in writing, that a change to this policy is warranted.”⁴⁶ In addition, the President gave both Secretaries discretion to “determine how to address transgender individuals currently serving” in the military and made clear that no action be taken against them until a determination was made.⁴⁷

On September 14, 2017, Secretary Mattis established a Panel of Experts to study, in a “comprehensive, holistic, and objective” manner, “military service by transgender individuals, focusing on military readiness, lethality, and unit cohesion, with due regard for budgetary constraints and consistent with applicable law.”⁴⁸ He directed the Panel to “conduct an independent multi-disciplinary review and study of relevant data and information pertaining to transgender Service members.”⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Id. at 1.

⁴⁵ Id. at 2.

⁴⁶ Id.

⁴⁷ Id.

⁴⁸ Memorandum from James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense, “Terms of Reference—Implementation of Presidential Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals,” pp. 1-2 (Sept. 14, 2017).

⁴⁹ Id. at 2.

The Panel consisted of the Under Secretaries of the Military Departments (or officials performing their duties), the Armed Services' Vice Chiefs (including the Vice Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard), and the Senior Enlisted Advisors, and was chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness or an official performing those duties. The Secretary of Defense selected these senior leaders because of their experience leading warfighters in war and peace or their expertise in military operational effectiveness. These senior leaders also have the statutory responsibility to organize, train, and equip military forces and are uniquely qualified to evaluate the impact of policy changes on the combat effectiveness and lethality of the force. The Panel met 13 times over a span of 90 days.

The Panel received support from medical and personnel experts from across the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. The Transgender Service Policy Working Group, comprised of medical and personnel experts from across the Department, developed policy recommendations and a proposed implementation plan for the Panel's consideration. The Medical and Personnel Executive Steering Committee, a standing group of the Surgeons General and Service Personnel Chiefs, led by Personnel and Readiness, provided the Panel with an analysis of accession standards, a multi-disciplinary review of relevant data, and information about medical treatment for gender dysphoria and gender transition-related medical care. These groups reported regularly to the Panel and responded to numerous queries for additional information and analysis to support the Panel's review and deliberations. A separate working group tasked with enhancing the lethality of our Armed Forces also

provided a briefing to the Panel on their work relating to retention standards.

The Panel met with and received input from transgender Service members, commanders of transgender Service members, military medical professionals, and civilian medical professionals with experience in the care and treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria. The Panel also reviewed information and analyses about gender dysphoria, the treatment of gender dysphoria, and the effects of currently serving individuals with gender dysphoria on military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and resources. Unlike past reviews, the Panel's analysis was informed by the Department's own data and experience obtained since the Carter policy took effect.

To fulfill its mandate, the Panel addressed three questions:

- Should the Department of Defense access transgender individuals?
- Should the Department allow transgender individuals to transition gender while serving, and if so, what treatment should be authorized?
- How should the Department address transgender individuals who are currently serving?

After extensive review and deliberation, which included evidence in support of and against the Panel's recommendations, the Panel exercised its professional military judgment and made recommendations. The Department considered those recommendations and the information underlying them, as well as additional information within the Department, and now proposes the following policy consistent with those recommendations.

Recommended Policy

To maximize military effectiveness and lethality, the Department, after consultation with and the concurrence of the Department of Homeland Security, recommends cancelling the Carter policy and, as explained below, adopting a new policy with respect to the accession and retention of transgender persons.

The Carter policy assumed that transgender persons were generally qualified for service and that their accession and retention would not negatively impact military effectiveness. As noted earlier, Secretary Carter directed the TSRWG, the group charged with evaluating, and making recommendations on, transgender service, to “start with the presumption that transgender persons can serve openly without adverse impact on military effectiveness and readiness, unless and except where objective practical impediments are identified.”⁵⁰ Where necessary, standards were adjusted or relaxed to accommodate service by transgender persons. The following analysis makes no assumptions but instead applies the relevant standards applicable to everyone to determine the extent to which transgender persons are qualified for military duty.

For the following reasons, the Department concludes that transgender persons should not be disqualified from service solely on account of their transgender status, provided that they, like all other Service members, are willing and able to adhere to all standards, including the standards associated with their biological sex. With respect to the subset of transgender persons

⁵⁰ Memorandum from Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, “Transgender Service Members” (July 28, 2015).

who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, however, those persons are generally disqualified unless, depending on whether they are accessing or seeking retention, they can demonstrate stability for the prescribed period of time; they do not require, and have not undergone, a change of gender; and they are otherwise willing and able to meet all military standards, including those associated with their biological sex. In order to honor its commitment to current Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria, those Service members who were diagnosed after the effective date of the Carter policy and before any new policy takes effect will not be subject to the policy recommended here.

Discussion of Standards

The standards most relevant to the issue of service by transgender persons fall into three categories: mental health standards, physical health standards, and sex-based standards. Based on these standards, the Department can assess the extent to which transgender persons are qualified for military service and, in light of that assessment, recommend appropriate policies.

A. Mental Health Standards

Given the extreme rigors of military service and combat, maintaining high standards of mental health is essential to military effectiveness and lethality. The immense toll that the burden and experience of combat can have on the human psyche cannot be overstated. Therefore, putting individuals into battle, who might be at increased risk of psychological injury, would be reckless, not only for those individuals, but for the Service members who serve beside them as well.

The Department's experience with the mental health issues arising from our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), only underscores the importance of maintaining high levels of mental health across the force. PTSD has reached as high as 2.8% of all active duty Service members, and in 2016, the number of active duty Service members with PTSD stood at 1.5%.⁵¹ Of all Service members in the active component, 7.5% have been diagnosed with a mental health condition of some type.⁵² The Department is mindful of these existing challenges and must exercise caution when considering changes to its mental health standards.

Most mental health conditions and disorders are automatically disqualifying for accession absent a waiver. For example, persons with a history of bipolar disorder, personality disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, suicidal behavior, and even body dysmorphic disorder (to name a few) are barred from entering into military service, unless a waiver is granted.⁵³ For a few conditions, however, persons may enter into service without a waiver if they can demonstrate stability for 24 to 36 continuous months preceding accession. Historically, a person is deemed stable if they are without treatment, symptoms, or behavior of a repeated nature that impaired social, school, or work efficiency for an extended period of several months. Such conditions include depressive disorder (stable for 36 continuous months) and

⁵¹ Deployment Health Clinical Center, "Mental Health Disorder Prevalence among Active Duty Service Members in the Military Health System, Fiscal Years 2005-2016" (Jan. 2017).

⁵² *Id.*

⁵³ DoDI 6130.03 at 47-48.

anxiety disorder (stable for 24 continuous months).⁵⁴ Requiring a period of stability reduces, but does not eliminate, the likelihood that the individual's depression or anxiety will return.

Historically, conditions associated with transgender individuals have been automatically disqualifying absent a waiver. Before the changes directed by Secretary Carter, military mental health standards barred persons with a “[h]istory of psychosexual conditions, including but not limited to transsexualism, exhibitionism, transvestism, voyeurism, and other paraphilias.”⁵⁵ These standards, however, did not evolve with changing understanding of transgender mental health. Today, transsexualism is no longer considered by most mental health practitioners as a mental health condition. According to the APA, it is not a medical condition for persons to identify with a gender that is different from their biological sex.⁵⁶ Put simply, transgender status alone is not a condition.

Gender dysphoria, by contrast, is a mental health condition that can require substantial medical treatment. Many individuals who identify as transgender are diagnosed with gender dysphoria, but “[n]ot all transgender people suffer from gender dysphoria and that distinction,” according to the APA, “is important to keep in mind.”⁵⁷ The DSM-5 defines gender dysphoria

⁵⁴ Id.

⁵⁵ Id. at 48.

⁵⁶ DSM-5 at 452-53.

⁵⁷ American Psychiatric Association, “Expert Q & A: Gender Dysphoria,” available at <https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/expert-qa> (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). Conversely, not all persons with gender dysphoria are transgender. “For ex-

as a “marked incongruence between one’s experience/expressed gender and assigned gender, of at least 6 months duration,” that is manifested in various specified ways.⁵⁸ According to the APA, the “condition is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”⁵⁹

Transgender persons with gender dysphoria suffer from high rates of mental health conditions such as anxiety, depression, and substance use disorders.⁶⁰ High rates of suicide ideation, attempts, and completion among people who are transgender are also well documented in the medical literature, with lifetime rates of suicide attempts reported to be as high as 41% (compared to

ample, some men who are disabled in combat, especially if their injury includes genital wounds, may feel that they are no longer men because their bodies do not conform to their concept of manliness. Similarly, a woman who opposes plastic surgery, but who must undergo mastectomy because of breast cancer, may find that she requires reconstructive breast surgery in order to resolve gender dysphoria arising from the incongruence between her body without breasts and her sense of herself as a woman.” M. Jocelyn Elders, George R. Brown, Eli Coleman, Thomas Kolditz & Alan Steinman, “Medical Aspects of Transgender Military Service,” *Armed Forces & Society*, p. 5 n.22 (Mar. 2014).

⁵⁸ DSM-5 at 452.

⁵⁹ DSM-5 at 453.

⁶⁰ Cecilia Dhejne, Roy Van Vlerken, Gunter Heylens & Jon Arcelus, “Mental health and gender dysphoria: A review of the literature,” *International Review of Psychiatry*, Vol. 28, pp. 44-57 (2016); George R. Brown & Kenneth T. Jones, “Mental Health and Medical Health Disparities in 5135 Transgender Veterans Receiving Healthcare in the Veterans Health Administration: A Case-Control Study,” *LGBT Health*, Vol. 3, p. 128 (Apr. 2016).

4.6% for the general population).⁶¹ According to a 2015 survey, the rate skyrockets to 57% for transgender individuals without a supportive family.⁶² The Department is concerned that the stresses of military life, including basic training, frequent moves, deployment to war zones and austere environments, and the relentless physical demands, will be additional contributors to suicide behavior in people with gender dysphoria. In fact, there is recent evidence that military service can be a contributor to suicidal thoughts.⁶³

⁶¹ Ann P. Haas, Philip L. Rodgers & Jody L. Herman, *Suicide Attempts among Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming Adults: Findings of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey*, p. 2 (American Foundation for Suicide Prevention and The Williams Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law 2014), available at <https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/AFSP-Williams-Suicide-Report-Final.pdf>; H.G. Virupaksha, Daliboyina Muralidhar & Jayashree Ramakrishna, “Suicide and Suicide Behavior among Transgender Persons,” *Indian Journal of Psychological Medicine*, Vol. 38, pp. 505-09 (2016); Claire M. Peterson, Abigail Matthews, Emily Copps-Smith & Lee Ann Conard, “Suicidality, Self-Harm, and Body Dissatisfaction in Transgender Adolescents and Emerging Adults with Gender Dysphoria,” *Suicide and Life Threatening Behavior*, Vol. 47, pp. 475-482 (Aug. 2017).

⁶² Ann P. Haas, Philip L. Rodgers & Jody L. Herman, *Suicide Attempts among Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming Adults: Findings of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey*, pp. 2, 12 (American Foundation for Suicide Prevention and The Williams Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law 2014), available at <https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/AFSP-Williams-Suicide-Report-Final.pdf>.

⁶³ Raymond P. Tucker, Rylan J. Testa, Mark A. Reger, Tracy L. Simpson, Jillian C. Shipherd, & Keren Lehavot, “Current and Military-Specific Gender Minority Stress Factors and Their Relationship with Suicide Ideation in Transgender Veterans,” *Suicide and Life Threatening Behavior* DOI: 10.1111/sltb.12432 (epub ahead

Preliminary data of Service members with gender dysphoria reflect similar trends. A review of the administrative data indicates that Service members with gender dysphoria are eight times more likely to attempt suicide than Service members as a whole (12% versus 1.5%).⁶⁴ Service members with gender dysphoria are also nine times more likely to have mental health encounters than the Service member population as a whole (28.1 average encounters per Service member versus 2.7 average encounters per Service member).⁶⁵ From October 1, 2015 to October 3, 2017, the 994 active duty Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria accounted for 30,000 mental health visits.⁶⁶

It is widely believed by mental health practitioners that gender dysphoria can be treated. Under commonly accepted standards of care, treatment for gender dysphoria can include: psychotherapy; social transition—also known as “real life experience”—to allow patients to live and work in their preferred gender without any hormone treatment or surgery; medical transition to align secondary sex characteristics with patients’ preferred gender using cross-sex hormone therapy and

of print), pp. 1-10 (2018); Craig J. Bryan, AnnaBelle O. Bryan, Bobbie N. Ray-Sannerud, Neysa Etienne & Chad E. Morrow, “Suicide attempts before joining the military increase risk for suicide attempts and severity of suicidal ideation among military personnel and veterans,” *Comprehensive Psychiatry*, Vol. 55, pp. 534-541 (2014).

⁶⁴ Data retrieved from Military Health System data repository (Oct. 2017).

⁶⁵ Data retrieved from Military Health System data repository (Oct. 2017). Study period was Oct. 1, 2015 to July 26, 2017.

⁶⁶ Data retrieved from Military Health System data repository (Oct. 2017).

hair removal; and surgical transition—also known as sex reassignment surgery—to make the physical body—both primary and secondary sex characteristics—resemble as closely as possible patients’ preferred gender.⁶⁷ The purpose of these treatment options is to alleviate the distress and impairment of gender dysphoria by seeking to bring patients’ physical characteristics into alignment with their gender identity—that is, one’s inner sense of one’s own gender.⁶⁸

Cross-sex hormone therapy is a common medical treatment associated with gender transition that may be commenced following a diagnosis of gender dysphoria.⁶⁹ Treatment for women transitioning to men in-

⁶⁷ RAND Study at 5-7, Appendices A & C; see also Hayes Directory, “Sex Reassignment Surgery for the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria,” p. 1 (May 15, 2014) (“The full therapeutic approach to [gender dysphoria] consists of 3 elements or phases, typically in the following order: (1) hormones of the desired gender; (2) real-life experience for 12 months in the desired role; and (3) surgery to change the genitalia and other sex characteristics (e.g., breast reconstruction or mastectomy). However, not everyone with [gender dysphoria] needs or wants all elements of this triadic approach.”); Irene Folaron & Monica Lovasz, “Military Considerations in Transsexual Care of the Active Duty Member,” *Military Medicine*, Vol. 181, p. 1183 (Oct. 2016) (“The Endocrine Society proposes a sequential approach in transsexual care to optimize mental health and physical outcomes. Generally, they recommend initiation of psychotherapy, followed by cross-sex hormone treatments, then [sex reassignment surgery].”).

⁶⁸ RAND Study at 73.

⁶⁹ Wylie C. Hembree, Peggy Cohen-Kettenis, Lous Gooren, Sabine Hannema, Walter Meyer, M. Hassan Murad, Stephen Rosenthal, Joshua Safer, Vin Tangpricha, & Guy T’Sjoen, “Endocrine Treatment of Gender-Dysphoric/Gender Incongruent Persons: An Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline.” *The Journal of*

volves the administration of testosterone, whereas treatment for men transitioning to women requires the blocking of testosterone and the administration of estrogens.⁷⁰ The Endocrine Society’s clinical guidelines recommend laboratory bloodwork every 90 days for the first year of treatment to monitor hormone levels.⁷¹

As a treatment for gender dysphoria, sex reassignment surgery is “a unique intervention not only in psychiatry but in all of medicine.”⁷² Under existing Department guidelines implementing the Carter policy, men transitioning to women may obtain an orchiectomy (surgical removal of the testicles), a penectomy (surgical removal of the penis), a vaginoplasty (surgical creation of a vagina), a clitoroplasty (surgical creation of a clitoris), and a labiaplasty (surgical creation of the labia). Women transitioning to men may obtain a hysterectomy (surgical removal of the uterus), a mastectomy (surgical removal of the breasts), a metoidioplasty (surgical enlargement of the clitoris), a phalloplasty (surgical crea-

Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism, Vol. 102, pp. 3869-3903 (Nov. 2017).

⁷⁰ Id. at 3885-3888.

⁷¹ Id.

⁷² Ceclilia Dhejne, Paul Lichtenstein, Marcus Boman, Anna L. Johansson, Niklas Långström & Mikael Landén, “Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing Sex Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden,” *PLoS One*, Vol. 6, pp. 1-8 (Feb. 2011); see also Hayes Directory, “Sex Reassignment Surgery for the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria,” p. 2 (May 15, 2014) (noting that gender dysphoria “does not readily fit traditional concepts of medical necessity since research to date has not established anatomical or physiological anomalies associated with [gender dysphoria]”); Hayes Annual Review, “Sex Reassignment Surgery for the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria” (Apr. 18, 2017).

tion of a penis), a scrotoplasty (surgical creation of a scrotum) and placement of testicular prostheses, a urethroplasty (surgical enlargement of the urethra), and a vaginectomy (surgical removal of the vagina). In addition, the following cosmetic procedures may be provided at military treatment facilities as well: abdominoplasty, breast augmentation, blepharoplasty (eyelid lift), hair removal, face lift, facial bone reduction, hair transplantation, liposuction, reduction thyroid chondroplasty, rhinoplasty, and voice modification surgery.⁷³

The estimated recovery time for each of the surgical procedures, even assuming no complications, can be substantial. For example, assuming no complications, the recovery time for a hysterectomy is up to eight weeks; a mastectomy is up to six weeks; a phalloplasty is up to three months; a metoidioplasty is up to eight weeks; an orchiectomy is up to six weeks; and a vaginoplasty is up to three months.⁷⁴ When combined with 12 continuous months of hormone therapy, which is

⁷³ Memorandum from Defense Health Agency, “Information Memorandum: Interim Defense Health Agency Procedures for Reviewing Requests for Waivers to Allow Supplemental Health Care Program Coverage of Sex Reassignment Surgical Procedures” (Nov. 13, 2017); see also RAND Study at Appendix C.

⁷⁴ University of California, San Francisco, Center of Excellence for Transgender Health, “Guidelines for the Primary and Gender-Affirming Care of Transgender and Gender Nonbinary People,” available at <http://transhealth.ucsf.edu/trans?page=guidelines-home> (last visited Feb. 16, 2018); Discussion with Dr. Loren Schechter, Visiting Clinical Professor of Surgery, University of Illinois at Chicago (Nov. 9, 2017).

required prior to genital surgery,⁷⁵ the total time necessary for surgical transition can exceed a year.

Although relatively few people who are transgender undergo genital reassignment surgeries (2% of transgender men and 10% of transgender women), we have to consider that the rate of complications for these surgeries is significant, which could increase a transitioning Service member's unavailability.⁷⁶ Even according to the RAND study, 6% to 20% of those receiving vaginoplasty surgery experience complications, meaning that "between three and 11 Service members per year would experience a long-term disability from gender reassignment surgery."⁷⁷ The RAND study further notes that of those receiving phalloplasty surgery, as many as 25%—one in four—will have complications.⁷⁸

The prevailing judgment of mental health practitioners is that gender dysphoria can be treated with the transition-related care described above. While there are numerous studies of varying quality showing that this treatment can improve health outcomes for individuals with gender dysphoria, the available scientific

⁷⁵ RAND Study at 80; see also Irene Folaron & Monica Lovasz, "Military Considerations in Transsexual Care of the Active Duty Member," *Military Medicine*, Vol. 181, p. 1184 (Oct. 2016) (noting that Endocrine Society criteria "require that the patient has been on continuous cross-sex hormones and has had continuous [real life experience] or psychotherapy for the past 12 months").

⁷⁶ Sandy E. James, Jody L. Herman, Susan Rankin, Mara Keisling, Lisa Mottet & Ma'ayan Anafi, *The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey*, pp. 100-103 (National Center for Transgender Equality 2016) available at <https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.PDF>.

⁷⁷ RAND Study at 40-41.

⁷⁸ *Id.* at 41.

evidence on the extent to which such treatments fully remedy all of the issues associated with gender dysphoria is unclear. Nor do any of these studies account for the added stress of military life, deployments, and combat.

As recently as August 2016, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) conducted a comprehensive review of the relevant literature, over 500 articles, studies, and reports, to determine if there was “sufficient evidence to conclude that gender reassignment surgery improves health outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries with gender dysphoria.”⁷⁹ After reviewing the universe of literature regarding sex reassignment surgery, CMS identified 33 studies sufficiently rigorous to merit further review, and of those, “some were positive; others were negative.”⁸⁰ “Overall,” according to CMS, “the quality and strength of evidence were low due to mostly observational study designs with no comparison groups, subjective endpoints, potential confounding . . . , small sample sizes, lack of validated assessment tools, and considerable [number of study subjects] lost to follow-up.”⁸¹ With respect to whether sex reassignment surgery was “reasonable and necessary” for the treatment of gender dysphoria, CMS concluded that there was “not enough high quality evidence to determine whether gender reassignment surgery improves health outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries with gender dysphoria and whether

⁷⁹ Tamara Jensen, Joseph Chin, James Rollins, Elizabeth Koller, Linda Gousis & Katherine Szarama, “Final Decision Memorandum on Gender Reassignment Surgery for Medicare Beneficiaries with Gender Dysphoria,” Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, p. 9 (Aug. 30, 2016) (“CMS Report”).

⁸⁰ *Id.* at 62.

⁸¹ *Id.*

patients most likely to benefit from these types of surgical intervention can be identified prospectively.”⁸²

Importantly, CMS identified only six studies as potentially providing “useful information” on the effectiveness of sex reassignment surgery. According to CRS, “the four best designed and conducted studies that assessed the quality of life before and after surgery using validated (albeit, non-specific) psychometric studies did not demonstrate clinically significant changes or differences in psychometric test results after [sex reassignment surgery].”⁸³ Additional studies found that the “cumulative rates of requests for surgical reassignment reversal or change in legal status” were between 2.2% and 3.3%.⁸⁴

A sixth study, which came out of Sweden, is one of the most robust because it is a “nationwide population-based, long-term follow-up of sex-reassigned transsexual persons.”⁸⁵ The study found increased mortality and

⁸² Id. at 65. CMS did not conclude that gender reassignment surgery can never be necessary and reasonable to treat gender dysphoria. To the contrary, it made clear that Medicare insurers could make their own “determination of whether or not to cover gender reassignment surgery based on whether gender reassignment surgery is reasonable and necessary for the individual beneficiary after considering the individual’s specific circumstances.” Id. at 66. Nevertheless, CMS did decline to require all Medicare insurers to cover sex reassignment surgeries because it found insufficient scientific evidence to conclude that such surgeries improve health outcomes for persons with gender dysphoria.

⁸³ Id. at 62.

⁸⁴ Id.

⁸⁵ Ceclilia Dhejne, Paul Lichtenstein, Marcus Boman, Anna L. Johansson, Niklas Långström & Mikael Landén, “Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing Sex Reassignment

psychiatric hospitalization for patients who had undergone sex reassignment surgery as compared to a healthy control group.⁸⁶ As described by CMS: “The mortality was primarily due to completed suicides (19.1-fold greater than in [the control group]), but death due to neoplasm and cardiovascular disease was increased 2 to 2.5 times as well. We note, mortality from this patient population did not become apparent until after 10 years. The risk for psychiatric hospitalization was 2.8 times

Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden,” *PLoS One*, Vol. 6, p. 6 (Feb. 2011); see also *id.* (“Strengths of this study include nationwide representativity over more than 30 years, extensive follow-up time, and minimal loss to follow-up. . . . Finally, whereas previous studies either lack a control group or use standardised mortality rates or standardised incidence rates as comparisons, we selected random population controls matched by birth year, and either birth or final sex.”).

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 7; see also at 6 (“Mortality from suicide was strikingly high among sex-reassigned persons, also after adjustment for prior psychiatric morbidity. In line with this, sex-reassigned persons were at increased risk for suicide attempts. Previous reports suggest that transsexualism is a strong risk factor for suicide, also after sex reassignment, and our long-term findings support the need for continued psychiatric follow-up for persons at risk to prevent this. Inpatient care for psychiatric disorders was significantly more common among sex-reassigned persons than among matched controls, both before and after sex reassignment. It is generally accepted that transsexuals have more psychiatric ill-health than the general population prior to the sex reassignment. It should therefore come as no surprise that studies have found high rates of depression, and low quality of life, also after sex reassignment. Notably, however, in this study the increased risk for psychiatric hospitalization persisted even after adjusting for psychiatric hospitalization prior to sex reassignment. This suggests that even though sex reassignment alleviates gender dysphoria, there is a need to identify and treat co-occurring psychiatric morbidity in transsexual persons not only before but also after sex reassignment.”).

greater than in controls even after adjustment for prior psychiatric disease (18%). The risk for attempted suicide was greater in male-to-female patients regardless of the gender of the control.”⁸⁷

According to the Hayes Directory, which conducted a review of 19 peer-reviewed studies on sex reassignment surgery, the “evidence suggests positive benefits,” including “decreased [gender dysphoria], depression and anxiety, and increased [quality of life],” but “because of serious limitations,” these findings “permit only weak conclusions.”⁸⁸ It rated the quality of evidence as “very low” due to the numerous limitations in the studies and concluded that there is not sufficient “evidence to establish patient selection criteria for [sex reassignment surgery] to treat [gender dysphoria].”⁸⁹

⁸⁷ CMS Report at 62. It bears noting that the outcomes for mortality and suicide attempts differed “depending on when sex reassignment was performed: during the period 1973-1988 or 1989-2003.” Cecilia Dhejne, Paul Lichtenstein, Marcus Boman, Anna L. Johansson, Niklas Långström & Mikael Landén, “Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing Sex Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden,” *PLoS One*, Vol. 6, p. 5 (Feb. 2011). Even though both mortality and suicide attempts were greater for transsexual persons than the healthy control group across both time periods, this did not reach statistical significance during the 1989-2003 period. One possible explanation is that mortality rates for transsexual persons did not begin to diverge from the healthy control group until after 10 years of follow-up, in which case the expected increase in mortality would not have been observed for most of the persons receiving sex reassignment surgeries from 1989-2003. Another possible explanation is that treatment was of a higher quality from 1989-2003 than from 1973-1988.

⁸⁸ Hayes Directory, “Sex Reassignment Surgery for the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria,” p. 4 (May 15, 2014).

⁸⁹ *Id.* at 3.

With respect to hormone therapy, the Hayes Directory examined 10 peer-reviewed studies and concluded that a “substantial number of studies of cross-sex hormone therapy each show some positive findings suggesting improvement in well-being after cross-sex hormone therapy.”⁹⁰ Yet again, it rated the quality of evidence as “very low” and found that the “evidence is insufficient to support patient selection criteria for hormone therapy to treat [gender dysphoria].”⁹¹ Importantly, the Hayes Directory also found: “Hormone therapy and subsequent [sex reassignment surgery] failed to bring overall mortality, suicide rates, or death from illicit drug use in [male-to-female] patients close to rates observed in the general male population. It is possible that mortality is nevertheless reduced by these treatments, but that cannot be determined from the available evidence.”⁹²

In 2010, Mayo Clinic researchers conducted a comprehensive review of 28 studies on the use of cross-sex hormone therapy in sex reassignment and concluded that there was “very low quality evidence” showing that such therapy “likely improves gender dysphoria, psychological functioning and comorbidities, sexual function and overall quality of life.”⁹³ Not all of the studies

⁹⁰ Hayes Directory, “Hormone Therapy for the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria,” pp. 2, 4 (May 19, 2014).

⁹¹ *Id.* at 4.

⁹² *Id.* at 3.

⁹³ Mohammad Hassan Murad, Mohamed B. Elamin, Magaly Zumaeta Garcia, Rebecca J. Mullan, Ayman Murad, Patricia J. Erwin & Victor M. Montori, “Hormonal therapy and sex reassignment: a systematic review and meta-analysis of quality of life and psychosocial outcomes,” *Clinical Endocrinology*, Vol. 72, p. 214 (2010).

showed positive results, but overall, after pooling the data from all of the studies, the researchers showed that 80% of patients reported improvement in gender dysphoria, 78% reported improvement in psychological symptoms, and 80% reported improvement in quality of life, after receiving hormone therapy.⁹⁴ Importantly, however, “[s]uicide attempt rates decreased after sex reassignment but stayed higher than the normal population rate.”⁹⁵

The authors of the Swedish study discussed above reached similar conclusions: “This study found substantially higher rates of overall mortality, death from cardiovascular disease and suicide, suicide attempts, and psychiatric hospitali[z]ations in sex-reassigned transsexual individuals compared to a healthy control population. This highlights that post[-]surgical transsexuals are a risk group that need long-term psychiatric and somatic follow-up. Even though surgery and hormonal therapy alleviates gender dysphoria, it is apparently not sufficient to remedy the high rates of morbidity and mortality found among transsexual persons.”⁹⁶

Even the RAND study, which the Carter policy is based upon, confirmed that “[t]here have been no randomized controlled trials of the effectiveness of various forms of treatment, and most evidence comes from retro-

⁹⁴ Id. at 216.

⁹⁵ Id.

⁹⁶ Ceclilia Dhejne, Paul Lichtenstein, Marcus Boman, Anna L. Johansson, Niklas Långström & Mikael Landén, “Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing Sex Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden,” *PLoS One*, Vol. 6, pp. 1-8 (Feb. 2011).

spective studies.”⁹⁷ Although noting that “[m]ultiple observational studies have suggested significant and sometimes dramatic reductions in suicidality, suicide attempts, and suicides among transgender patients after receiving transition-related treatment,” RAND made clear that “none of these studies were randomized controlled trials (the gold standard for determining treatment efficacy).”⁹⁸ “In the absence of quality randomized trial evidence,” RAND concluded, “it is difficult to fully assess the outcomes of treatment for [gender dysphoria].”⁹⁹

Given the scientific uncertainty surrounding the efficacy of transition-related treatments for gender dysphoria, it is imperative that the Department proceed cautiously in setting accession and retention standards for persons with a diagnosis or history of gender dysphoria.

B. Physical Health Standards

Not only is maintaining high standards of mental health critical to military effectiveness and lethality, maintaining high standards of physical health is as well. Although technology has done much to ease the physical demands of combat in some military specialties, war very much remains a physically demanding endeavor. Service members must therefore be physically prepared to endure the rigors and hardships of military service, including potentially combat. They must be able to carry heavy equipment sometimes over long distances; they must be able to handle heavy machinery;

⁹⁷ RAND Study at 7.

⁹⁸ Id. at 10 (citing only to a California Department of Insurance report).

⁹⁹ Id.

they must be able to traverse harsh terrain or survive in ocean waters; they must be able to withstand oppressive heat, bitter cold, rain, sleet, and snow; they must be able to endure in unsanitary conditions, coupled with lack of privacy for basic bodily functions, sometimes with little sleep and sustenance; they must be able to carry their wounded comrades to safety; and they must be able to defend themselves against those who wish to kill them.

Above all, whether they serve on the frontlines or in relative safety in non-combat positions, every Service member is important to mission accomplishment and must be available to perform their duties globally whenever called upon. The loss of personnel due to illness, disease, injury, or bad health diminishes military effectiveness and lethality. The Department's physical health standards are therefore designed to minimize the odds that any given Service member will be unable to perform his or her duties in the future because of illness, disease, or injury. As noted earlier, those who seek to enter military service must be free of contagious diseases; free of medical conditions or physical defects that could require treatment, hospitalization, or eventual separation from service for medical unfitness; medically capable of satisfactorily completing required training; medically adaptable to the military environment; and medically capable of performing duties without aggravation of existing physical defects or medical conditions.¹⁰⁰ To access recruits with higher rates of anticipated unavailability for deployment thrusts a heavier burden on those who would deploy more often.

¹⁰⁰ DoDI 6130.03 at 2.

Historically, absent a waiver, the Department has barred from accessing into the military anyone who had undergone chest or genital surgery (e.g., removal of the testicles or uterus) and anyone with a history of major abnormalities or defects of the chest or genitalia, including hermaphroditism and pseudohermaphroditism.¹⁰¹ Persons with conditions requiring medications, such as anti-depressants and hormone treatment, were also disqualified from service, unless a waiver was granted.¹⁰²

These standards have long applied uniformly to all persons, regardless of transgender status. The Carter policy, however, deviates from these uniform standards by exempting, under certain conditions, treatments associated with gender transition, such as sex reassignment surgery and cross-sex hormone therapy. For example, under the Carter policy, an applicant who has received genital reconstruction surgery may access without a waiver if a period of 18 months has elapsed since the date of the most recent surgery, no functional limitations or complications persist, and no additional surgery is required. In contrast, an applicant who received similar surgery following a traumatic injury is disqualified from military service without a waiver.¹⁰³ Similarly, under the Carter policy, an applicant who is presently receiving cross-sex hormone therapy post-gender transition may access without a waiver if the applicant has been stable on such hormones for 18 months. In contrast, an applicant taking synthetic hormones for

¹⁰¹ Id. at 25-27.

¹⁰² Id. at 46-48.

¹⁰³ Id. at 26-27.

the treatment of hypothyroidism is disqualified from military service without a waiver.¹⁰⁴

C. Sex-Based Standards

Women have made invaluable contributions to the defense of the Nation throughout our history. These contributions have only grown more significant as the number of women in the Armed Forces has increased and as their roles have expanded. Today, women account for 17.6% of the force,¹⁰⁵ and now every position, including combat arms positions, is open to them.

The vast majority of military standards make no distinctions between men and women. Where biological differences between males and females are relevant, however, military standards do differentiate between them. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the lawfulness of sex-based standards that flow from legitimate biological differences between the sexes.¹⁰⁶ These sex-based standards ensure fairness, equity, and safety; satisfy reasonable expectations of privacy; reflect common practice in society; and promote core military val-

¹⁰⁴ Id. at 41.

¹⁰⁵ Defense Manpower Data Center, Active and Reserve Master Files (Dec. 2017).

¹⁰⁶ For example, in *United States v. Virginia*, the Court noted approvingly that “[a]dmitting women to [the Virginia Military Institute] would undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements, and to adjust aspects of the physical training programs.” 518 U.S. 515, 550-51 n.19 (1996) (citing the statute that requires the same standards for women admitted to the service academies as for the men, “except for those minimum essential adjustments in such standards required because of physiological differences between male and female individuals”).

ues of dignity and respect between men and women—all of which promote good order, discipline, steady leadership, unit cohesion, and ultimately military effectiveness and lethality.

For example, anatomical differences between males and females, and the reasonable expectations of privacy that flow from those differences, at least partly account for the laws and regulations that require separate berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities and different drug testing procedures for males and females.¹⁰⁷ To maintain good order and discipline, Congress has even required by statute that the sleeping and latrine areas provided for “male” recruits be physically separated from the sleeping and latrine areas provided for “female” recruits during basic training and that access by drill sergeants and training personnel “after the end of the training day” be limited to persons of the “same sex as the recruits” to ensure “after-hours privacy for recruits during basic training.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ See, e.g., Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Regulation 350-6, “Enlisted Initial Entry Training Policies and Administration,” p. 56 (Mar. 20, 2017); Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 32-6005, “Unaccompanied Housing Management,” p. 35 (Jan 29., 2016); Department of the Army, Human Resources Command, AR 600-85, “Substance Abuse Program” (Dec. 28, 2012) (“Observers must . . . [b]e the same gender as the Soldier being observed.”).

¹⁰⁸ See 10 U.S.C. § 4319 (Army), 10 U.S.C. § 6931 (Navy), and 10 U.S.C. § 9319 (Air Force) (requiring the sleeping and latrine areas provided for “male” recruits to be physically separated from the sleeping and latrine areas provided for “female” recruits during basic training); 10 U.S.C. § 4320 (Army), 10 U.S.C. § 6932 (Navy), and 10 U.S.C. § 9320 (Air Force) (requiring that access by drill

In addition, physiological differences between males and females account for the different physical fitness and body fat standards that apply to men and women.¹⁰⁹ This ensures equity and fairness. Likewise, those same physiological differences also account for the policies that regulate competition between men and women in military training and sports, such as boxing and combatives.¹¹⁰ This ensures protection from injury.

sergeants and training personnel “after the end of the training day” be limited to persons of the “same sex as the recruits”).

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., Department of the Army, Army Regulation 600-9, “The Army Body Composition Program,” pp. 21-31 (June 28, 2013); Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 6110.IJ, “Physical Readiness Program,” p. 7 (July 11, 2011); Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 36-2905, “Fitness Program,” pp. 86-95, 106-146 (Aug. 27, 2015); Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Order 6100.13, “Marine Corps Physical Fitness Program,” (Aug. 1, 2008); Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Order 6110.3A, “Marine Corps Body Composition and Military Appearance Program,” (Dec. 15, 2016); see also United States Military Academy, Office of the Commandant of Cadets, “Physical Program Whitebook AY 16-17,” p. 13 (specifying that, to graduate, cadets must meet the minimum performance standard of 3:30 for men and 5:29 for women on the Indoor Obstacle Course Test); Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Regulation 350-6, “Enlisted Initial Entry Training Policies and Administration,” p. 56 (Mar. 20, 2017) (“Performance requirement differences, such as [Army Physical Fitness Test] scoring are based on physiological differences, and apply to the entire Army.”).

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., Headquarters, Department of the Army, TC 3-25.150, “Combatives,” p. A-15 (Feb. 2017) (“Due to the physiological difference between the sexes and in order to treat all Soldiers fairly and conduct gender-neutral competitions, female competitors will be given a 15 percent overage at weigh-in.”); *id.* (“In championships at battalion-level and above, competitors are divided into eight weight class brackets. . . . These classes take into account weight and gender.”); Major Alex Bedard, Major Robert Peterson &

Uniform and grooming standards, to a certain extent, are also based on anatomical differences between males and females. Even those uniform and grooming standards that are not, strictly speaking, based on physical biology nevertheless flow from longstanding societal expectations regarding differences in attire and grooming for men and women.¹¹¹

Ray Barone, “Punching Through Barriers: Female Cadets Integrated into Mandatory Boxing at West Point,” *Association of the United States Army* (Nov. 16, 2017), <https://www.ausa.org/articles/punching-through-barriers-female-cadets-boxing-west-point> (noting that “[m]atching men and women according to weight may not adequately account for gender differences regarding striking force” and that “[w]hile conducting free sparring, cadets must box someone of the same gender”); RAND Study at 57 (noting that, under British military policy, transgender persons “can be excluded from sports that organize around gender to ensure the safety of the individual or other participants”); see also International Olympic Committee Consensus Meeting on Sex Reassignment and Hyperandrogenism (Nov. 2015), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/2015-11_ioc_consensus_meeting_on_sex_reassignment_and_hyperandrogenism-en.pdf; NCAA Office of Inclusion; NCAA Inclusion of Transgender Student-Athletes (Aug. 2011), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Transgender_Handbook_2011_Final.pdf.

¹¹¹ “The difference between men’s and women’s grooming policies recognizes the difference between the sexes; sideburns for men, different hairstyles and cosmetics for women. Establishing identical grooming and personal appearance standards for men and women would not be in the Navy’s best interest and is not a factor in the assurance of equal opportunity.” Department of the Navy, Navy Personnel Command, Navy Personnel Instruction 156651, “Uniform Regulations,” Art. 2101.1 (July 7, 2017); see also Department of the Army, Army Regulation 670-1, “Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia,” pp. 4-16 (Mar. 31, 2014); Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 26-2903, “Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel,” pp. 17-27 (Feb. 9,

Because these sex-based standards are based on legitimate biological differences between males and females, it follows that a person's physical biology should dictate which standards apply. Standards designed for biological males logically apply to biological males, not biological females, and vice versa. When relevant, military practice has long adhered to this straightforward and logical demarcation.

By contrast, the Carter policy deviates from this longstanding practice by making military sex-based standards contingent, not necessarily on the person's biological sex, but on the person's gender marker in DEERS, which can be changed to reflect the person's gender identity.¹¹² Thus, under the Carter policy, a biological male who identifies as a female (and changes his gender marker to reflect that gender) must be held to the standards and regulations for females, even though those standards and regulations are based on female physical biology, not female gender identity. The same goes for females who identify as males. Gender identity alone, however, is irrelevant to standards that are designed on the basis of biological differences.

Rather than apply only to those transgender individuals who have altered their external biological characteristics to fully match that of their preferred gender, under the Carter policy, persons need not undergo sex reassignment surgery, or even cross-sex hormone ther-

2017); Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Order P1020.34G, "Marine Corps Uniform Regulations," pp. 1-9 (Mar. 31, 2003).

¹¹² Department of Defense Instruction 1300.28, *In-service Transition for Service Members Identifying as Transgender*, pp. 3-4 (June 30, 2016).

apy, in order to be recognized as, and thus subject to the standards associated with, their preferred gender. A male who identifies as female could remain a biological male in every respect and still must be treated in all respects as a female, including with respect to physical fitness, facilities, and uniform and grooming. This scenario is not farfetched. According to the APA, not “all individuals with gender dysphoria desire a complete gender reassignment. . . . Some are satisfied with no medical or surgical treatment but prefer to dress as the felt gender in public.”¹¹³ Currently, of the 424 approved Service member treatment plans, at least 36 do not include cross-sex hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery.¹¹⁴ And it is questionable how many Service members will obtain any type of sex reassignment surgery. According to a survey of transgender persons, only 25% reported having had some form of transition-related surgery.¹¹⁵

The variability and fluidity of gender transition undermine the legitimate purposes that justify different biologically-based, male-female standards. For example, by allowing a biological male who retains male anatomy to use female berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities, it undermines the reasonable expectations of privacy and dignity of female Service members. By allowing a biological male to meet the female physical fitness and body fat standards and to compete against

¹¹³ American Psychiatric Association, “Expert Q & A: Gender Dysphoria,” available at <https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/expert-qa> (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).

¹¹⁴ Data reported by the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Oct. 2017).

¹¹⁵ *Id.*

females in gender-specific physical training and athletic competition, it undermines fairness (or perceptions of fairness) because males competing as females will likely score higher on the female test than on the male test and possibly compromise safety. By allowing a biological male to adhere to female uniform and grooming standards, it creates unfairness for other males who would also like to be exempted from male uniform and grooming standards as a means of expressing their own sense of identity.

These problems could perhaps be alleviated if a person's preferred gender were recognized only after the person underwent a biological transition. The concept of gender transition is so nebulous, however, that drawing any line—except perhaps at a full sex reassignment surgery—would be arbitrary, not to mention at odds with current medical practice, which allows for a wide range of individualized treatment. In any event, rates for genital surgery are exceedingly low—2% of transgender men and 10% of transgender women.¹¹⁶ Only up to 25% of surveyed transgender persons report having had some form of transition-related surgery.¹¹⁷ The RAND study estimated that such rates “are typically only around 20 percent, with the exception of chest surgery among female-to-male transgender individuals.”¹¹⁸ Moreover, of the 424 approved Service member

¹¹⁶ Sandy E. James, Jody L. Herman, Susan Rankin, Mara Keisling, Lisa Mottet & Ma'ayan Anafi, *The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey*, pp. 100-103 (National Center for Transgender Equality 2016) available at <https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.PDF>.

¹¹⁷ *Id.* at 100.

¹¹⁸ RAND Study at 21.

treatment plans available for study, 388 included cross-sex hormone treatment, but only 34 non-genital sex reassignment surgeries and one genital surgery have been completed thus far. Only 22 Service members have requested a waiver for a genital sex reassignment surgery.¹¹⁹

Low rates of full sex reassignment surgery and the otherwise wide variation of transition-related treatment, with all the challenges that entails for privacy, fairness, and safety, weigh in favor of maintaining a bright line based on biological sex—not gender identity or some variation thereof—in determining which sex-based standards apply to a given Service member. After all, a person’s biological sex is generally ascertainable through objective means. Moreover, this approach will ensure that biologically-based standards will be applied uniformly to all Service members of the same biological sex. Standards that are clear, coherent, objective, consistent, predictable, and uniformly applied enhance good order, discipline, steady leadership, and unit cohesion, which in turn, ensure military effectiveness and lethality.

New Transgender Policy

In light of the forgoing standards, all of which are necessary for military effectiveness and lethality, as well as the recommendations of the Panel of Experts, the Department, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security, recommends the following policy:

¹¹⁹ Defense Health Agency, Supplemental Health Care Program Data (Feb. 2018).

A. Transgender Persons Without a History or Diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria, Who Are Otherwise Qualified for Service, May Serve, Like All Other Service Members, in Their Biological Sex.

Transgender persons who have not transitioned to another gender and do not have a history or current diagnosis of gender dysphoria—i.e., they identify as a gender other than their biological sex but do not currently experience distress or impairment of functioning in meeting the standards associated with their biological sex—are eligible for service, provided that they, like all other persons, satisfy all mental and physical health standards and are capable of adhering to the standards associated with their biological sex. This is consistent with the Carter policy, under which a transgender person’s gender identity is recognized only if the person has a diagnosis or history of gender dysphoria.

Although the precise number is unknown, the Department recognizes that many transgender persons could be disqualified under this policy. And many transgender persons who would not be disqualified may nevertheless be unwilling to adhere to the standards associated with their biological sex. But many have served, and are serving, with great dedication under the standards for their biological sex. As noted earlier, 8,980 Service members reportedly identify as transgender, and yet there are currently only 937 active duty Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since June 30, 2016.

B. Transgender Persons Who Require or Have Undergone Gender Transition Are Disqualified.

Except for those who are exempt under this policy, as described below in C.3, and except where waivers or exceptions to policy are otherwise authorized, persons who are diagnosed with gender dysphoria, either before or after entry into service, and require transition-related treatment, or have already transitioned to their preferred gender, should be disqualified from service. In the Department's military judgment, this is a necessary departure from the Carter policy for the following reasons:

1. *Undermines Readiness.* While transition-related treatments, including real life experience, cross-sex hormone therapy, and sex reassignment surgery, are widely accepted forms of treatment, there is considerable scientific uncertainty concerning whether these treatments fully remedy, even if they may reduce, the mental health problems associated with gender dysphoria. Despite whatever improvements in condition may result from these treatments, there is evidence that rates of psychiatric hospitalization and suicide behavior remain higher for persons with gender dysphoria, even after treatment, as compared to persons without gender dysphoria.¹²⁰ The persistence of these problems is a risk for readiness.

Another readiness risk is the time required for transition-related treatment and the impact on deployability. Although limited and incomplete because many transitioning Service members either began treatment before the Carter policy took effect or did not require

¹²⁰ See *supra* at pp. 24-26.

sex reassignment surgery, currently available in-service data already show that, cumulatively, transitioning Service members in the Army and Air Force have averaged 167 and 159 days of limited duty, respectively, over a one-year period.¹²¹

Transition-related treatment that involves cross-sex hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery could render Service members with gender dysphoria non-deployable for a significant period of time—perhaps even a year—if the theater of operations cannot support the treatment. For example, Endocrine Society guidelines for cross-sex hormone therapy recommend quarterly blood work and laboratory monitoring of hormone levels during the first year of treatment.¹²² Of the 424 approved Service member treatment plans available for study, almost all of them—91.5%—include the prescription of cross-sex hormones.¹²³ The period of potential non-deployability increases for those who undergo sex reassignment surgery. As described earlier,

¹²¹ Data reported by the Departments of the Army and Air Force (Oct. 2017).

¹²² Wylie C. Hembree, Peggy Cohen-Kettenis, Lous Gooren, Sabine Hannema, Walter Meyer, M. Hassan Murad, Stephen Rosenthal, Joshua Safer, Vin Tangpricha, & Guy T'Sjoen, “Endocrine Treatment of Gender-Dysphoric/Gender Incongruent Persons: An Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline,” *The Journal of Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism*, Vol. 102, pp. 3869-3903 (Nov. 2017).

¹²³ Data reported by the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Oct. 2017). Although the RAND study observed that British troops who are undergoing hormone therapy are generally able to deploy if the “hormone dose is steady and there are no major side effects,” it nevertheless acknowledged that “deployment to all areas may not be possible, depending on the needs associated with any medication (e.g., refrigeration).” RAND Study at 59.

the recovery time for the various sex reassignment procedures is substantial. For non-genital surgeries (assuming no complications), the range of recovery is between two and eight weeks depending on the type of surgery, and for genital surgeries (again assuming no complications), the range is between three and six months before the individual is able to return to full duty.¹²⁴ When combined with 12 continuous months of hormone therapy, which is recommended prior to genital surgery,¹²⁵ the total time necessary for sex reassignment surgery could exceed a year. If the operational environment does not permit access to a lab for monitoring hormones (and there is certainly debate over how common this would be), then the Service member must be prepared to forego treatment, monitoring, or the deployment. Either outcome carries risks for readiness.

Given the limited data, however, it is difficult to predict with any precision the impact on readiness of al-

¹²⁴ For example, assuming no complications, the recovery time for a hysterectomy is up to eight weeks; a mastectomy is up to six weeks; a phalloplasty is up to three months; a metoidioplasty is up to 8 weeks; an orchiectomy is up to 6 weeks; and a vaginoplasty is up to three months. See University of California, San Francisco, Center of Excellence for Transgender Health, “Guidelines for the Primary and Gender-Affirming Care of Transgender and Gender Nonbinary People,” available at <http://transhealth.ucsf.edu/trans?page=guidelines-home> (last visited Feb. 16, 2018); see also Discussion with Dr. Loren Schechter, Visiting Clinical Professor of Surgery, University of Illinois at Chicago (Nov. 9, 2017).

¹²⁵ RAND Study at 80; see also *id.* at 7; Irene Folaron & Monica Lovasz, “Military Considerations in Transsexual Care of the Active Duty Member,” *Military Medicine*, Vol. 181, p. 1184 (Oct. 2016) (noting that Endocrine Society criteria “require that the patient has been on continuous cross-sex hormones and has had continuous [real life experience] or psychotherapy for the past 12 months”).

lowing gender transition. Moreover, the input received by the Panel of Experts varied considerably. On one hand, some commanders with transgender Service members reported that, from the time of diagnosis to the completion of a transition plan, the transitioning Service members would be non-deployable for two to two-and-a-half years.¹²⁶ On the other hand, some commanders, as well as transgender Service members themselves, reported that transition-related treatment is not a burden on unit readiness and could be managed to avoid interfering with deployments, with one commander even reporting that a transgender Service member with gender dysphoria under his command elected to postpone surgery in order to deploy.¹²⁷ This conclusion was echoed by some experts in endocrinology who found no harm in stopping or adjusting hormone therapy treatment to accommodate deployment during the first year of hormone use.¹²⁸ Of course, postponing treatment, especially during a combat deployment, has risks of its own insofar as the treatment is necessary to mitigate the clinically significant distress and impairment of functioning caused by gender dysphoria. After all, “when Service members deploy and then do not meet medical deployment fitness standards, there is risk for inadequate treatment within the operational theater, personal risk due to potential inability to perform combat required skills, and the potential to be sent home from the deployment and render

¹²⁶ Minutes, Transgender Review Panel (Oct. 13, 2017).

¹²⁷ *Id.*

¹²⁸ Minutes, Transgender Review Panel (Nov. 9, 2017).

the deployed unit with less manpower.”¹²⁹ In short, the periods of transition-related nonavailability and the risks of deploying untreated Service members with gender dysphoria are uncertain, and that alone merits caution.

Moreover, most mental health conditions, as well as the medication used to treat them, limit Service members’ ability to deploy. Any DSM-5 psychiatric disorder with residual symptoms, or medication side effects, which impair social or occupational performance, require a waiver for the Service member to deploy.¹³⁰ The same is true for mental health conditions that pose a substantial risk for deterioration or recurrence in the deployed environment.¹³¹ In managing mental health conditions while deployed, providers must consider the risk of exacerbation if the individual were exposed to trauma or severe operational stress. These determinations are difficult to make in the absence of evidence on the impact of deployment on individuals with gender dysphoria.¹³²

The RAND study acknowledges that the inclusion of individuals with gender dysphoria in the force will have a negative impact on readiness. According to RAND,

¹²⁹ Institute for Defense Analyses, “Force Impact of Expanding the Recruitment of Individuals with Auditory Impairment,” pp. 60-61 (Apr. 2016).

¹³⁰ Modification Thirteen to U.S. Central Command Individual Protection and Individual, Unit Deployment Policy. Tab A, p. 8 (Mar. 2017).

¹³¹ *Id.*

¹³² See generally Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, “Clinical Practice Guidance for Deployment-Limiting Mental Disorders and Psychotropic Medications,” pp. 2-4 (Oct. 7, 2013).

foreign militaries that allow service by personnel with gender dysphoria have found that it is sometimes necessary to restrict the deployment of transitioning individuals, including those receiving hormone therapy and surgery, to austere environments where their health-care needs cannot be met.¹³³ Nevertheless, RAND concluded that the impact on readiness would be minimal—e.g., 0.0015% of available deployable labor-years across the active and reserve components—because of the exceedingly small number of transgender Service members who would seek transition-related treatment.¹³⁴ Even then, RAND admitted that the information it cited “must be interpreted with caution” because “much of the current research on transgender prevalence and medical treatment rates relies on self-reported, nonrepresentative samples.”¹³⁵ Nevertheless, by RAND’s standard, the readiness impact of many medical conditions that the Department has determined to be disqualifying—from bipolar disorder to schizophrenia—would be minimal because they, too, exist only in relatively small numbers.¹³⁶ And yet that is no reason to allow persons with those conditions to serve.

¹³³ RAND Study at 40.

¹³⁴ *Id.* at 42.

¹³⁵ *Id.* at 39.

¹³⁶ According to the National Institute of Mental Health, 2.8% of U.S. adults experienced bipolar disorder in the past year, and 4.4% have experienced the condition at some time in their lives. National Institute of Mental Health, “Bipolar Disorder” (Nov. 2017) <https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/bipolar-disorder.shtml>. The prevalence of schizophrenia is less than 1%. National Institute of Mental Health, “Schizophrenia” (Nov. 2017) <https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/schizophrenia.shtml>.

The issue is not whether the military can absorb periods of non-deployability in a small population; rather, it is whether an individual with a particular condition can meet the standards for military duty and, if not, whether the condition can be remedied through treatment that renders the person non-deployable for as little time as possible. As the Department has noted before: “[W]here the operational requirements are growing faster than available resources,” it is imperative that the force “be manned with Service members capable of meeting all mission demands. The Services require that every Service member contribute to full mission readiness, regardless of occupation. In other words, the Services require all Service members to be able to engage in core military tasks, including the ability to deploy rapidly, without impediment or encumbrance.”¹³⁷ Moreover, the Department must be mindful that “an increase in the number of non-deployable military personnel places undue risk and personal burden on Service members qualified and eligible to deploy, and negatively impacts mission readiness.”¹³⁸ Further, the Department must be attuned to the impact that high numbers of non-deployable military personnel places on families whose Service members deploy more often to backfill or compensate for non-deployable persons.

In sum, the available information indicates that there is inconclusive scientific evidence that the serious problems associated with gender dysphoria can be fully re-

¹³⁷ Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Fiscal Year 2016 Report to Congress on the Review of Enlistment of Individuals with Disabilities in the Armed Forces,” p. 9 (Apr. 2016).

¹³⁸ *Id.* at 10.

mediated through transition-related treatment and that, even if it could, most persons requiring transition-related treatment could be non-deployable for a potentially significant amount of time. By this metric, Service members with gender dysphoria who need transition-related care present a significant challenge for unit readiness.

2. *Incompatible with Sex-Based Standards.*

As discussed in detail earlier, military personnel policy and practice has long maintained a clear line between men and women where their biological differences are relevant with respect to physical fitness and body fat standards; berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities; and uniform and grooming standards. This line promotes good order and discipline, steady leadership, unit cohesion, and ultimately military effectiveness and lethality because it ensures fairness, equity, and safety; satisfies reasonable expectations of privacy; reflects common practice in the society from which we recruit; and promotes core military values of dignity and respect between men and women. To exempt Service members from the uniform, biologically-based standards applicable to their biological sex on account of their gender identity would be incompatible with this line and undermine the objectives such standards are designed to serve.

First, a policy that permits a change of gender without requiring any biological changes risks creating unfairness, or perceptions thereof, that could adversely affect unit cohesion and good order and discipline. It could be perceived as discriminatory to apply different biologically-based standards to persons of the same biological sex based on gender identity, which is irrelevant to standards grounded in physical biology. For example, it

unfairly discriminates against biological males who identify as male and are held to male standards to allow biological males who identify as female to be held to female standards, especially where the transgender female retains many of the biological characteristics and capabilities of a male. It is important to note here that the Carter policy does not require a transgender person to undergo any biological transition in order to be treated in all respects in accordance with the person's preferred gender. Therefore, a biological male who identifies as female could remain a biological male in every respect and still be governed by female standards. Not only would this result in perceived unfairness by biological males who identify as male, it would also result in perceived unfairness by biological females who identify as female. Biological females who may be required to compete against such transgender females in training and athletic competition would potentially be disadvantaged.¹³⁹ Even more importantly, in physi-

¹³⁹ See *supra* note 109. Both the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) have attempted to mitigate this problem in their policies regarding transgender athletes. For example, the IOC requires athletes who transition from male to female to demonstrate certain suppressed levels of testosterone to minimize any advantage in women's competition. Similarly, the NCAA prohibits an athlete who has transitioned from male to female from competing on a women's team without changing the team status to a mixed gender team. While similar policies could be employed by the Department, it is unrealistic to expect the Department to subject transgender Service members to routine hormone testing prior to biannual fitness testing, athletic competition, or training simply to mitigate real and perceived unfairness or potential safety concerns. See, e.g., International Olympic Committee Consensus Meeting on Sex Reassignment and Hyperandrogensim (Nov. 2015), <https://>

cally violent training and competition, such as boxing and combatives, pitting biological females against biological males who identify as female, and vice versa, could present a serious safety risk as well.¹⁴⁰

This concern may seem trivial to those unfamiliar with military culture. But vigorous competition, especially physical competition, is central to the military life and is indispensable to the training and preparation of warriors. Nothing encapsulates this more poignantly than the words of General Douglas MacArthur when he was superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy and which are now engraved above the gymnasium at West Point: “Upon the fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that, upon other fields, on other days will bear the fruits of victory.”¹⁴¹ Especially in combat units and in training, including the Service academies, ROTC, and other commissioning sources, Service members are graded and judged in significant measure based upon their physical aptitude, which is only fitting given that combat remains a physical endeavor.

Second, a policy that accommodates gender transition without requiring full sex reassignment surgery could also erode reasonable expectations of privacy that

stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/2015-11_ioc_consensus_meeting_on_sex_reassignment_and_hyperandrogenism-en.pdf; NCAA Office of Inclusion, NCAA Inclusion of Transgender Student-Athletes (Aug. 2011), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Transgender_Handbook_2011_Final.pdf.

¹⁴⁰ See *supra* note 109.

¹⁴¹ Douglas MacArthur, *Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations* (1989), available at <http://www.bartleby.com/73/1874.html>.

are important in maintaining unit cohesion, as well as good order and discipline. Given the unique nature of military service, Service members of the same biological sex are often required to live in extremely close proximity to one another when sleeping, undressing, showering, and using the bathroom. Because of reasonable expectations of privacy, the military has long maintained separate berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities for men and women while in garrison. In the context of recruit training, this separation is even mandated by Congress.¹⁴²

Allowing transgender persons who have not undergone a full sex reassignment, and thus retain at least some of the anatomy of their biological sex, to use the facilities of their identified gender would invade the expectations of privacy that the strict male-female demarcation in berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities is meant to serve. At the same time, requiring transgender persons who have developed, even if only partially, the anatomy of their identified gender to use the facilities of their biological sex could invade the privacy of the transgender person. Without separate facilities for transgender persons or other mitigating accommodations, which may be unpalatable to transgender individuals and logistically impracticable for the Department, the privacy interests of biological males and females and transgender persons could be anticipated to result in irreconcilable situations. Lieutenants, Sergeants, and Petty Officers charged with carrying out their units' assigned combat missions should not be

¹⁴² See *supra* note 108.

burdened by a change in eligibility requirements disconnected from military life under austere conditions.

The best illustration of this irreconcilability is the report of one commander who was confronted with dueling equal opportunity complaints—one from a transgender female (i.e., a biological male with male genitalia who identified as female) and the other from biological females. The transgender female Service member was granted an exception to policy that allowed the Service member to live as a female, which included giving the Service member access to female shower facilities. This led to an equal opportunity complaint from biological females in the unit who believed that granting a biological male, even one who identified as a female, access to their showers violated their privacy. The transgender Service member responded with an equal opportunity complaint claiming that the command was not sufficiently supportive of the rights of transgender persons.¹⁴³

The collision of interests discussed above are a direct threat to unit cohesion and will inevitably result in greater leadership challenges without clear solutions. Leaders at all levels already face immense challenges in building cohesive military units. Blurring the line that differentiates the standards and policies applicable to

¹⁴³ Minutes, Transgender Review Panel (Oct. 13, 2017). Limited data exists regarding the performance of transgender Service members due to policy restrictions in Department of Defense 1300.28, *In-Service Transition for Transgender Service Members* (Oct. 1, 2016), that prevent the Department from tracking individuals who may identify as transgender as a potentially unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

men and women will only exacerbate those challenges and divert valuable time and energy from military tasks.

The unique leadership challenges arising from gender transition are evident in the Department's handbook implementing the Carter policy. The handbook provides guidance on various scenarios that commanders may face. One such scenario concerns the use of shower facilities: "A transgender Service member has expressed privacy concerns regarding the open bay shower configuration. Similarly, several other non-transgender Service members have expressed discomfort when showering in these facilities with individuals who have different genitalia." As possible solutions, the handbook offers that the commander could modify the shower facility to provide privacy or, if that is not feasible, adjust the timing of showers. Another scenario involves proper attire during a swim test: "It is the semi-annual swim test and a female to male transgender Service member who has fully transitioned, but did not undergo surgical change, would like to wear a male swimsuit for the test with no shirt or other top coverage." The extent of the handbook's guidance is to advise commanders that "[i]t is within [their] discretion to take measures ensuring good order and discipline," that they should "counsel the individual and address the unit, if additional options (e.g., requiring all personnel to wear shirts) are being considered," and that they should consult the Service Central Coordination Cell, a help line for commanders in need of advice.

These vignettes illustrate the significant effort required of commanders to solve challenging problems posed by the implementation of the current transgender service policies. The potential for discord in the unit

during the routine execution of daily activities is substantial and highlights the fundamental incompatibility of the Department's legitimate military interest in uniformity, the privacy interests of all Service members, and the interest of transgender individuals in an appropriate accommodation. Faced with these conflicting interests, commanders are often forced to devote time and resources to resolve issues not present outside of military service. A failure to act quickly can degrade an otherwise highly functioning team, as will failing to seek appropriate counsel and implementing a faulty solution. The appearance of unsteady or seemingly unresponsive leadership to Service member concerns erodes the trust that is essential to unit cohesion and good order and discipline.

The RAND study does not meaningfully address how accommodations for gender transition would impact perceptions of fairness and equity, expectations of privacy, and safety during training and athletic competition and how these factors in turn affect unit cohesion. Instead, the RAND study largely dismisses concerns about the impact on unit cohesion by pointing to the experience of four countries that allow transgender service—Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United Kingdom.¹⁴⁴ Although the vast majority of armed forces around the world do not permit or have policies on transgender service, RAND noted that 18 militaries do, but only four have well-developed and publicly available policies.¹⁴⁵ RAND concluded that “the available research revealed no significant effect on cohesion, operational effective-

¹⁴⁴ RAND Study at 45.

¹⁴⁵ *Id.* at 50.

ness, or readiness.”¹⁴⁶ It reached this conclusion, however, despite noting reports of resistance in the ranks, which is a strong indication of an adverse effect on unit cohesion.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, RAND acknowledged that the available data was “limited” and that the small number of transgender personnel may account for “the limited effect on operational readiness and cohesion.”¹⁴⁸

Perhaps more importantly, however, the RAND study mischaracterizes or overstates the reports upon which it rests its conclusions. For example, the RAND study cites *Gays in Foreign Militaries 2010: A Global Primer* by Nathaniel Frank as support for the conclusions that there is no evidence that transgender service has had an adverse effect on cohesion, operational effectiveness, or readiness in the militaries of Australia and the United Kingdom and that diversity has actually led to increases in readiness and performance.¹⁴⁹ But that particular study has nothing to do with examining the service of transgender persons; rather, it is about the integration of homosexual persons into the military.¹⁵⁰

With respect to transgender service in the Israeli military, the RAND study points to an unpublished paper

¹⁴⁶ Id. at 45.

¹⁴⁷ Id.

¹⁴⁸ Id.

¹⁴⁹ Id.

¹⁵⁰ Nathaniel Frank, “Gays in Foreign Militaries 2010: A Global Primer,” p. 6 *The Palm Center* (Feb. 2010), <https://www.palmcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/FOREIGNMILITARIESPRIMER2010FINAL.pdf> (“This study seeks to answer some of the questions that have been, and will continue to be, raised surrounding the instructive lessons from other nations that have lifted their bans on openly gay service.”).

by Anne Speckhard and Reuven Paz entitled *Transgender Service in the Israeli Defense Forces: A Polar Opposite Stance to the U.S. Military Policy of Barring Transgender Soldiers from Service*. The RAND study cites this paper for the proposition that “there has been no reported effect on cohesion or readiness” in the Israeli military and “there is no evidence of any impact on operational effectiveness.”¹⁵¹ These sweeping and categorical claims, however, are based only on “six in-depth interviews of experts on the subject both inside and outside the [Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)]: two in the IDF leadership—including the spokesman’s office; two transgender individuals who served in the IDF, and two professionals who serve transgender clientele—before, during and after their IDF service.”¹⁵² As the RAND report observed, however: “There do appear to be some limitations on the assignment of transgender personnel, particularly in combat units. Because of the austere living conditions in these types of units, necessary accommodations may not be available for Service members in the midst of a gender transition. As a result, transitioning individuals are typically not assigned to combat units.”¹⁵³ In addition, as the RAND study notes, under the Israeli policy at the time, “assignment of housing, restrooms, and showers is typically linked to the birth gender, which does not change in the military system until after gender reassignment

¹⁵¹ Rand Study at 45.

¹⁵² Anne Speckhard & Reuven Paz, “Transgender Service in the Israeli Defense Forces: A Polar Opposite Stance to the U.S. Military Policy of Barring Transgender Soldiers from Service,” p. 3 (2014), <http://www.researchgate.net/publication/280093066>.

¹⁵³ Rand Study at 56.

surgery.”¹⁵⁴ Therefore, insofar as a Service member’s change of gender is not recognized until after sex reassignment surgery, the Israeli policy—and whatever claims about its impact on cohesion, readiness, and operational effectiveness—are distinguishable from the Carter policy.

Finally, the RAND study cites to a journal article on the Canadian military experience entitled *Gender Identity in the Canadian Forces: A Review of Possible Impacts on Operational Effectiveness* by Alan Okros and Denise Scott. According to RAND, the authors of this article “found no evidence of any effect on unit or overall cohesion.”¹⁵⁵ But the article not only fails to support the RAND study’s conclusions (not to mention the article’s own conclusions), but it confirms the concerns that animate the Department’s recommendations. The article acknowledges, for example, the difficulty commanders face in managing the competing interests at play:

Commanders told us that the new policy fails to provide sufficient guidance as to how to weigh priorities among competing objectives during their subordinates’ transition processes. Although they endorsed the need to consult transitioning Service members, they recognized that as commanding officers, they would be called on to balance competing requirements. They saw the primary challenge to involve meeting trans individual’s expectations for reasonable accommodation and individual privacy while avoiding creating conditions that place extra burdens on others or undermined the overall team effective-

¹⁵⁴ Id. at 55.

¹⁵⁵ Id. at 45.

ness. To do so, they said that they require additional guidance on a range of issues including clothing, communal showers, and shipboard bunking and messing arrangements.¹⁵⁶

Notwithstanding its optimistic conclusions, the article also documents serious problems with unit cohesion. The authors observe, for instance, that the chain of command “has not fully earned the trust of the transgender personnel,” and that even though some transgender Service members do trust the chain of command, others “expressed little confidence in the system,” including one who said, “I just don’t think it works that well.”¹⁵⁷

In sum, although the foregoing considerations are not susceptible to quantification, undermining the clear sex-differentiated lines with respect to physical fitness; berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities; and uniform and grooming standards, which have served all branches of Service well to date, risks unnecessarily adding to the challenges faced by leaders at all levels, potentially fraying unit cohesion, and threatening good order and discipline. The Department acknowledges that there are serious differences of opinion on this subject, even among military professionals, including among some who provided input to the Panel of Experts,¹⁵⁸ but given

¹⁵⁶ Alan Okros & Denise Scott, “Gender Identity in the Canadian Forces,” *Armed Forces and Society* Vol. 41, p. 8 (2014).

¹⁵⁷ *Id.* at 9.

¹⁵⁸ While differences of opinion do exist, it bears noting that, according to a Military Times/Syracuse University’s Institute for Veterans and Military Families poll, 41% of active duty Service members polled thought that allowing gender transition would hurt their unit’s readiness, and only 12% thought it would be beneficial. Overall, 57% had a negative opinion of the Carter policy. Leo

the vital interests at stake—the survivability of Service members, including transgender persons, in combat and the military effectiveness and lethality of our forces—it is prudent to proceed with caution, especially in light of the inconclusive scientific evidence that transition-related treatment restores persons with gender dysphoria to full mental health.

3. *Imposes Disproportionate Costs.* Transition-related treatment is also proving to be disproportionately costly on a per capita basis, especially in light of the absence of solid scientific support for the efficacy of such treatment. Since implementation of the Carter policy, the medical costs for Service members with gender dysphoria have increased nearly three times—or 300%—compared to Service members without gender dysphoria.¹⁵⁹ And this increase is despite the low number of costly sex reassignment surgeries that have been performed so far.¹⁶⁰ As noted earlier, only 34 non-genital sex reassignment surgeries and one genital surgery have been completed,¹⁶¹ with an additional 22 Service members requesting a waiver for genital surgery.¹⁶² We can expect the cost disparity to grow as more Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria avail themselves of surgical treatment. As many as 77% of the

Shane III, “Poll: Active-duty troops worry about military’s transgender policies,” *Military Times* (July 27, 2017) available at <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/07/27/poll-active-duty-troops-worry-about-militarys-transgender-policies/>.

¹⁵⁹ Minutes, Transgender Review Panel (Nov. 2, 2017).

¹⁶⁰ Minutes, Transgender Review Panel (Nov. 2, 2017).

¹⁶¹ Data retrieved from Military Health System Data Repository (Nov. 2017).

¹⁶² Defense Health Agency Data (as of Feb. 2018).

424 Service member treatment plans available for review include requests for transition-related surgery, although it remains to be seen how many will ultimately obtain surgeries.¹⁶³ In addition, several commanders reported to the Panel of Experts that transition-related treatment for Service members with gender dysphoria in their units had a negative budgetary impact because they had to use operations and maintenance funds to pay for the Service members' extensive travel throughout the United States to obtain specialized medical care.¹⁶⁴

Taken together, the foregoing concerns demonstrate why recognizing and making accommodations for gender transition are not conducive to, and would likely undermine, the inputs—readiness, good order and discipline, sound leadership, and unit cohesion—that are essential to military effectiveness and lethality. Therefore, it is the Department's professional military judgment that persons who have been diagnosed with, or have a history of, gender dysphoria and require, or have already undergone, a gender transition generally should

¹⁶³ Data reported by the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Oct. 2017).

¹⁶⁴ Minutes, Transgender Review Panel (Oct. 13, 2017); see also Irene Folaron & Monica Lovasz, "Military Considerations in Transsexual Care of the Active Duty Member," *Military Medicine*, Vol. 181, p. 1185 (Oct. 2016) ("As previously discussed, a new diagnosis of gender dysphoria and the decision to proceed with gender transition requires frequent evaluations by the [mental health professional] and endocrinologist. However, most [military treatment facilities] lack one or both of these specialty services. Members who are not in proximity to [military treatment facilities] may have significant commutes to reach their required specialty care. Members stationed in more remote locations face even greater challenges of gaining access to military or civilian specialists within a reasonable distance from their duty stations.").

not be eligible for accession or retention in the Armed Forces absent a waiver.

C. Transgender Persons With a History or Diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria Are Disqualified, Except Under Certain Limited Circumstances.

As explained earlier in greater detail, persons with gender dysphoria experience significant distress and impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. Gender dysphoria is also accompanied by extremely high rates of suicidal ideation and other comorbidities. Therefore, to ensure unit safety and mission readiness, which is essential to military effectiveness and lethality, persons who are diagnosed with, or have a history of, gender dysphoria are generally disqualified from accession or retention in the Armed Forces. The standards recommended here are subject to the same procedures for waiver as any other standards. This is consistent with the Department's handling of other mental conditions that require treatment. As a general matter, only in the limited circumstances described below should persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria be accessed or retained.

1. *Accession of Individuals Diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria.* Given the documented fluctuations in gender identity among children, a history of gender dysphoria should not alone disqualify an applicant seeking to access into the Armed Forces. According to the DSM-5, the persistence of gender dysphoria in biological male children "has ranged from 2.2% to 30%," and the persistence of gender dysphoria in biological female children "has ranged from 12% to 50%."¹⁶⁵ Accordingly, persons

¹⁶⁵ DSM-5 at 455.

with a history of gender dysphoria may access into the Armed Forces, provided that they can demonstrate 36 consecutive months of stability—i.e., absence of gender dysphoria—immediately preceding their application; they have not transitioned to the opposite gender; and they are willing and able to adhere to all standards associated with their biological sex. The 36-month stability period is the same standard the Department currently applies to persons with a history of depressive disorder. The Carter policy’s 18-month stability period for gender dysphoria, by contrast, has no analog with respect to any other mental condition listed in DoDI 6130.03.

2. *Retention of Service Members Diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria.* Retention standards are typically less stringent than accession standards due to training provided and on-the-job performance data. While accession standards endeavor to predict whether a given applicant will require treatment, hospitalization, or eventual separation from service for medical unfitness, and thus tend to be more cautious, retention standards focus squarely on whether the Service member, despite his or her condition, can continue to do the job. This reflects the Department’s desire to retain, as far as possible, the Service members in which it has made substantial investments and to avoid the cost of finding and training a replacement. To use an example outside of the mental health context, high blood pressure does not meet accession standards, even if it can be managed with medication, but it can meet retention standards so long as it can be managed with medication. Regardless, however, once they have completed treatment, Service members must continue to meet the standards that apply to them in order to be retained. Therefore, Service members who are diagnosed with gender dys-

phoria after entering military service may be retained without waiver, provided that they are willing and able to adhere to all standards associated with their biological sex, the Service member does not require gender transition, and the Service member is not otherwise non-deployable for more than 12 months or for a period of time in excess of that established by Service policy (which may be less than 12 months).¹⁶⁶

3. *Exempting Current Service Members Who Have Already Received a Diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria.* The Department is mindful of the transgender Service members who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria and either entered or remained in service following the announcement of the Carter policy and the court orders requiring transgender accession and retention. The reasonable expectation of these Service members that the Department would honor their service on the terms that then existed cannot be dismissed. Therefore, transgender Service members who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a military medical provider after the effective date of the Carter policy, but before the effective date of any new policy, may continue to receive all medically necessary treatment, to change their gender marker in DEERS, and to serve in their preferred gender, even after the new policy commences. This includes transgender Service members who entered into military service after January 1, 2018, when the Carter accession policy took effect by court order. The Service member must, however, adhere to the procedures set forth in DoDI 1300.28, and

¹⁶⁶ Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DoD Retention Policy for Non-Deployable Service Members” (Feb. 14, 2018).

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may not be deemed to be non-deployable for more than 12 months or for a period of time in excess of that established by Service policy (which may be less than 12 months). While the Department believes that its commitment to these Service members, including the substantial investment it has made in them, outweigh the risks identified in this report, should its decision to exempt these Service members be used by a court as a basis for invalidating the entire policy, this exemption instead is and should be deemed severable from the rest of the policy.

Conclusion

In making these recommendations, the Department is well aware that military leadership from the prior administration, along with RAND, reached a different judgment on these issues. But as the forgoing analysis demonstrates, the realities associated with service by transgender individuals are more complicated than the prior administration or RAND had assumed. In fact, the RAND study itself repeatedly emphasized the lack of quality data on these issues and qualified its conclusions accordingly. In addition, that study concluded that allowing gender transition would impede readiness, limit deployability, and burden the military with additional costs. In its view, however, such harms were negligible in light of the small size of the transgender population. But especially in light of the various sources of uncertainty in this area, and informed by the data collected since the Carter policy took effect, the Department is not convinced that these risks could be responsibly dismissed or that even negligible harms should be incurred given the Department's grave responsibility to fight and win the Nation's wars in a manner that maximizes the effectiveness, lethality, and survivability of our most precious assets—our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.

Accordingly, the Department weighed the risks associated with maintaining the Carter policy against the costs of adopting a new policy that was less risk-favoring in developing these recommendations. It is the Department's view that the various balances struck by the recommendations above provide the best solution currently available, especially in light of the significant uncertainty in this area. Although military leadership

from the prior administration reached a different conclusion, the Department's professional military judgment is that the risks associated with maintaining the Carter policy—risks that are continuing to be better understood as new data become available—counsel in favor of the recommended approach.

APPENDIX O



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

[FEB 22, 2018]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Service by Transgender Individuals

“Transgender” is a term describing those persons whose gender identity differs from their biological sex. A subset of transgender persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria experience discomfort with their biological sex, resulting in significant distress or difficulty functioning. Persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria often seek to transition their gender through prescribed medical treatments intended to relieve the distress and impaired functioning associated with their diagnosis.

Prior to your election, the previous administration adopted a policy that allowed for the accession and retention in the Armed Forces of transgender persons who had a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria. The policy also created a procedure by which such Service members could change their gender. This policy was a departure from decades-long military personnel policy. On June 30, 2017, before the new accession standards were set to take effect. I approved the recommendation of the Services to delay for an additional six months the implementation of these standards to evaluate more carefully their impact on readiness and lethality. To that end, I established a study group that included the representatives of the Service Secretaries

and senior military officers, many with combat experience, to conduct the review.

While this review was ongoing, on August 25, 2017, you sent me and the Secretary of Homeland Security a memorandum expressing your concern that the previous administration's new policy "failed to identify a sufficient basis" for changing longstanding policy and that "further study is needed to ensure that continued implementation of last year's policy change would not have . . . negative effects." You then directed the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security to reinstate the preexisting policy concerning accession of transgender individuals "until such time as a sufficient basis exists upon which to conclude that terminating that policy" would not "hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military resources." You made clear that we could advise you "at any time, in writing, that a change to this policy is warranted."

I created a Panel of Experts comprised of senior uniformed and civilian Defense Department and U.S. Coast Guard leaders and directed them to consider this issue and develop policy proposals based on data, as well as their professional military judgment, that would enhance the readiness, lethality, and effectiveness of our military. This Panel included combat veterans to ensure that our military purpose remained the foremost consideration. I charged the Panel to provide its best military advice, based on increasing the lethality and readiness of America's armed forces, without regard to any external factors.

The Panel met with and received input from transgender Service members, commanders of transgender

Service members, military medical professionals, and civilian medical professionals with experience in the care and treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria. The Panel also reviewed available information on gender dysphoria, the treatment of gender dysphoria, and the effects of currently serving individuals with gender dysphoria on military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and resources. Unlike previous reviews on military service by transgender individuals, the Panel's analysis was informed by the Department's own data obtained since the new policy began to take effect last year.

Based on the work of the Panel and the Department's best military judgment, the Department of Defense concludes that there are substantial risks associated with allowing the accession and retention of individuals with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria and require, or have already undertaken, a course of treatment to change their gender. Furthermore, the Department also finds that exempting such persons from well-established mental health, physical health, and sex-based standards, which apply to all Service members, including transgender Service members without gender dysphoria, could undermine readiness, disrupt unit cohesion, and impose an unreasonable burden on the military that is not conducive to military effectiveness and lethality.

The prior administration largely based its policy on a study prepared by the RAND National Defense Research Institute; however, that study contained significant shortcomings. It referred to limited and heavily caveated data to support its conclusions, glossed over the impacts of healthcare costs, readiness, and unit cohesion, and erroneously relied on the selective experi-

ences of foreign militaries with different operational requirements than our own. In short, this policy issue has proven more complex than the prior administration or RAND assumed.

I firmly believe that compelling behavioral health reasons require the Department to proceed with caution before compounding the significant challenges inherent in treating gender dysphoria with the unique, highly stressful circumstances of military training and combat operations. Preservation of unit cohesion, absolutely essential to military effectiveness and lethality, also reaffirms this conclusion.

Therefore, in light of the Panel's professional military judgment and my own professional judgment, the Department should adopt the following policies:

- Transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are disqualified from military service, except under the following limited circumstances: (1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering into service may be retained if they do not require a change of gender and remain deployable within applicable retention standards; and (3) currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration's policy took effect and prior to the effective date of this new policy, may continue to serve in their preferred gender and receive medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria.

- Transgender persons who require or have undergone gender transition are disqualified from military service.
- Transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria, who are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all other Service members, in their biological sex.

I have consulted with the Secretary of Homeland Security, and she agrees with these proposed policies.

By its very nature, military service requires sacrifice. The men and women who serve voluntarily accept limitations on their personal liberties—freedom of speech, political activity, freedom of movement—in order to provide the military lethality and readiness necessary to ensure American citizens enjoy their personal freedoms to the fullest extent. Further, personal characteristics, including age, mental acuity, and physical fitness—among others—matter to field a lethal and ready force.

In my professional judgment, these policies will place the Department of Defense in the strongest position to protect the American people, to fight and win America's wars, and to ensure the survival and success of our Service members around the world. The attached report provided by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness includes a detailed analysis of the factors and considerations forming the basis of the Department's policy proposals.

I therefore respectfully recommend you revoke your memorandum of August 25, 2017, regarding Military Service by Transgender Individuals, thus allowing me and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to

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the U.S. Coast Guard, to implement appropriate policies concerning military service by transgender persons.

/s/ JAMES N. MATTIS
JAMES N. MATTIS

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
Secretary of Homeland Security

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APPENDIX P

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Mar. 23, 2018

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY**

SUBJECT: Military Service by Transgender Individuals

Pursuant to my memorandum of August 25, 2017, “Military Service by Transgender Individuals,” the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, submitted to me a memorandum and report concerning military service by transgender individuals.

These documents set forth the policies on this issue that the Secretary of Defense, in the exercise of his independent judgment, has concluded should be adopted by the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Homeland Security concurs with these policies with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard.

Among other things, the policies set forth by the Secretary of Defense state that transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria—individuals who the policies state may require substantial medical treatment, including medications and surgery—are disqualified from military service except under certain limited circumstances.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. I hereby revoke my memorandum of August 25, 2017, “Military Service by Transgender Individuals,” and any other directive I may have made with respect to military service by transgender individuals.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, may exercise their authority to implement any appropriate policies concerning military service by transgender individuals.

Sec. 3. (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

- (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
- (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

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(d) The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the *Federal Register*.

/s/ DONALD TRUMP
DONALD TRUMP